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PREFACE

We live in an era where communication is virtually ubiquitous. The joys
and hazards of living in a small town where everybody knows you are
quickly becoming a reality for everyone. Television, the internet, cell
phones, and a host of new communications technologies assure that anyone who does not already know you can quickly find out all about you.
Indeed, as television exposés and Internet Web sites with streaming
voice and video have revealed, if we wish, we can make everything we say
and do available to nearly everyone. This ubiquity of access to personal
communication has begun to blur the boundary of the private and the
public. What meanings and consequences do our words have in a world
in which there appears to be little that is private? Can and should our
personal lives be separate from our public rhetoric? Indeed, what connection is there between what we privately think and how we publicly
communicate with others? And what implications do our answers to
these questions have for how we interact with others as speakers and
writers?
This anthology contains sixteen essays by scholars in the fields of rhetoric, communication, and critical theory who examine the ways in which
concepts of the private relate to public communication. The first essay,
Barbara Couture’s “Reconciling Private Lives and Public Rhetoric:
What’s at Stake?,” serves as an introduction to this volume and addresses one of the central questions inherent in our attempts to reconcile private lives with public rhetoric: Does the blending of the private and the
public in speech and writing contribute to the public good? The fifteen
essays that follow Couture’s introduction employ a wide variety of disciplinary and philosophical perspectives concerning the nature of private
lives and public rhetorics, but each essay in its own way asks us to consider, as Couture phrases it, the ramifications of “saying that private lives,
identities, and values remain out of the sphere of public rhetoric and, in
contrast, in making a private value the standard for public rhetoric.”
To address the central topic of this book—the intersections and the
interactions of private lives and public rhetorics—we have organized the
chapters of this volume thematically into four segments. The first segment,
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“Public Expression Meets Private Experience,” contains four chapters
that address the complex interplay between our private lives and our
public expressions in divergent social realms such as politics, jazz, and
medicine. In the first chapter, “Ain’t Nobody’s Business? A Public
Personal History of Privacy After Baird v. Eisenstadt,” Nancy Welch examines milestone legal decisions concerning the protections of privacy,
decisions that liberalized access to birth control information and devices
and created a shift from what Welch calls the “politics of the personal”
to the “politics of privacy.” In “Virtuosos and Ensembles: Rhetorical
Lessons from Jazz,” Gregory Clark argues that the private jazz performance, although improvisational, may be understood nonetheless as a
rhetorical model that teaches us “something about how private intention can be rendered publicly useful.” In chapter three, “Keeping the
World Safe for Class Struggle: Revolutionary Memory in a Postmarxist
Time,” John Trimbur describes what he terms “revolutionary memory”
and explains how revolutionary memory might enable us to think
beyond national borders and “articulate a program to extend literacy
and the higher learning” to anyone who seeks a college education. In
the final chapter of this segment, “Mary Putnam Jacobi and the
Speaking Picture,” Susan Wells examines Mary Putnam’s personal fascination concerning the relation between word and image and how
Putnam’s experiments in visual representation reveal a medical “truth
about the tempo and structure of complex bodily processes, particularly as they were actively constructed by human beings in displays and
experiments.”
Part two of this book, “Confronting the Public and the Private in
Written Language,” concentrates directly on the problematic intersection of private experience and public expression within the academy
and within the academic disciplines that constitute our colleges and
universities. In “The Collective Privacy of Academic Language,” David
Bleich points out that “in the history of the academy, only one sense of
privacy has existed, the collective privacy of the male group,” a group
“bound together by a language few others in society knew.” Bleich concludes his chapter by arguing that this limited sense of privacy and the
privileged academic language that is allowed by this limited sense of privacy can no longer be assumed to be necessary, in that no justification
now exists “for not letting the language speak of all the constituencies
now entering the university.” Addressing issues concerning the essay as
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a genre—issues central to the discipline of English studies—the second
chapter in this segment, Lynn Bloom’s “The Essayist In—and Behind—
the Essay: Vested Writers, Invested Readers,” argues that the work of
canonical essayists is qualitatively different from the work of other essayists, and “[i]f more teachers wrote essays, or academic articles with presence that acknowledged their authorial investment, they would be better able to teach students not only the craft but the art” of the essay
genre. In the third chapter of this segment, “Upon the Public Stage:
How Professionalism Shapes Accounts of Composing in the Academies,”
Cheryl Geisler explores the ways in which writers construct professional
identities, and she argues that professionalization shapes “the very language with which we account for our work, the daily stories we and our
students tell of our progress in the academy, the stories through which
we shape our identities.” The final chapter of this segment investigates
the role of the individual within groups of collaborative writers, an issue
centrally important to a variety of academic disciplines. In his chapter
“Ethical Deliberation and Trust in Diverse-Group Collaboration,”
Geoffrey Cross argues that common trust drives successful collaboration
and that we frequently need to go beyond the logos of collaboration into
the ethos or “spirit” of collaboration.
Part three, “Public and Private Identities in Popular and Mass
Communication,” brings together three chapters that investigate the
role that personal identity and private experience play in a world dominated by popular media, especially the Internet. The first chapter of this
segment, Douglas Hesse’s “Identity and the Internet: The Telling Case
of Amazon.com’s Top 50 Reviewers,” provides a provocative analysis of
the process employed by Amazon.com to review the products sold
through its Web site. In “The Influence of Expanded Access to Mass
Communication on Public Expression: The Rise of Representatives of
the Personal,” David Kaufer investigates another aspect of mass communication. Kaufer poses the intriguing question, “What is public
expression and what properties does it confer to ordinary expression?,”
and he concludes that “our increased access through technology has
weakened the ties between ourselves as individuals and has further weakened our attention to one another’s messages.” In the concluding chapter of this segment, Marguerite Helmers, in “Private Witness and
Popular Imagination,” describes the “personal narrative of trauma,”
and she provides a remarkable analysis of several mass-media accounts
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of the 1996 “disaster season,” when several professional and amateur
climbers died while attempting to scale Mt. Everest.
The final section of this book, “The Public and the Private in the
Discipline of Composition Studies,” concentrates on the important
debate regarding what has come to be called the “personal turn” now
occurring in the areas of rhetoric and composition studies. In his investigation of this topic, Bruce Horner in “Mixing It Up: The Personal in
Public Discourse” argues that the “confusion over what constitutes the
personal . . . prevents us from more productive engagement with the personal in public discourse, in both our writing and our teaching.” In
“Cultural Autobiographics: Complicating the ‘Personal Turns’ in
Rhetoric and Composition Studies,” Krista Ratcliffe reviews the two
“personal turns” that have occurred within the discipline of composition
studies. She argues that “these two personal turns, though related, generate debates with different histories, definitions, and stakes,” and she
concludes her chapter “by imagining how autobiography theory, particularly a concept of cultural autobiographics, may productively complicate our field’s thinking about ‘personal turns.’” Addressing what he
takes to be the false distinction between public and private discourse
held by many scholars in the field of rhetoric and composition studies,
Sidney Dobrin in “Locating Public/Private Discourse” argues that the
reductive distinctions between public and private discourses often limit
our understanding of communication, and he concludes that “[a]ny
discourse, no matter what we chose to label it for the sake of convenience . . . is, then, always already public.” In the final chapter, “Public
Writing and Rhetoric: A New Place for Composition,” Christian R.
Weisser investigates some of the pedagogical ramifications of the personal turn, and he concludes with the observation that “[if] we wish to
create assignments, courses, and pedagogies that enable students to
interact more effectively with other groups and individuals in public
arenas, we could begin by considering where and to whom meaningful
and productive public writing might be delivered.”
Taken as a whole, the chapters in this volume define, dissolve, and
bridge the gaps that distinguish the private and the public as epiphenomena that have implications for theorizing and practicing rhetoric
and composition studies. These chapters also serve as an important first
step toward a better and more nuanced understanding of the intersections
and interactions between private experience and public expression, and
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perhaps more important, these chapters stand as excellent examples of
the informed, lively, and often controversial conversations that currently animate the disciplines of rhetoric and composition studies.
Thomas Kent
Utah State University

1
R E C O N C I L I N G P R I VAT E L I V E S A N D
PUBLIC RHETORIC
What’s at Stake?
Barbara Couture

“I tried it, but I didn’t inhale.” It is hard not to smile at the irony of former president Bill Clinton’s wan attempt to place himself on the right
side of the law in public when disclosing his private use of marijuana.
And the irony is doubly inflected for us, knowing—as we do now—about
his duplicitous public admission that he never “had sex” with Monica
Lewinsky. Perhaps there is no figure in American life for whom private
life and public rhetoric are more intertwined than for our nation’s president. This consequence of public life in America’s most visible office is
well known and well accepted.
Lately, the conflation of private life with public rhetoric has become
the norm for many of us in far less visible positions, with interesting and
perhaps problematic consequences. Some intrusions of public discourse
into private life are legislated and involuntary: none of us who travel by
air nowadays escape the public questions of a stranger about the contents of our baggage, questions often accompanied by a search of our
most intimate personal belongings—including our persons!—amid a
crowd of onlookers. Other such intrusions are voluntary: some of us
cheerfully encourage the ubiquitous distribution of our private dalliances in public chat rooms on the Internet, for instance.
Whether by wish or by force, there is no question that private lives are
increasingly becoming the subject of public expression. Consider the
following (far from exhaustive) list of examples:
1. The rock star Ozzie Osbourne’s family life, displayed on television twentyfour hours a day, became one of the most popular American shows.
2. A new illness, now treated by psychiatrists, is “Internet addiction”; it
involves the obsessive desire of individuals to talk about themselves in public chat rooms to strangers online.
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3. TV, radio, and Internet talk-show hosts invite individuals to review intimate details of their private lives in forums for public discussion.
4. Increased electronic access to personal data allows news services, consumer outlets, and government agencies to “learn” more about private citizens, with thousands of nameless employees tailoring services to private
individuals, often without their direct knowledge, and contacting them by
phone, mail, or e-mail.
5. Academics who teach online courses report exhaustive involvement in
public e-mail discussions of individual students’ responses—often personal—to classroom materials, discussions viewed by entire classes.

The increased forced and voluntary opportunities to make the private doings of many or most of us the subject of public rhetoric have
consequences for its function, content, and form—consequences that
not only provide topics of interest for scholars and challenges for teachers of writing and speech, but that also affect the potential utility of public rhetoric in the service of the common good.
One could argue, of course, that rhetoric, by definition, is not necessarily an art in service of the common good; by far, its most common
interpreted function is “persuasion”—with no assumption made as to
whether the goal is to persuade for good or ill. Yet in the grand tradition
of classical humanistic education, the aim of teaching the rhetorical arts
has always been and today remains to prepare students to contribute to
the public good. James Zappen, for one, made the point convincingly
over a decade ago, arguing for a “pluralistic rhetoric” in the teaching
and writing of technical and managerial discourse that encourages writers to serve organizational goals while relating decision making to the
greater good (Zappen 39).
The question for our contributors, responding in this volume to the
growing tendency to confuse and conflate private lives with public rhetoric, is this: Does this blending of the private and the public in speech
and writing contribute to the public good? Or is increased confusion
over the boundaries of the public and the private in communication a
bad thing? In the discussion that follows, I suggest that this increased
fusing of the private and public does not bode well for public rhetoric;
it does not lead to expression that contributes to the public good. In
making this argument, I will define the consequences of conflating private life with public expression, giving contemporary examples of how
public expression that is confused with private life obliterates the possibility
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of public rhetoric—that is, communication for the public good.
Referring to the scholarship of philosophers and rhetoricians, I will
argue further that public expression that functions effectively as public
rhetoric requires a reconciliation of private concerns with the ethical
demand of relating to others, concluding with some examples of
approaches to the study and teaching of rhetoric that meet this aim.
C O N F L AT I N G P R I VAT E L I V E S A N D P U B L I C E X P R E S S I O N

We have many amusing and some pathetic examples of the tendency of
some individuals to make their private lives the subject of ubiquitous
public expression. Cited earlier was the “glass house” example of Ozzie
Osbourne and his family, whose public exposure of their private lives has
led many to conclude that the rich and famous—at least those who
appear to have grown up on the same side of the tracks as we—are not
all that different. They argue, curse their spouses and children, do goofy
things, have disgusting personal habits, and harbor questionable prejudices—just like us. As Internet users, we have daily access to the twentyfour-hour “Webcams” of persons who have invited us into their rooms,
the personal Web pages and diaries of yet others, and the dominators of
public chat rooms who reveal their personal likes and dislikes to hundreds.
Such voluntary exposés of private life on the public scene are not
new: we are all familiar with the appeals of the lovelorn and love-happy
in newspaper want ads and with the occasional ebullient suitor who skywrites a declaration of love or proposal of marriage. All of these public
expressions of private business appear quite harmless, though perhaps
annoying. Yet even voluntary “harmless” exposure of private life in the
public forum can have deleterious consequences. Many find worrisome,
for instance, the talk-show exposés of Jerry Springer and Jenny Jones,
where individuals choose to reveal personal secrets before millions of
onlookers whose prurient interest is piqued by the emotional trauma
that enfolds before their eyes when the speaker’s relatives and friends
learn as we do about the speaker’s faults and transgressions.
What is common to these examples of private life revealed in public
expression is the effort to use identity as a way to reach and influence
someone else. The aim is either to erase the distinction between the
communicator and the audience—there being nothing private about
me that is not shared with you—or to confront an audience with one’s
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identity, as does the talk-show guest, revealing secrets that effectively
reduce the significance of someone else in public.
In short, this conflation of private life with public expression
demands that the audience absorb, deny, refuse, or obliterate difference, specifically what is different from the identity of the speaker. Ozzie
Osbourne’s family and the twenty-four-hour Webcam hosts have
imposed their lives on the public, giving us the options of finding ourselves to be the same as Ozzie or the Webcam host, denying or refusing
affiliation with the likes of them, or obliterating them by simply “turning them off.” Such communication of one’s private life as an expression
to the public does not contribute to a development of some shared
understanding of what it is to be human because there is no shared
effort on the part of either the exposer or the voyeur to reach a mutual
understanding of this communication.
Private life that functions as public expression in the modes just
described poses no unavoidable threat: we can always choose not to participate in the imposed assimilation of or conflict with the private identity being thrust upon us. But what happens when private lives conveyed
through public expression become representative—exclusively—of the
interests and welfare of others? In short, when a public expression of private life becomes the standard for public participation? This phenomenon has been treated by a number of prominent scholars lately, notably
by Jacques Derrida in his philosophical treatise on the ancient concept
of friendship as a form of identity politics that was opposed to democracy. In composition studies, Dianne Rothleder similarly has explored
private identity as a substitute for public expression as this substitution
figures in rhetorical theory and writing pedagogy.
In Politics of Friendship, Derrida tells us that the classical valorization of
personal friendship as a virtuous activity—one that assumes accepting a
person as a friend, unconditionally, despite his or her faults and regardless of reciprocal devotion—had a dark side that intruded upon public
political life. He explores what he claims to have been Nietzsche’s nagging question about the nature of friendship, that is, how does one
maintain a friend without having enemies, without identifying those
who are excluded from the circle of friendship? Derrida extends this
concern to the framework of public policy: to define the bonds between
compatriots as friendship is to assume that those outside this bond are
enemies of the state. The classical concept of friendship held these consequential political overtones.
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Nietzsche, claims Derrida, was also troubled by the classical conception of friendship, seeing there a contradiction that calls into question
not only the antithesis of friendship and enmity, but also by extension all
antitheses, including good and evil, truth and error. Nietzsche was
obsessed with a comment on friendship often repeated by Aristotle, and
later noted by Montaigne, that Aristotle had attributed to a sage who lay
dying: the old wise man whispers to a young friend, “O my friend, there
is no friend.” Derrida claims that Nietzsche found this comment so
intriguing because it disguises a truth about friendship as classically conceived.
The sage says to his friend that there is no friend because friendship
cannot exist without the possibility of enemies. To believe in enemies is
to hold the possibility of friendship. But a deeper truth concealed in this
phrase, suggests Nietzsche, is one far more maddening: friendship,
unconditional friendship, hides from truth. True friends ignore the
faults of one another, keeping a silence that is required to keep friends,
to close a circle against a presumed enemy. The closed classical conception of friendship involves, as Derrida tells us, “making each other laugh
about evil. Among friends” (56). We do not need to look far for contemporary examples of this kind of friendship, a friendship closed to
truth. Abuse of others handily persists in the name of friendship, by
those who count one another as friends against others: be they a nation
such as Nazi Germany, a faction such as the ultraconservative Right, or
a family that disowns a son or daughter for living a life to which its other
members cannot subscribe.
What defines this kind of friendship is a closed and singular identity,
a private circle of like minds, exclusive of others. This is what friendship
means when self and others are linked through an exclusive bond of
identity. Because it is based in loving, this kind of friendship has the
moral force of virtue—yet it is a love that categorically excludes difference. It is a love that, when practiced by many, obliterates the possibility of democracy and a public forum that acknowledges and respects difference.
The forced or voluntary display of private life as public expression
can have the same exclusionary effect as “classical friendship” when
practiced by those who claim to represent others through this display. A
striking example is the now famous spectre of Osama Bin Laden, who
has addressed the public on tape while among friends and devotees
from his home or other protected site. The chilling power of these
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messages lies in their presentation of his private identity as the emblematic representation of a virtuous friendship of the faithful that excludes
nonbelievers as the enemy. It is not insignificant that these presentations, meant to be broadcast publicly, were made in his home or barracks, exclusive of any site where a public other may reside or be
acknowledged. Through this private communication in public he has
imposed an identity on the public that speaks to and acknowledges no
one but himself and those who have become as himself. For Bin
Laden—who remains hidden or dead as I write—this private life or identity expressed in public but not interacting with the public is the standard for public interaction in the closed society he advocates; on his
terms, private life as public expression is the model for public rhetoric.
For public expression to function as public rhetoric requires a reconciliation of private identity with the ethical demand of relating to others.
This movement cannot occur if we merely substitute private identity for
public expression. And it cannot occur if we hold that our identity is
defined and preserved through excluding rather than acknowledging
others. In short, to transform private life as public expression into a public rhetoric is to transform private identity.
FROM PUBLIC EXPRESSION TO PUBLIC RHETORIC

It is important to elaborate at this point what is at stake in distinguishing
public expression from public rhetoric, that is, in distinguishing a “private life made public” from the reconciliation of private life with the ethical demand of relating to others. I have already noted that the imposition of private life through public expression can only be accepted,
rejected, or obliterated by the audience responding to such display. Such
public expression of private life allows no opportunity for a shared
understanding of identity developed through acknowledging or listening
to others, a conversation that may result in the speaker reconsidering his
or her identity in light of what is learned about others and vice versa.
One could argue that a reconsideration of identity is not needed—or
desired—in a community of speakers who are already satisfied with their
shared identity and interactions among their members. One can imagine, for instance, a small town, an industry, or an academic department
where like minds have created tight friendships based on shared identity—places where presumably no one feels excluded. Public expression
in these domains easily can be relegated to a mayor, executive, or
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department head whose private desires, beliefs, and affiliations
expressed in public are assumed to be—and, in fact, are—representative
of the group. We can imagine, for instance, a mayor who speaks for
everyone when he talks of the dangers of building a public housing unit
that will attract jobless immigrants “not like us,” an executive who strikes
in her board of directors a single chord when she calls a family-leave
plan “bad for business,” or a department chair receiving nods of
approval when he rejects a job candidate’s scholarship as lacking the test
of rigor as applied to himself and, of course, others already in the
department. We can draw a picture here of an ideal social group in
which conflict does not exist about the identity the group shares.
The problem with limiting public expression to such displays of singular identity, as these examples suggest, is not so much that the speech
reflects the homogeneous identity of the speaker with the group as that
it does not leave an opening for debate about that identity. And why is
this important? It is important because private identity accepted as public without debate poses a threat to an open society and this in turn
threatens pursuit of an ancient value that stands above identity, affiliation, and social politics—truth itself.
To forestall sidelining this argument by introducing a debate here as
to whether “truth” is obtainable, let me say that I am referring to “truth”
as it is most popularly conceived—as a commodity that a society values
as a common pursuit, that is, knowledge that reveals individual or societal motives, desires, and needs publicly without deception. Karl Popper
has elucidated most clearly the threat to public truth that exists by posing private identity or affiliation as public rhetoric in The Spell of Plato,
volume one of The Open Society and Its Enemies. To keep society open,
capable of revealing public truth, he advocates competition among individual viewpoints and warns against identity politics, that is, the tendency for individuals to “accrue privileges by virtue of membership in a specific group, whether that be defined by race, creed, politics, or profession” (153). He further warns against the uncompromising viewpoints
of radicals, who promote an aesthetic ideal at the expense of social systems and individual freedom through fanatical identification with an
idea—such as fascism, communism, or white supremacy, for instance
(see Popper 146–47).
Derrida, in his own fashion, has come to similar conclusions about
identity and public expression. In Politics of Friendship, he argues that the
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conditions for a democratic, open society could not be met in ancient
society until the conception of friendship as a closed circle of persons
who share an identity outside of which lies the enemy changed to
include others not previously defined by that shared identity.
A democracy thrives by allowing an ever-widening public circle of possible friends to develop and prosper. A democracy requires the participation of persons who are not defined by the enemy that exists without,
but rather by the anticipation of human connection of persons known
and yet unknown, across societies, space, and time. A democracy ideally
supports the reciprocal, equal participation of all in dialogue toward
public truth, a circle of possible friends—as Derrida has put it—friends
connected across the divide of space and time. We can think of all who
form a democracy as connected to that possibility of a future friend who
will answer the questions we cannot answer, uncover the public truths we
seek but cannot yet find.
Modern political democracies, like ancient democracies composed of
those who share a political bond, thrive in part on the virtue of friendship
as classically defined, a shared identity, but they are also linked “to loving,
to friendship as well as to love—more precisely, to the Greek, Jewish, and
Christian history of this link, of the binding and unbinding of this link”
(Derrida 79). Unlike classical friendship, which was based on a desire to
maintain exclusivity, modern democratic friendship is based on a constant
“binding and unbinding” of a link to others through love. The fraternization that typifies modern democracies is dependent both on the loving
that overlooks—the ancient ideal of virtuous friendship that accepts affiliation with another, regardless of what that other does—and on the loving
that looks for truth: in short, a love that hopes to find in another a better
understanding of our own lives and purpose, one that leads to a better
society. It is this latter act that requires a reconciliation of private identity
with the possibility of having that identity challenged, changed, and
expanded by virtue of contact with others in a public forum.
For the mayor, business executive, and department chair of my earlier examples, a reconciliation of private life or identity with the aim of
democratic participation in an ever-expanding fraternity of possible
friends could inspire a move from public expression to public rhetoric.
Consider, for example, that our mayor could view the immigrants’ presence in public housing as an opportunity to expand his own and his
community’s customs, languages, and beliefs; or the business executive
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might interpret a family-leave policy as an opportunity to expand the
talent pool of a workforce by bringing in more single parents and
change—for the better—the relationships of employees to the company;
or the department chair might regard a candidate’s research as groundbreaking and innovative when it differs from the norm, as presented by
the measure of his own work and that of his colleagues.
All of these rhetorical moves require the speaker to reconcile a previous conception of a private, closed identity—albeit shared—with the
needs of an outside individual or group with whom they will build a relationship, a future, that will change them both in the common pursuit of
a public good. This is the aim of public rhetoric, as I see it.
R E C O N C I L I N G P R I VAT E L I V E S A N D P U B L I C R H E TO R I C

In many ways, linking rhetoric with participation in an open, democratic society in pursuit of the public good underlies much of modern
rhetorical theory. Note, for instance, Habermas’s theory of communicative action, which links discourse interaction to moral sensitivity to the
needs and perceptions of others; Burke’s advocacy of the conversational parlor, an environment for continually renewed, healthy, and reciprocal exchange within an environment of safety; and, Rorty’s model of
building knowledge by “recontextualizing belief,” that is, exposing oneself to as many new contexts and beliefs as possible and then contributing one’s own view in reciprocal exchange (80). My coeditor and I also
have linked rhetorical practice and reciprocal, democratic participation
in our scholarship. Thomas Kent’s theory of paralogic rhetoric defines
textual meaning as the function of a dynamic interaction that involves
charitable linguistic exchange (Paralogic Rhetoric). Taking this notion yet
further, I have characterized meaningful rhetoric in public contexts as a
phenomenological outcome of altruistic attention to others (Couture,
Phenomenological Rhetoric).
In short, contemporary rhetorical theorists have fairly widely
acknowledged that if rhetoric is to serve the public good, it must involve
the reciprocal exchange of views in a charitable context. What is perhaps
less widely acknowledged is the threat to such open exchange that is
embedded in the increased opportunity to offer private life—whether
individual or community—as a substitute for public rhetoric. Also rarely
acknowledged is the threat to public rhetoric that lies in distinctly
Western notions of how knowledge is created.

10
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Although intrusions of private life in the public forum afforded by
television and the Internet are relatively new developments, the justification for making public exposé of private life a substitute for public
rhetoric is embedded deep in Western culture and continues to be
strongly advocated in rhetorical theory today. I speak here of the literary and rhetorical tradition of the “strong poet.” Those individuals who
emulate this tradition are valued for the ways in which they distinguish
themselves, separate themselves from others, in their private quest for
truth, a quest that they can choose to make—or not to make—public.
Furthermore, if the quest is made public, the strong poet who reveals his
or her beliefs ideally remains resistant to critique, valuing original, individual expression over collaborative dialogue. Such is the generally
admired behavior of the independent critic, for instance—the one who
is better than, smarter than, richer than—and, perhaps, more holy
than—others.
The rhetorical stance of the strong poet provides a significant challenge to modern theories of rhetoric that advocate democratic participation. To illustrate, Dianne Rothleder, in The Work of Friendship, tests
Rorty’s rhetorical ideal of “solidarity,” for instance, against the demands
of participatory democracy as practiced in the classrooms where we teach
children how to play, work, learn, and communicate together. In these
settings, she finds that Rorty’s rhetorical project falls short. She concludes that participatory democracy requires a transformation of private
life in the public forum, one that is in direct conflict with Rorty’s rhetorical ideal of the strong poet. Because Rorty preserves the strong poet
ideal by defining “solidarity as a public phenomenon that is kept far from
private concerns,” as Rothleder explains (xiv), he develops a negative
vision of how private belief contributes to knowledge in a public rhetoric.
For Rorty, individual genius—or the ability to create radically new knowledge—is not debated in the public forum; genius is always “other,” outside of the familiar space that the public shares. Idiosyncratic difference
and individual suffering also are circumscribed as private phenomena by
Rorty and not discussed as public issues. As Rothleder tells us: “Solidarity,
for Rorty, is based solely on each person’s desire not to have his or her
idiosyncracies judged in the court of reason” (44).
Instead of interpreting communal solidarity as the outcome of individuals communicating openly with one another, Rorty appears to
define it as the result of a common desire not to be in pain or to cause
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others pain. Consequently, he limits discussion about personal experiences that may illuminate difference to the private sphere. He advocates
reading as a good way to experience private life as others do, lacking or
even avoiding direct conversational acquaintance with them. For Rorty,
Rothleder concludes, “Others and otherness are instrumental, experimental curiosities to be experienced and then used privately. Rortian
self-creation is a negation of others, is anti-social, is friendless, and is
indeed cruel” (52).
The desire to experience difference only in private shifts public
responsibility for dealing with difference to the private sphere.
Furthermore, because difference and suffering are dealt with in the private sphere where they are personally reflected upon and interpreted by
the sole voice—that is, the strong poet—we relegate to the public sphere
only those matters about which there can be no disagreement.
According to Rothleder, Rorty assumes there is consensus about basic
values in the public sphere and “makes what might be controversial
seem entirely noncontroversial.” “Who,” Rothleder exclaims, “could
comfortably argue against freedom?” (95). In American contexts, it is
simply not a subject for debate.
Rothleder offers a new vision of public rhetoric, a rhetoric based in
friendship that fosters reciprocal engagement in knowledge creation for
the public good—the kind of rhetoric that Rorty presumably advocates,
but that is hampered by the image and presence of the strong poet.
Instead of asking students to emulate the ideal of the strong poet who
retreats from society, Rothleder encourages them to develop “friendships of play,” taking as her model the pedagogical practice and theory
of educator Vivian Paley.
Friendships of play are safe havens where individuals can share their
life stories without fear of retribution. However, the sharing of one’s life
story here does not result in conveying an obsessively pure, unchallenged, exclusive identity. Storytelling, she says in reference to Paley’s
classroom methods, must bridge the gap between private self-creation
and public justice: “My self-creation needs to be just, and justice needs
to give a turn to tell stories; I direct no cruelty to others and no one
directs cruelty toward me” (138). Yet others are free to redescribe me
and themselves in an experience that is shared, unlike Rorty’s vision of
self-narrative, which valorizes only the strong poet who is not the victim
of others’ redescriptions of themselves. (The irony, for Rothleder, is that
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those who are doing the redescribing are the very strong poets whom
Rorty admires.) By relegating these critics to the private sphere, they
remain protected from others and are never forced to engage with
them. Having to participate in the public sphere occasionally would
keep them from becoming too self-centered, but in Rorty’s vision, the
public sphere is not destined to be the place where meaningful ideas are
exchanged. Rothleder concludes: “The strong poet . . . is Rorty’s regulative ideal for the private sphere. We cannot, any of us, realize this
strength, but we are obligated to set up the world so that we can keep
trying. And we preserve the public sphere insofar as it guarantees that
we cannot withdraw completely into solipsism” (106).
In contrast to life as the strong poet, engagement in friendships of
play, as Rothleder describes them, makes it possible for us to be changed
by others through our interactions with them. She envisions rhetorical
interactions within friendships of play as scenes where we can address
private life in the public sphere without relapsing into solipsism on the
one hand or destroying our individual integrity through vulnerable
overexposure on the other. At the same time, within friendships of play
mere public expression of private life is deemed an unacceptable imposition on others; what is expected is a speaker’s transformed presentation of private life that anticipates and respects the stories of others
already told and yet to come. Moreover, the creative mission of the
strong poet is not abandoned within friendships of play. In contrast to
emulating the artist who values only his or her own depiction of the
world, within friendships of play our goal should be to become “a poet
whose creations have room for parents, for the tradition, and for
change” (Rothleder 141). Finally, Rothleder advises, we must both tell
and listen within the friendships of play: “If we only read, we are limited
by what has been written, and thus we must write and tell stories as well”
(120).
Rothleder’s appeal to transform the ancient and powerful value of
friendship into a scene for public rhetoric that will lead to good rings
true for me. The obligation to create the conditions for this kind of
interchange lies within those who “play” in forums where public rhetoric dominates: in our classrooms, in community and corporate meeting
rooms, in our Congress, and in the White House—all places where private lives need be reconciled with the ethical demand of public rhetoric
to let everyone play.
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I have outlined here just a few of the implications of relaxing and
strengthening the contrasts and distinctions between private life and
public rhetoric. This discussion began with some amusing examples of
the imposition of private life on the public scene, but it must end with a
reminder that horrific consequences of not reconciling private life with
public rhetoric are daily present. In a recent New York Times editorial,
Beena Sarwar speaks of the decision of a tribal council in a Pakistani village to have a young woman raped as revenge for a crime that her brother committed—a decree of Jirga law, which is “rooted in tribal customs
and the power of elders,” a power that the state chooses to ignore by calling these “private” matters. As Sarwar explains: “This often means, in
practice, giving this small portion of the population private power over
others, particularly women.” The state’s excuse for calling this a private
matter is that this ceding of power leads to social stability—for all those
who hold private power. Within very recent memory we have repeatedly heard our American president declare the private value of American
freedom to be the justification for invading Iraq and uprooting Saddam
Hussein. This private value, repeated as public rhetoric, is in effect
assumed to be the voice of the people—a community of like minds and
identity—and assumed to be a position unchallenged, not only by
nations other than America, but also by those living in America. Yet,
freedom demonstrably has not always had one value for all who live
here. As W.E.B. DuBois poignantly remarked: “few men ever worshiped
Freedom with half such unquestioning faith as the American Negro for
two centuries” (7), two centuries when freedom was granted only to
white Americans.
Much is at stake in saying that private lives, identities, and values
remain out of the sphere of public rhetoric and, in contrast, in making
a private value the standard for public rhetoric. It is a topic worth our
study and a problem that should continue to hold our attention as
teachers, scholars, and practitioners of public rhetoric.
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A I N ’ T N O B O DY ’ S B U S I N E S S ?
A Public Personal History of
Privacy after Baird v. Eisenstadt
Nancy Welch

For women the measure of intimacy has been the measure of oppression.
Catherine A. MacKinnon
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State

One can agree that privacy is not enough without concluding that the
choice of privacy arguments in the Roe context was a setback for
women.
Ruth Garrison
“Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction”

What is needed . . . is not the abandonment of rights language for all
purposes, but an attempt to become multilingual in the semantics of
evaluating rights.
Patricia J. Williams
The Alchemy of Race and Rights

TA K E O N E : T H E P R I VAC Y G E N E R AT I O N

Some years ago my mother told me the story of how, when she was twenty years old and the mother of two, she drummed up the courage to ask
the family doctor about something called “birth control.” “Oh, no,” the
doctor replied, “Not until you have six children at least.”
“So you were born ten months later, and your brother, fourteen
months after that.”
“And then?” I asked.
“And then your father learned the word vasectomy.”
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At the time my mother told this tale, I was twenty years old, working
in Boston, and had just gotten myself down to the Bill Baird Clinic on
Boylston Street to be fitted for a diaphragm. I didn’t tell her about my
visit to Bill Baird; there seemed little to tell. Between her story of a
humiliating exchange and my entirely unremarkable after-work appointment lay the Supreme Court decisions of Griswold v. Connecticut (1965)
and Baird v. Eisenstadt (1972). Like Roe v. Wade, soon to follow, these
landmark decisions, which liberalized access to birth control information and devices, extended the protections of privacy to (some) sexual
practices and decisions. The 125-year-old Massachusetts law that would
have shut down the Boylston Street clinic just ten years before in the
name of protecting future generations’ “virility” and “virtue” had been
overturned. When I made my appointment, words like purity and chastity were as far from my mind as my ninth-grade, Cliff Notes–assisted reading of The Scarlet Letter. (On my mind instead: would I have the money
for the $35 appointment, the diaphragm, and a tube of spermicidal jelly,
given that my secretary’s paycheck was $230 a week before taxes?) I didn’t
have to tell my mother about my appointment or why I needed a
diaphragm because I understood such matters to be private.
Out of this story—or out of this assertion that, thanks to Bill Baird
and the Supreme Court, I, unlike my mother, have no story to tell—I
might conclude that I was born into the first generation of women to
experience the lucky boon of privacy. I might celebrate the good fortune of being granted the “right to be let alone” (Warren and Brandeis)
without even having to have argued for it. There would be obvious weaknesses in such a conclusion: the Supreme Court’s refusal to extend privacy protection to lesbians and gays (Bowers v. Hardwick, 1986); the use
of the privacy argument to rule against state funding for medically
required abortions (Harris v. McRae, 1980); the erosion of geographic
and economic, as well as legal, access to birth control and safe abortions
through thirty years of legislative and extralegislative activity including
presidential gag orders, parental notification and consent statutes, waiting periods, and the shutting down of clinics. I could note these weaknesses—and the ways in which privacy rights have not been uniformly
extended to poor women, people of color, immigrants with and without
green cards, anyone receiving public assistance—and maybe, noting
these limits, I might argue that women of my generation and beyond
need to come together for renewed arguments, renewed activism.
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There’s a catch here, though, a problem with the idea that “women
like me”—white, heterosexual, and, back when I was twenty, urban and a
part of the pink-collar workforce—can agitate to extend privacy rights to
others. How does one argue—publicly—for that which has been defined
as private, outside rhetoric’s realm? The Supreme Court rulings on
reproduction between 1965 and 1979 did not, after all, expand women’s
spheres of liberty but instead marked new zones of privacy. These rulings
weren’t aimed at granting women freedom to do as they wished but instead
(some amount of) freedom from public interference and also, by implication, from public debate. Of course, I’ve felt pressed many, many times to
join phone banks, stuff envelopes, lift banners, raise my voice. But that’s
just it: I’ve felt pressed to defend that which I’ve been raised to believe
should need no defense. As a member of the privacy generation, I’ve
been raised to regard sex, birth control, and abortion rights (for starters)
as self-regarding, not other-regarding (to adopt John Stuart Mill’s classic
distinction from On Liberty)—nobody’s business but my own.
Indeed, I had no idea, until my mother told me her story, that the
right to birth control—no, the right to privacy regarding birth control
decisions—had such a recent history, more recent than, say, the nineteenth century.
Do We Have (Too Much) Privacy?

The common wisdom is that in this hypercommunicative age, the
boundaries between private and public are giving way, our sense of privacy and rights to privacy eroding. “There is less privacy than there used
to be,” write Ellen Alderman and Caroline Kennedy at the start of their
critique of contemporary publicity (xiv). If I bracket the question of who
has less privacy than before—who, historically, has been granted and
who denied privacy and according to what racial, gendered, and classed
markers—I can see plenty of evidence for this claim. At this moment, I
look up from typing to see the U.S. attorney general argue on TV for
increased wiretapping powers. I check my neighborhood Listserv and
find a posting, subject heading “Homeland Security,” that offers tips for
exercising surveillance on our street. I check the rest of my e-mail and
find half a dozen action alerts: an antiwar activist interrogated by the FBI
for her involvement in the (Nobel Peace Prize–nominated) Women in
Black, a library worker suspended for using her university e-mail
account to compose a message critical of U.S. foreign policy, a Green
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Party member prevented from flying from Bangor to Chicago because
she showed up on a computerized list as a security risk. Confronting
these encroachments upon the individual freedoms of private citizens in
the name of public interest, I can agree: there’s not as much privacy as
there used to be.
Yet even though I can see stark examples of privacy under siege, I want
to disturb the common wisdom long enough to reveal an opposite and at
least equally pressing problem that we—particularly as teachers of writing
and rhetoric within a would-be democratic society—need to address: we
don’t live in a world of too little privacy but, increasingly, too much.
Consider:
1. At the same time people lament a loss of privacy, millions of Americans
live in 5,000-plus square-foot homes in gated communities and incorporated cities (such as Disney’s Celebration, Florida) where not only public
spaces are privatized (and policed) but the social responsibilities of citizenship and government are turned over to private enterprise (see Blakely
and Snyder).
2. This privatizing trend affects virtually all areas of public life—schools,
prisons, hospitals, policing, trash collection, transportation services, and,
in the news most recently, airport security—as local, state, and national
governments “outsource” public services to private companies, transforming citizens into consumers (see Bunker and Davis; Giroux).
3. Since the 1980s companies have increasingly asserted a “corporate right to
privacy” (Gilbert, Hare, and Ollanik) to justify a growing use of confidentiality agreements in the settlements of sexual harassment, workplace discrimination, and products liability lawsuits (Ramsey, Durrell, and Ahearn;
Hans 70–111). Well known, for instance, is the 1985 California court settlement that sealed all evidence of the dangers of silicon breast implants
and thus protected manufacturer Dow Corning from publicity while thousands more women were implanted with the potentially toxic device (see
Gilbert, Hare, and Ollanik.).
4. The agents of neoliberalism such as the International Monetary Fund
have made privatization a key condition for any country seeking economic aid. As third world countries have privatized airlines, telecommunications, and energy to meet IMF mandates, U.S. and European multinationals have stepped in to scoop up these prizes—converting a country’s
public resources and services into another nation’s private property (see
Green 51).
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With these examples, it may appear that I’m conflating privacy and
privatization. Privacy is a word we typically associate with personal and
domestic realms, realms in which we may feel entitled to freedom from
observation and interference. Though the entitlements of private life
are certainly subject to periodic debate and dramatic revision—as birth
control is renamed from moral menace to private choice and as domestic abuse made the opposite shift from personal prerogative to public
crime—we most often think of private life as “self-regarding,” that is,
outside the public interest. Privatization, in contrast, we associate with
political economy and particularly as one piece of the larger trend of
neoliberalism. It would seem to be distinct from our ideas of personal
privacy first because neoliberal economic tenets are always presented as
impersonal (that invisible hand of the market) and second because,
feminism’s critique of Victorian “separate spheres” notwithstanding,
we’re still so schooled to distinguish between the (self-regarding) realm
of home and the (other-regarding) realms of market and government.
Given these usual distinctions, it might seem, then, that I’m confusing
the problem of growing economic privatization with the separate issue
of personal privacy.
Yet that’s precisely my point: the distinctions are confused, as anyone
must surely feel driving by a gated community or, maybe more to the
point, living in one. The rights of privacy, as I’ve found growing up after
Baird v. Eisenstadt, do have some liberalizing potential. It’s because of privacy rights that I could choose, as my mother could not, when to bear children or, in fact, whether to bear children. Yet these privacy rights, specifically, the right to exclude a woman’s decisions about reproduction from
public regulation and debate, have proved shaky, to the say the least. It has
turned out that the right to privacy is not really the same thing as having
full, publicly articulated and publicly defended reproductive rights and
full, publicly assisted access to exercising these rights, since our rights and
access currently are very much tied to our economic standing.
Moreover, privacy rights have also shown potential to collude with the
aims of neoliberal privatization, which, after all, likewise seeks to
exclude some or most (business/market) matters from public regulation and debate. In fact, when it comes to writing out definitions, as
Nancy Fraser points out, domestic and economic privacies wind up
sounding much the same. “The rhetoric of domestic privacy,” Fraser
writes, “seeks to exclude some issues and interests from public debate by
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personalizing and/or familializing them.” Similarly, the “rhetoric of
economic privacy . . . seeks to exclude some issues and interests from
public debate by economizing them” (Justice Interruptus 88). The
means—familializing, economizing—may be different, but the ends—
excluding a set of interests and issues from public debate—are the same.
Hence, as Fraser has argued elsewhere, if we want to get a critical purchase on this idea of privacy, we might need a shift in terms from “private” experience to “privatized” experience (Unruly Practices 135). That
shift can remind us that experiences marked as “self-regarding” are not
naturally and inevitably outside social jurisdiction but have been placed
there, raising the questions of by whom, for whom, and with what interests and aims. By thinking in terms of active, historic privatization, not
immutable privacy, we can examine how issues become privatized and
thus removed from public debate.
We can also, I think, extend Fraser’s critique of domestic and economic privacies, with their shared aims of exclusion, by considering
those uncanny moments when constructions of domestic privacy don’t
just collude with economic privatization but become indistinguishable
from it. These are moments in which our existence suddenly appears so
thoroughly economized that what we find under siege isn’t privacy but
publicity: our rights and access to a public self. Maybe I can dramatize
this sort of threat through a recent example.
The public radio program Marketplace Morning Report aired a story on
the minifinancial boom experienced by hearth-and-home stores in the
aftermath of the Twin Towers and Pentagon attacks. Amid grim reports
of falling stocks and rising joblessness, stores such as Williams-Sonoma
reported robust sales. People want to “cocoon” at a time like this (the
first day of the bombing of Afghanistan), one interviewee explained.
They feel a psychological need to “nest.” The story’s reporter, Aaron
Schacter, also went on to speculate that there may be more at work than
individual psychology. Perhaps people (people, that is, with spending
power) were shopping as an expression of their patriotism, answering
the president’s call to boost the economy. (Perhaps, I would add, such
shoppers had seen the October 15 cover of Us magazine—Laura Bush
accompanied by the bold heading “Comforter in Chief”—and understood their own feminized roles to provide domestic comfort rather than
direct or protest public policy.) Viewed from this angle, such shopping
expresses people’s strong desires to do something—protecting the
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“homeland” symbolically with duvet covers and cookie sheets. (After all,
ordinary citizens hadn’t been invited to join politicians, policy makers,
and the corporate media in shaping or debating the military attacks. We
were sent off instead to silent candlelight vigils, then to malls.) So maybe
such shopping isn’t about nesting, cocooning, or retreats into privacy at
all. Maybe it signals the very opposite: an attempt (one that ought to give
any rhetorician pause) at something like public voice, something like public
action—an attempt not only channeled into consumerism but defined
from the very start as consumerism.
A few minutes later, a news story aired on the latest threats to our privacy. I didn’t listen. I was too busy thinking about a different sort of
threat: the threat to our publicity rights, to our sense of being public
selves. When I tried to explain this issue to my husband, who is not a U.S.
citizen, he shrugged. “There’s nothing new about Americans going
shopping.”
On the one hand, I want to say there is something new about this
blunt, unapologetic championing of consumerism as the only sanctioned form of civic participation, the only way to do something other than
display a flag or give blood. (As I write, teach-in, rally, and debate are
decidedly not among the currently sanctioned forums in which to do
something.) I want to say there’s something breathtaking and terrifying
about the dropping of all pretense: the measure of America isn’t democracy but capitalism, the measure of one’s citizenship isn’t one’s participation in public decision-making forums but one’s spending in the private retail sector. Breathtaking, terrifying, what’s dropped to dust in the
aftermath of September 11.
On the other hand, if I can resist the current national chorus—the one
declaring “Everything’s changed!”—long enough to reread my own history,
I have to say my husband’s right: there is nothing new about privatization.
TA K E T W O : T H E P R I VAT I Z E D G E N E R AT I O N

Looking back, I see that my family associated privacy not only with matters of sexuality and reproduction but with just about every realm of
daily experience: religion, politics, family economics, employment and
joblessness. This reign of privacy probably had little to do with the
Supreme Court and much more to do with my parents’ upbringing in
lower-middle-class Yankee families where morality was measured by the
ability to mind one’s tongue.
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“Who did you vote for?” I asked my parents in 1972.
“Shush,” Mom replied. “That isn’t polite.”
“Are we at war?” I asked.
“No,” Mom said. “That has nothing to do with us.” Even Vietnam was
none of our business.
To be fair, I have to recognize that my parents were also products of
the McCarthy era—enough to make entire English departments stop
talking about anything but beauty and form—as well as the cold-war
dread of privacy rights violations that had produced 1984 and The Naked
Society (see Hasian, especially 97–100). They were the first in each of their
families to move away from the tiny corner of southeastern Massachusetts
where Welches, Winslows, Gauntlets, and Shoveltons had subjected one
another to daily scrutiny for more than two hundred years. Now my
mother frets that giant grocery store chains like Kroger’s and Big Bear
are tracking her purchases through her use of a membership card.
Even my father’s choice to be an on-the-road salesman—no shop
floor or office cubicle for him—appears bound up in an idealization of
individual privacy that’s so American: it’s a shock to realize that nowhere
is the right to privacy constitutionally guaranteed. (Supreme Court decisions like Roe v. Wade were argued through the constitutional guarantee
of due process, with privacy understood to be an implied or a priori
right enabling that guarantee.) When twice in six months, by two different companies in two different states, my father was laid off, we experienced the other side of privacy, the side not associated with freedom and
mobility but (as my mother had experienced in the doctor’s office years
before) humiliation and shame. Laid off is how the companies put it.
Canned, my father always said, though whether to emphasize his sense of
personal disgrace or to expose what lay beneath corporate euphemism,
I don’t know, because really this event wasn’t a matter for family discussion. Twice in one year my father came home, handed my mother a letter, and announced, “I’ve been canned.” Twice we children were sent
outside to play, then called back in, nothing more said about the matter
until the day came to pack and move. We’d have brought up sex at our
dinner table, I think, sooner than the word unemployment.
In later years—having witnessed the journey of my sister’s family from
Lincoln to Rochester to Lafayette to Columbus in a search for full-time,
not contract, employment; having listened to my university president
announce a faculty downsizing program, then counsel us to learn to live
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with “anxiety”; having witnessed with my in-laws in France what Pierre
Bourdieu later called a “social miracle”—legions of unemployed French
workers organizing to protest for increased benefits, the vast majority of
the country, feeling the insecurity of their own jobs, supporting their
aims—I would understand, finally, that these are not private, self-regarding matters. Neoliberalism. Globalization. Underemployment. If the extension
of privacy rights to (some) women appears to mark a radical break
between my mother’s experience and mine, the trend of privatization
binds us all back together.
Privatization. It’s a word I think of not only in relation to the dominant
economic paradigm since Reagan but also in relation to my own increasingly constricted and privatized world between 1978, when my vocational high school began sending me to work in lieu of classes, and 1986,
when an unusual and lucky combination of public funding and prominent, public-space advertising brought me to the University of
Massachusetts at Boston. By saying that I lived in an increasingly constricted and privatized world until I started college, I’m not invoking the
usual tale of liberal education. According to the usual tale, the university transforms the asocial or self-centered individual into a public, civicminded citizen. What I experienced was very different. My education
didn’t take me from private to public but instead offered glimpses
into—a critical purchase on—the ways in which I was already socialized
and, especially, socialized to regard virtually everything in my world as
strictly personal (and so not discussible) or strictly impersonal (and so
not discussible either). For example, in 1982 when I left my $230-a-week
secretarial job for one that paid $265, I handed my boss a neatly typed
letter of resignation. (Write a letter, the employment agency I’d visited
on my lunch hour had counseled. Keep it vague. Say you’re resigning for
“personal reasons” and refuse, on the grounds of privacy, to reveal any
more.)
“You can’t do this,” my boss protested. “We paid a lot of money for
you.” She was referring to the $230 fee they’d paid to the same employment agency for bringing me to them three months before.
“You have to give a reason,” she said. “Otherwise . . .” She looked me
up and down, her eyes coming to rest on my midsection. “Otherwise, we
have to assume the worst about you.”
When still I refused to explain, she concluded, “You can’t give notice.
Clearly we can no longer trust you. You’re fired.”
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“Whatever you think is best,” I said, and then—this is how I would
remember that moment in years to come, a denouement created more
from my reading of Carson McCuller’s “Wunderkind” than from actual
fact—I took the elevator down forty-seven floors, spun out into the
noontime world of fresh air and light.
I’ve told this story many times over the past twenty years, adding that
this boss used to follow me into the ladies’ room and dictate telexes
through the closed stall door—so much for privacy. It’s one of a dozen
or so back-when-I-was-a-secretary tales I cart about like battle honors. In
each telling, I stress how this woman regarded me as she might a cow
she’d purchased and now had doubts about, how I’d smiled right back
and then broke away—free! independent! a wily deal maker able to get herself
$35 more a week! I hope the paucity of that pay increase and the ridiculousness, or pathos, of that wily deal-maker image of myself is apparent.
Consider that Tom Wolfe at this very moment must have been gathering
material among Wall Street’s billionaire bond barons for his Bonfire of the
Vanities. Now picture me on the sidewalk outside Boston’s Hancock
Tower, rifling through my empty briefcase—leather, Aigner, a Katharine
Gibbs graduation gift from my Aunt Joan—and panicking because I
couldn’t find my monthly T pass. That subway pass cost $22, the first two
weeks of my raise, after taxes, already eaten up.
What I always leave out when I tell this tale is the perplexing question
of just why I heeded in the first place the employment agency’s advice:
Be vague, don’t mention the new job, let her think you’re knocked up if
she wants to. (Of course, I understand why the employment agency gave
me this counsel: they wanted to continue business with this company,
wanted me to invoke personal privacy as a cover for them.) Why not say,
“I’ve found a new job that pays more, and you ought to be paying more,
too”? Why not go back out into the secretarial pool and—instead of
silently picking up my briefcase and sneakers—shout, “Everyone!
Listen! There’s more money out there! Not much, but it’s a start, and if
we just band together . . .”?
The answers to these “Why not?” questions are pretty obvious: my family history joined to New Right Reaganism where employment is a personal matter of self-created success or self-inflicted failure. (For an examination of the Reagan-era semantics transforming social issues into
“lifestyle” choices, see Howell and Ingham.) As for shouting out loud,
calling on others to rally around: the very thought of this possibility
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would have overwhelmed me with embarrassment (a feeling I finally had
to confront and fight head-on when I took a public role last year in my
university’s faculty union drive). Though I’d found the final scenes of
Norma Rae thrilling, the movie 9 to 5 deeply satisfying, the idea of actually joining NOW or the Boston chapter of 9 to 5 ran entirely counter to my
Mary Tyler Moore idea of making it through by being plucky, pert, and
indispensable. Feminism? I had my diaphragm, needed nothing else.
My new boss was the treasurer for what would turn out to be a successful U.S. Senate campaign. He enjoyed hitching his thigh up on my
desk, lighting a cigar (since I smoked at my desk, I didn’t regard this as
rude, just characteristic), then telling me how politics really work: “You
pay them; they do what you want.”
“So what about me?” I asked. It was an honest question, not cynical or
sarcastic. I really wanted to know, really hoped he’d tell me. Somewhere
out there was the public world, and despite my keen discomfort at the
thought of joining anything (what if I accidentally joined the wrong
group, like the Hari Krishnas I saw every weekend in front of the
Harvard Co-op?), I wanted desperately to find that world, “a world just
a little inaccessible,” as Susan Wells writes, “like live theater or downtown
department stores” (“Rogue Cops” 326). It’s the usual story: I wanted to
do something, be someone, belong somewhere. I felt this desire especially when
the handsome man who would become Massachusetts’ next senator
came in—sailed in, really, never pausing at my desk, never knocking at
my boss’s closed door, entirely free from the usual business-office rules
of entry. Sometimes while I typed my boss’s fund-raising letters, I tried
to imagine myself as a political candidate and then, failing that, I entertained fantasies that I would become someone by becoming a writer.
“So what about me?” I asked my boss. “What can I do?”
“Ha,” he said. “That’s funny.”
It was about this time that I bought myself a journal. I still have it, one
of those cardboard-cover composition books, and it contains a single
entry: “I know I want to write but what?”
Rhetorical Questions

For as long as I’ve been in the fields of composition and women’s studies, the questions of what we and our students should write and how we
should write have been framed in terms of “personal vs. public.”
Recently, for instance, Deborah Brandt and Anne Herrington have
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argued for composition researchers to distinguish between personal
lives and public interest. It’s not the person writing or being written
about who matters, Brandt argues: “What matters are the ideas or knowledge that research yields for public use” (42) and is in the “public interest” (44). To this argument for research that serves the public interest,
Herrington adds: “We should make the choice as to what of our personal lives we feel should be made public on the basis of our own sense
of professional and political purposes” (48).
It’s tough to argue against the good of writing in the public interest.
But in my teaching and writing that’s exactly what I’ve tried to do. Or,
more accurately, what I’ve tried to do is make the classifications of public, private, personal, and social arguable. The terms public and private, as
Fraser underscores, aren’t “straight-forward designations of societal
spheres” but are “rhetorical labels and cultural classifications,” labels and
classifications that function “to delegitimate some interests, views, and
topics, and to valorize others” (Justice Interruptus 88). What counts as public interest? Whose interests are protected under the banner of privacy?
What has gone into creating our guiding sense of what to include, what
to exclude? These are crucial rhetorical questions for any class to take up.
In recent years, as I’ve sought to place these questions at the center
of my teaching, I’ve also shifted from talking with students about the
“politics of the personal” to the “politics of privacy.” That word privacy
carries with it a history that the term personal simply does not. Bound up
with privacy are stories of benefit and protection and simultaneously stories of exclusion and denial, including countless examples of how privacy rights have been used to justify the power of a husband over a wife, a
master over a slave, a boss over a worker, and North American interests
over Latin American. Though in the end, I can’t join with Catherine
MacKinnon in arguing that we should abolish the very idea of privacy,
for I’ve benefited too much from the strategic if incomplete privacy
arguments advanced through Baird v. Eisenstadt and Roe v. Wade,
However, analyses such as MacKinnon’s, my own uneasy history, and the
many stories my students bring to class keep me mindful of what the
measure of privacy has too often been. I want that tension between privacy as boon and privacy as bane in my classroom and in my scholarship.
For my classes, then, I look for texts offering prime examples of how
voices and views get “worked up” as strictly private. (This idea of looking
at how things get “worked up” into institutional categories comes from
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feminist sociologist Dorothy Smith. Her book The Everyday World as
Problematic: A Feminist Sociology provided me with the inspiration to
approach this chapter as I did: using my history as what Smith calls a
“point d’apui” for grasping the cultural construction and social regulation of privacy.) I look, too, for examples of what Fraser calls “discursive
contestation” (Justice Interruptus 86) over the highly political questions of
who gets to draw the public/private boundary. Other texts that not only
show the persistent problems of public/private boundaries as experienced in specific contexts but also how individuals and groups labor in
language to contest these categories include Patricia Williams’s critique
of the privatization of racial segregation (in The Alchemy of Race and
Rights), Fraser’s examination of challenges to the liberal model of the
public sphere in the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearing (in Justice
Interruptus), and Jacqueline Jones Royster’s detailed historical account
of African American women’s work to create democratic counterpublics
in which they could be heard (in Traces of a Stream).
With and through published examples, I also want my students to
have the means to examine and contest what’s been worked up as merely self-regarding or entirely other-regarding in their own histories. These
are, after all, writing classes I teach, and I know from that single journal
entry I wrote in the 1980s—“I want to write but what?”—that a precondition of writing is the belief that one’s experiences, perceptions, and
spheres of participation are discussible. Fulfilling that condition takes
an act of double consciousness that I’ve tried to dramatize in my
approach to this chapter and that I try to foreground in my teaching,
particularly through revision exercises aimed at filling up margins and
backs of pages with both contextual detail and analytic speculation. One
exercise, “Reseeing the Argument,” for instance, asks a writer to look
again at a draft, no matter what the genre and no matter how seemingly “personal” the approach, and to draw out in the margins the arguments this early draft may be advancing or implying. The point of such
an exercise is not to move students from “private” to “public” or from
“narrative” to “argument” but to dramatize, visibly in the margins, how
experiences and genres we’ve been taught to regard as personal and private are very much bound up in what is social, public, and arguable. The
exercise might lead a student to a revision that does indeed highlight
the teased-out argument. It might also lead a student to delve all the
more into the complexities of context.

30

T H E P R I V AT E , T H E P U B L I C , A N D T H E P U B L I S H E D

Regardless of the final product that results, what I want my students
to experience through such an exercise is a growing, heady, and also
very possibly disorienting sense of how much social history and public
debate is packed into a single rough-draft paragraph—even and especially a paragraph about a matter typically marked as merely personal. I
want them to have a sense of how hard it is to write about such a subject,
how necessary, too, to exercise real choices between the freedom from
intrusion and the freedom to articulate. The exercise of such choices in
writing isn’t enough, obviously, to unseat the dominating logic of
neoliberalism and halt the privatization of public services, public spaces,
and public issues. Much more than classroom work is needed here. But
it does mark one point of resistance, one way that teachers of writing can
refuse to participate.
T A K E T H R E E : B E V E R Y A F R A I D . B U T S T A N D U P A N Y W AY

When I started this essay, I had it in mind to argue that the much publicized threats to individual privacy in an Internet age distract us from the
real and growing threats to our democratic publicity rights. That’s an
argument I’ve backed away from, though, because the more I unpack
my rhetorical terms, the more I recognize that privacy and publicity exist
as two sides of the same coin. For example, today among my e-mails is
an ACLU action alert detailing the latest legislative proposal to defend
national security through electronic surveillance, detainment without
due process, and secret searches. (The U.S. Patriot Act has, of course,
with overwhelming and dismaying congressional support, gone on to
become law. One of Vermont’s senators even snapped a photo of George
Bush signing the act into law—a Kodak moment for his personal photo
album, I suppose.) The U.S. Patriot Act has profound and damaging
consequences for our rights of privacy. In a crucial twist, however, what
this e-mail alert emphasizes are the devastating effects these invasions of
personal privacy will have on democratic publicity: on people’s ability
and willingness to assemble, dissent, be noticed in any way. The alert
ends with this ambivalent call to public action: “Be very afraid. But stand
up anyway.”
I read those lines, remember my mother saying, “Shush. That has
nothing to do with us,” and I realize that the lesson she imparted wasn’t
specific to her own post-McCarthy era but still operates, and must be
resisted, in ours.

3
VIRTUOSOS AND ENSEMBLES
Rhetorical Lessons from Jazz
Gregory Clark

Reconciling our desire for individual freedom to act with our practical
need to establish and maintain with others a working consensus might
well be the foundational project of human sociality, and it is certainly
the reason for rhetoric. Particularly in a democratic society, this binary
structures the experience of social interaction and, consequently,
rhetorical practice. It structures conventional rhetorical practice in the
form of a conflict that is resolvable only when one element of the binary concedes to the other, or, at its most democratic, when each relinquishes enough to the other to effect a momentary compromise.
Conventionally, then, we use rhetoric to manage the ongoing confrontation of two conflicting aspirations. The familiar conflicts between
individual and collective, private and public, autonomy and consensus,
so pervades our experience that the very suggestion of fully reconciling
the two seems at least to be naive. By almost every definition we have,
rhetoric is a method for engaging, not reconciling, that conflict.
However, one definition does seem to admit that possibility, offered
some time ago by John Poulakos as a “Sophistic” definition of rhetoric:
“Rhetoric is the art which seeks to capture in opportune moments that
which is appropriate and attempts to suggest that which is possible”
(26). Absent from the terms of this definition is any reference to that
persistent conflict between our desire for individual freedom and our
need to build and maintain consensus that traditionally gives rhetoric its
form and function. Instead, these terms suggest the general shape of a
discursive practice that joins people together in activities of collectively
beneficial innovation. Rather than reconciling competing interests, the
purpose of the discourse defined here is to move its participants more
or less together from what Poulakos calls “the sphere of actuality” to an
altogether new sphere, “a place in that of potentiality” (26). Functionally,
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this notion of rhetorical practice seems to structure an alternative relationship between individual and collectivity. What, exactly, might this
relationship be? Beyond conflict, what sort of relationship between the
two is possible?
Poulakos envisions a rhetoric that would be “ultimately more persuasive” than the familiar rhetoric of conflict (29). Functionally, what he
seems to describe is an aesthetic act within which those engaged in discourse together leave the realm of the actual to imagine a new realm
comprising their common potential. But such a process remains difficult to envision using the language of the rhetorical tradition. Perhaps
Kenneth Burke came the closest when he reconceived rhetoric in terms
that rely heavily on aesthetic experience. But the problem that remains
is that the concept of persuasion is itself constituted of this conflict of
autonomy and affiliation. Using rhetorical terms, we can hardly conceptualize any other sort of discursive exchange.
But there is another set of terms, these derived from another sort of
communicative practice in which the contending opposites of autonomy
and affiliation seem, indeed, to be reconciled. That practice is the
ensemble performance of jazz music. Its reconciliation of this conflict is
observed, though not analyzed and explained, by the dean of twentiethcentury jazz critics, Martin Williams, in his history of jazz performance,
The Jazz Tradition. The book concludes with this description of what that
music can teach:
The high degree of individuality, together with the mutual respect and cooperation required in a jazz ensemble carry with them philosophical implications that are so exciting and far-reaching that one almost hesitates to contemplate them. It is as if jazz were saying to us that not only is greater individuality possible . . . but that such individuality, far from being a threat to a
cooperative social structure, can actually enhance society. (253)

And Williams himself hesitates to contemplate that possibility, offering this observation only at the end of his book. But his chronicle of
great jazz performances documents this reconciliation of autonomy and
affiliation in action. In jazz performances, neither the virtuosity of the
soloist nor the unified authority of the ensemble is subordinated to the
other. Rather, the two are inextricably interwoven and absolutely interdependent. In Williams’s descriptions, the more individually unique
and expressive the solo, the more powerful the performance of the
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ensemble. And, at once, the more cohesive and intense the music of the
ensemble, the more each soloist is enabled to perform as a virtuoso. In
jazz, the virtuoso performance is the moment when the private is made
public. The individual performer brings the resources of skill and feeling to a moment of public expression, and in jazz that moment is most
powerful when the individual performance is deeply embedded in the
performance of a group.
In the best jazz performances, the individual and the collective interact in relationships of collaboration. But collaborate is a very weak term
for describing what happens in an ensemble performance of jazz. What
I hope to explore here is the possibility of finding in jazz performance
some better terms to describe the possibilities for a positive relationship
between individuals and collectives, a relationship in which private individuals can join in a powerful public expression, together, of their individuality. Some terms that describe this aesthetic practice that, at its best,
enacts a seamless joining of individual and collective, might help us envision ways that the contentious competition of autonomy and affiliation
might be transcended in rhetorical interaction. Specifically, this “new
language” for collaboration in communication may help us envision a
rhetorical practice in which collectives are created by a project that
enables the individuals who share interest in that project to thrive. It
renders rhetorical practice a pragmatic social context in conflicts
between the private aspirations of individuals and the public performance of the group where these conflicts can be rendered productive.
DEFINITION

Poulakos’s definition suggests that considerable rhetorical power is
wielded by collective aesthetic effort in which people work together
using resources available in “opportune moments” to construct images
of “that which is possible.” And that, to most jazz critics, commentators,
and performers, is precisely the power of jazz music, a music they treat
as wielding considerable rhetorical power. At the end of his book,
Williams hesitates to contemplate the “philosophical implications” of
the stunning reconciliation of individual and collective that he witnesses in a good performance of jazz, but he does contemplate in detail its
rhetorical effect. Art, he writes, “does not reflect society and environment and consciousness so much as it tells us what environment and
society and conscious do not know.” In other words, art “reveals to us
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that there are other, perhaps opposite, but still tenable ways of looking
at things, of feeling about things. Art tells us what we do not know or do
not realize,” presenting us with “resolutions to the problems of paradox”
(253). In particular, the art of jazz
not only exalts the individual finding his own way, it also places him in a fundamental, dynamic, and necessary cooperation with his fellows. It handles
paradox—the paradox of emotion but also the paradox of thinking and
doing—in ways that perhaps no other music has. It does not deal with
absolutes, and it does not deny the relative function of time. (256)

The individual finding his or her own way within a “fundamental,
dynamic, and necessary cooperation” with others and individuals working together through shared paradoxes, using the resources made available by a particular place and time, together constitute jazz performance. However, they also constitute rhetorical practice, at least by its
more dialogical definitions. And in that sense, rhetoric functions aesthetically in the same way that, according to Williams, jazz does.
Although rhetorical interactions merely reflect “society and environment and consciousness,” they can also produce innovations that, as he
puts it, tell “us what environment and society and conscious do not
know” as, like jazz, they reveal “other . . . ways of looking at things, of
feeling about things” (253).
Like rhetoric, jazz is perhaps best defined in terms of its functions
rather than its forms. By function, I mean both how the practice itself—
whether rhetoric or jazz—prompts people to interact as well as the
effects of those interactions on their participants. This focus on function
is readily apparent in many definitions of jazz—those, for example, from
one of the most articulate of contemporary jazz musicians, Wynton
Marsalis. When asked by an interviewer to define the essence of jazz,
Marsalis first listed three central elements that, he noted, “have nothing
to do with music.” The first is “play”—that primarily aesthetic experience of making something new from something else. The second, which
immediately follows from the first, is a “desire to play with other people.”
The third is what success in the second requires—“learning to respect
individuality” (Scherman 30). And that is learned in the practice of
improvisation, which, along with the rhythm of swing and the harmonics of the blues, is conventionally one of the three formal characteristics
of jazz music. “Classical music doesn’t prize improvisation,” Marsalis
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notes. “It doesn’t place a premium on individuality. In jazz the point is
to achieve your identity on your instrument, no matter what role you
play” (31). However, that individuality is most fully expressed when jazz
improvisation occurs within the common project of an ensemble where
individuality must be made accessible to and usable by cooperating others. At its best, then, jazz improvisation “mediates” individualities but
does not diminish them. Marsalis describes swing—that rolling rhythmic
jazz feeling that resists any musical notation—as the “great mediator” of
the individuality in a jazz performance as each participant both internalizes and expresses this common feeling (interview 2000). The crucial
fact is that the ensemble swings best only when all of the participating
individuals swing together.
Another definitional discussion of jazz—this one from Martin
Williams—resonates more immediately with the terms of rhetorical theory. Also emphasizing its function over its form, Williams observes:
“Jazz knows of no absolutes: there is no one ‘best’ way of performing a
piece. Each day, each moment has its way, and hence its own meaning”
(251). So a jazz performance is always contingent, always an expression
of the situation within which it occurs. But within that situation, successful performers function as fully and integrally human: “To a jazz
musician, thought and feeling, reflection and emotion, come together
uniquely, and resolve in the act of doing.” That is because what jazz
demands from each performer is a “spontaneous individual invention
of new melody, individual articulation of emotion, and individual interpretation of musical sound.” Yet the success of the performance itself
depends entirely “on group cooperation”—on the capacity of these performers to devote their individuality to “collective ensemble improvisation” (252). For Williams, as for Marsalis, jazz is more than music—it is
an occasion in which individuals are at their best as they enact community by directing their private goals toward the public purposes enacted
in an ensemble performance. For Williams, “jazz not only exalts the
individual finding his own way, it also places him in a fundamental,
dynamic, and necessary cooperation with his fellows” (256). For
Marsalis, who tends to define jazz in rhetorical terms, jazz is participation in a conversation (Scherman 35); specifically, it creates “harmony
through conflict, like a good, hot discussion”—one in which individuals are both transformed and unified by each other’s influence
(Marsalis and Stewart 146).
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Jazz, like rhetoric, does the aesthetic work of inventing new ideas
through collective interaction. Like participants in a rhetorical
exchange, performers in a jazz ensemble are cooperative and competitive at once in ways that render the two complementary. But unlike rhetoric, in the best jazz, the separate work of those individuals is almost perfectly coherent, suggesting that the conflicts of autonomy and affiliation
that are inherent in most social encounters might be rendered productive for the individuals and the collectives that comprise them. That is
what seems to happen when a great jazz ensemble performs. As Martin
Williams explains, “It is as if jazz were saying to us that not only is far
greater individuality possible to man than he has so far allowed himself,
but that such individuality, far from being a threat to a cooperative social
structure, can actually enhance society” (252–53). Ralph Ellison was
more specific about what that process would entail:
True jazz is an art of individual assertion within and against the group. Each
true jazz moment . . . springs from a contest in which each artist challenges
all the rest, each solo flight, or improvisation, represents . . . a definition of
his identity as individual, as member of the collectivity, and as a link in the
chain of tradition. Thus, because jazz finds its very life in an endless improvisation upon traditional materials, the jazzman must lose his identity even as
he finds it. (36)

The language of Christian transformation is deliberate here. Ellison
explains that after learning the fundamentals of the instrument and the
music, the performer “must then ‘find himself,’ must be reborn, must
find, as it were, his soul. All this through achieving that subtle identification between his instrument and his deepest desires which will allow
him to express his own unique ideas and his own unique voice” (60–61).
That language seems to exalt the private individual—but it is a private
individual already rendered public. The unique self expressed by a fully
formed jazz musician is not the autonomous self that first entered the
ensemble. That self has been transformed by the experience of the
ensemble’s performance. Writer Albert Murray describes how this transformation happened to the members of Duke Ellington’s orchestra, an
ensemble where “each solo participant fulfills a role that is as immediately distinguishable as a character in a story.” That could only occur,
however, after each was transformed by what Murray calls “the Ellington
process.” Playing in that ensemble “did not reduce musicians to robots.”
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Instead, as he says: “[It] brought the very best they had in them. Indeed,
in almost every instance, the musician found himself being featured
before he himself realized that he had something special to offer” (111).
Students of rhetorical theory will detect elements of Kenneth Burke’s
very important redefinition of rhetoric in this description of what happened to the individuals who joined Ellington’s ensemble. As a cultural
critic and social theorist, Burke—a contemporary and compatriot of jazz
music—lived through all but the last seven years of the American twentieth century. It was a century that saw countless wars, more acts of genocide than anyone would care to count, and the creation and use of
weapons capable of ending human existence altogether. Burke witnessed all that. By the third decade of the century he had already
defined his lifelong project of articulating a communicative method that
would enable people to move themselves toward “the purification of
war,” as he put it at midcentury in the epigraph to A Grammar of Motives.
Simply put, he worked to describe a mode of interaction that would render human conflicts constructive rather than destructive. Summarizing
the method at midcentury as “dialectic,” a concept and term borrowed
from classical philosophy and rhetoric, he described interactions that
would encompass both “the competition of cooperation, or the cooperation of competition” (Grammar 402–03). The outcome that would follow from that sort of exchange is, in his preferred term, “transcendence.” In one of his more precise descriptions, transcendence is “the
building of a terministic bridge whereby one realm is transcended by being
viewed in terms of a realm beyond it” (“I, Eye, Aye” 151). For Burke, that
aspiration to build a bridge from what is directly to what might be is universally human. We all have a need to “stretch forth our hands through
love of a farther shore”—a place where we might consider things “in
terms of a broader scope” than our own (163). That entails a transformation of individual identity and private ambition, as people leave interactions with others understanding themselves and their place in a
shared world differently than they had before.
Rhetoric redefined in this sense extends well beyond a discursive
genre to encompass a kind of interpersonal relationship. In this sense,
rhetoric describes relationships in which selves are mutually transformed
by the influence of each other. This is what Burke meant by rhetoric—a
mode of relationship that enables the transformation of self that follows
from a dialectical encounter with others. Here is Burke’s redefinition:
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If I had to sum up in one word the difference between the ‘old’ rhetoric and
a ‘new’ . . . I would reduce it to this: The key term for the old rhetoric was
“persuasion,” and its stress was upon deliberate design. The key term for the
new rhetoric would be “identification,” which can include a partially “unconscious” factor in appeal. “Identification” at its simplest is also a deliberate
device, as when the politician seeks to identify himself with his audience. In
this respect, its equivalents are plentiful in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. But “identification” can also be an end, as when people earnestly yearn to identify themselves with some group or other. Here they are not necessarily being acted
upon by a conscious external agent, but may be acting upon themselves to
this end. (“Rhetoric” 203)

The term persuasion suggests one individual dominating another, the
sort of relationship assumed by traditional rhetoric. But the term identification suggests a genuine sort of intimacy shared among interacting individuals—even, it seems, a momentary experience of communion. That is
the place at which Burke’s revisionist rhetoric is distinctly different from
the traditional. “In such identification,” he continues, “there is a partially
dreamlike, idealistic motive, somewhat compensatory to real differences
and real divisions, which the rhetoric of identification would transcend”
(“Rhetoric” 203). Living through the twentieth century, Kenneth Burke
saw unthinkable destruction caused by difference and division, as well as
by the most insidious of communions. So he focused his attention on the
project of explaining how individuals are transformed by a community.
This, he hoped, would enable them to seek the right sort of communions.
That is the “idealistic motive” that directed his work.
Burke’s definition of rhetoric significantly expands the category. In
his A Rhetoric of Motives (1950), he described as rhetorical any encounter
that prompts a “persuasion ‘to attitude’”—a description that extends the
term beyond the traditional concept of “persuasion to out-and-out
action” by treating attitude itself as “an incipient act.” It also extended
formal notions of what counts as rhetoric, noting that defining rhetoric
as “persuasion to attitude would permit the application of rhetorical
terms to purely poetic structures” (50). Indeed, for Burke, the “simplest
case of persuasion” is more precisely a kind of human relationship than
it is a rational argument: “you persuade a man only insofar as you can
talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, attitude,
idea, identifying your ways with his” (55). So rhetoric remains a matter of
persuasion, but the experiences it includes are so diverse and pervasive
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that the term is hardly useful. Essentially, rhetoric is what happens when
individuals interact and, through the influences of that interaction,
come to understand themselves and their connections to others differently. The consequence of rhetoric is a new identity, individual and collective. This outcome constitutes the experience of playing in a jazz
ensemble that Ellison described, and of the “Ellington process” that
transformed individuals into virtuosos by integrating them into the
ensemble. This process seems to be what Marsalis was getting at when he
said that “the ultimate achievement in jazz music is the interplay of distinctive personalities through . . . a musical form [within which] the
group establishes its identity” (Marsalis and Stewart 148).
For Burke, then, rhetorical power resides in the full range of relational experiences that comprise a life in society, life constituted of
“rhetorical situations” that shape the identities of those who share them.
The shaping forces there are those others who are “participants in a
common situation” as well as “the words one is using and the nonverbal
circumstances in which one is using them” (“Rhetorical Situation” 263;
my emphasis) that together provide a common set of “resources of identification” (267). Simply put, individual identity is constituted from the
resources of social experience as the private self is continually re-created in response to engagement with the public other. In Burke’s words,
it “may involve identification not just with mankind or the world in general, but with some kind of congregation that also implies some related
norms of differentiation and segregation” (268). And the experience of
jazz performance suggests that it is in the context of this congregation
that individual identity becomes most rhetorically powerful and socially
productive.
I M P R OV I S I N G I D E N T I T I E S

Kenneth Burke’s redefinition of rhetoric as identification rather than
merely persuasion entails a particular definition of identity: “Personal
identity comes to a focus in the complex of attitudes . . . that constitute
the individual’s orientation (sense of ‘reality’ with corresponding sense
of relationships)” (Permanence 309–10). For Burke, identity both encompasses and expresses an individual’s role in the social world. And rhetoric is always about transforming that identity—for better or for worse.
For Burke, the study of rhetoric is the study of “the rhetorical constitution of the subject” within human relationships (Wess 136). That is the
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project of inquiry into the origin of human motives that he developed
as “dramatism.” Dramatism focuses on the actions and social roles of
individuals, a study Burke extended when he began to explore “constitutional relations” as a way of understanding the mutual influences of
individuals and groups. The aging Burke once briefly explained this
aspect of his project in these terms:
. . . I having gone from my first book of critical theory (Counter-Statement),
built around the subject of literary form in such texts as the plays of
Shakespeare to my realization that our Constitution is a literary form. And
quite as Shakespeare’s literary forms were “enacted” in historical situations
largely non-literary, so the Constitutional principles, or ideals, or wishes
involve enactments in the largely and ever-changingly extra-Constitutional
situation. (letter)

Indeed, near the end of his life (for example, his 1989 talk at the
Conference on College Composition and Communication, titled
“Speaking on Language and Power”), Burke was locating this study of
constitutional relations at the center of his lifelong project of envisioning a more constructive engagement of individual and collective.
Burke defined a constitution as “an enactment of human wills”
(Grammar 323) that addresses a collective for the purpose of establishing
the common ground upon which the individuals who comprise it will
interact. Consequently, constitutions are intensely rhetorical, functioning
primarily as “hortatory” (332) assertions of a collective identity that
demands something of the individuals addressed. In effect, they constitute
identity, individual as well as collective. As Burke put it, “in actual point of
fact, a Constitution is addressed by the first person to the second person”
(360), and when people adopt a constitution—when they acknowledge
individually its address and in that process accept the identity it imputes
(Charland 138)—they “in their present person . . . address commands to
their future person” (Grammar 361). Burke uses the U.S. Constitution as
his primary example of that fundamental sort of rhetorical act.
The first words of its preamble, “‘We, the People,” demonstrate that
the primary rhetorical function of the Constitution is to articulate to a
collective of individuals their identity as a community. That is the task of
a constitution, to unite diverse people in a common identity that is at
once philosophical and practical. A constitution addresses the people
whose individual and private identities it makes public by attributing to
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them all the collective identity of “the people.” As one rhetorical theorist puts it, “the people” is a rhetorical reality that remains in existence
only so long as the rhetoric that describes it has force (McGee 345).
Burke’s work suggests that this constitutional function can follow from
many communicative forms—from policy documents, shared narratives,
even nondiscursive social practices. Whatever the form, each reconstitutes individuals by addressing them as a part of a “people,” an address
that asserts a “new version of collective life” with which they should
aspire to identify (Grammar 347). So this sort of rhetoric addresses individuals in ways that reconstitute them as members of a community that
shares perspectives, values, commitments, and projects. And that constitutional process is necessarily ongoing.
In the case of the U.S. Constitution, that ongoing process proceeds,
as Kenneth Burke and contemporary jazz critic Stanley Crouch both
observe, through the process of amendment. Crouch notes that by mandating a mechanism for its own revision, “the Constitution recognizes
that there may be times in the future when what we now think of as hard
fact might be no more than nationally accepted prejudice” that needs to
be eliminated from national policy (All-American Skin Game 10–11). That
rhetorical process of amendment, central to the survival of that
Constitution and the nation it constitutes, mirrors the practice of
improvisation in which the conflicting identities of individual and group
are rendered complementary in the performance of jazz music. As
Crouch puts it, “perhaps no society so significant has emerged over the
last five centuries that has made improvisation so basic to its sensibility”
(15). And it is probably not coincidental that the culture that has sustained itself into a third century by an amendable constitution is also the
culture that created jazz music. When Crouch writes that “jazz is an art
in which improvisation declares an aesthetic rejection of the preconceptions that stifle individual and collective invention” (16–17), that
“jazzmen” provide a model for “how freedom and discipline could coexist within the demands of an ensemble improvisation” (17), and that
what characterizes jazz virtuosity above all is “the ability to make musical
sense during the act of playing” with a group, he describes a sort of civic
interaction to which the structure of their constitution invites U.S. citizens to aspire.
Essentially, improvisation in a successful jazz ensemble enacts a practical ideal of democratic citizenship. It requires people to work constructively
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with paradoxes, uniting the dichotomies of tradition and innovation as
well as of individual and collective. “The demands on and the respect for
the individual in the jazz band puts democracy into aesthetic action,”
writes Crouch.
Each performer must bring technical skill, imagination, and the ability to create coherent statements through improvised interplay with the rest of the
musicians. That interplay takes its direction from the melodic, harmonic,
rhythmic, and timbral elements of the piece being played, and each player
must have a remarkably strong sense of what constitutes the making of music
opposed to the rendering of music. (15)

In the process of jazz performance, then, individuals can confront
and resolve conflicts that construct human experience in general and
are perhaps intensified in an American experience. At least, they can
resolve them “aesthetically.” In jazz, writes one of its scholars, “expressions tending toward complete formal freedom have always been placed
within well-respected structures,” one demonstration of its “successful
joining of invention and order” (Lichtenstein 229). An aesthetic resolution is not actual, practical resolution. But it can be instructive, suggesting what reality might become. Indeed, the aesthetic explores alternative futures that address present needs and aspirations. And in jazz,
innovation is born out of the aesthetic resolution of problematical opposites—freedom and discipline, virtuoso and ensemble, invention and
order, private and public.
TO WA R D A J A Z Z R H E TO R I C

But jazz is not rhetoric. Jazz, as Stanley Crouch recently put it, “is an art,
not practical politics” (interview). And practical politics, as Aristotle and
many others have observed, is precisely what much of rhetoric is about.
Given that definitional disjunction, is there any value in this project of
looking to jazz performance as a model for an alternative sort of rhetorical interaction? I think that depends on how we define art. When Albert
Murray writes about jazz as an art, he draws upon Burke’s definition and
describes art as a particular kind of “equipment for living,” one that provides “images, representative anecdotes, emblems that condition us to
confront what we must confront, and it disposes us to do what we must
do.” For Murray, then, jazz fits that functional definition of art, and he
concludes that the sort of interactions that produce jazz music in a “jam
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session” may be the best “representative anecdote” for life in the United
States, a term he borrows directly from Burkean rhetoric (112). In that
situation, “the musician is always engaged in the dialogue or a conversation, or even argument. . . . He achieves his individuality by saying ‘yes
and also’ to that with which he agrees, and by saying ‘no,’ or in any case,
‘on the other hand,’ to that with which he disagrees” (113). This rhetorical vocabulary is being used to describe the art of jazz. Jazz is not politics, but it is an intensely collaborative art that models modes of individual interaction that have a potential to improve our social and political
life. Consequently, it is worthwhile to examine jazz and to do so in terms
of how it is made. As the pianist Bill Evans once put it: “Jazz is not a
‘what,’ it’s a ‘how,’ and if you do things according to the ‘how’ of jazz,
it’s jazz” (Mehegan 150).
Jazz is made democratically. Its varied and infectious rhythms, its simple and memorable harmonies, its canon composed largely of the familiar melodies of American popular song rendered anew for each new situation—all draw upon resources of common experience. And jazz is
democratic in its social functions. For Wynton Marsalis, that function is
to reach people at a common root of rhythm and song and invite that
part of them to a “gathering place” (interview 2001). There, those who
have the skill and experience improvise an expression of themselves as
a productive community using the resources they find available at the
time and place of their gathering. And there, those without the skills
gather to listen, transcending their inherent isolation and separation as
they share together a very accessible and inviting aesthetic experience.
They not only listen to the music but also move along with it, once filling dance floors and now, much more subtly, nodding heads and tapping feet and fingers all together.
Jazz enacts a mode of sociality that intensifies individuality and, at the
same time, propels the process of creating community. But that, ideally,
is precisely what rhetoric would do. A great jazz performance prefigures
a rhetorical interaction that would enable people to encompass and
transcend the conflicts of competing selves in order to create from the
potential chaos that is inherent in any group of individuals something
unified in beauty and order that is satisfying to all. And jazz does that in
the moment that this creation is needed, and using the resources at
hand. Jazz improvises order out of chaos, cooperation out of conflict, art
out of the everyday. That improvisation is what every jazz musician must
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be prepared to enact. And it is also, increasingly it seems, what every citizen must be prepared to enact as well. Especially in a time when new situations continually surprise us. In an hour, the crime of hijacking
became a mode of genocide and, for millions, the world changed. This
new world required individuals actively to become a society, and it
required that society immediately improvise ways to return order and
meaning and direction to the common life that the individuals who
compose it must share. Perhaps now more than ever before we need to
learn the civic lessons that jazz can teach. Now, more than ever, we need
to attend to, in Crouch’s words, “what jazz has done, with its improvising
attention to the details of memory, imagination, experience, passion,
and design.” What it has done “is make the velocity of creation equal to
that of destruction” (All-American Skin Game 144). Now rhetoric and politics must do that as well.
This attempt to find in jazz a set of terms we might use to recast our
concept of rhetorical interaction in ways that will enable us to do that
has produced only one term, improvisation. And it is a very general term
with much implicit within it. But it offers a starting point for thinking
about resolving the conflict of individual and community in ways that
conventional terms of rhetoric don’t allow. But thinking that through
will be difficult. It is difficult for the best of jazz musicians. Bill Evans was
a piano virtuoso whose trio aspired to an improvisational ideal that
would transcend the turn-taking exchange of most of his contemporaries. “I’m hoping the trio will grow in the direction of simultaneous
improvisation,” he wrote, “rather than just one guy blowing followed by
another guy blowing. If the bass player, for example, hears an idea he
wants to answer, why should he just keep playing a background?” (liner
notes, “Portrait”). He envisioned “the very provocative revelation of two,
three, four, or five minds responding simultaneously to each other in a
unified coherent performance” (liner notes, “Conversations”). But this
ideal was unstable in practice, perhaps because it is finally difficult for
individuals to “respond simultaneously to each other in a unified coherent performance.” In fact, this statement of Evans’s vision is from the
liner notes to a recording in which three pianos improvise together,
each played by Bill Evans on overdubbed tracks.
Occasionally, Bill Evans’s trio achieved the ideal of “simultaneous
improvisation,” but it may have been, finally, inadvertent, in the
moments when these three custodians of their separate egos each lost
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themselves at once in their ensemble performance. But it clearly was not
for those moments that Bill Evans preferred playing in trios. Late in his
career, when asked about that preference, he replied:
Well, for me it’s a very pure group. But primarily, I’m more in control of the
music. I can shape the music and I state the theme, I keep the flow going . . .
and it becomes a totally musical experience for the group and also the audience. If I just added a horn—now, I enjoy playing with horns; I record with
horns frequently—but that’s the main reason. Even if I use one horn, it
changes the whole concept, because then, the thematic statements and all
are out of my hands. (interview)

Yet for me, one of Bill Evans’s most powerful performances of jazz is
given that power precisely at the moment when a horn takes all that out
of his hands. The performance begins with his solo piano playing his
poignant composition, “Waltz for Debbie,” a song about a beloved little
girl grown up and gone. I was alone when I first heard it, listening during a long day of driving, and lamenting the loss of my own little girls to
adulthood—until Cannonball Adderly’s saxophone, backed by a bass
and drumset, picked up the song from Evans’s piano and he joined their
ensemble in an swinging testament of gratitude for the past and hope
for the future that entirely transformed my mood. Evans was a virtuoso
whose lovely opening solo prompted me to lonely reflection. But when
the ensemble took the song out of his hands and he was no longer playing alone, I found myself moving to the music and thinking about how
and when to get together with my daughters again.
The aesthetic experience of listening to this jazz performance was,
for me, a powerful rhetorical experience as well. And Kenneth Burke’s
claim that rhetoric is primarily an experience of identification suggests
that the aesthetic and rhetorical are not entirely different experiences.
Indeed, Burke’s first book, Counter-Statement, was written to counter conventional notions of the aesthetic by examining the rhetorical functions
of the sort of “art” that “deals with life for a great many people” by “symbolizing” for the individuals it addresses “such patterns of experience as
characterize a great many people” (191). Some twenty years later, his
Rhetoric of Motives similarly countered conventional notions of rhetoric,
described there as that vast “intermediate area of expression that is not
wholly deliberate, yet not wholly unconscious”—an expansive realm of
communicative symbols that occupy an intentional space “midway
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between aimless utterance and speech directly purposive” (viii). Clearly,
jazz performance does not provide a usable model for argumentation or
a practical method for conflict resolution. It does not teach us very
much about the rhetorical formation of public policy. But it does teach
us something about how private intention can be rendered publicly useful. And it does model interactions—and attitudes toward interaction—
that acknowledge the extent to which individuals are necessarily interdependent, and the extent to which their success is dependent upon
their cooperation as they make their separate ways together in the
world.

4
KEEPING THE WORLD SAFE FOR
CLASS STRUGGLE
Revolutionary Memory in a Post-Marxist Time
John Trimbur

In the last few months, I have gone to demonstrations against the “war
on terrorism” and rallies on behalf of a living wage for Providence city
workers. I attended a public hearing of the Workers Rights Board—a
grassroots organization of trade unionists, clergy, and community
activists—to investigate the conditions of undocumented workers in
Rhode Island’s fish-packing industry. I’ve made phone calls, written letters and e-mails, signed petitions, and raised money for a workers’ housing project in South Africa. To be honest, I don’t consider myself much
of an activist these days. Instead, I see my participation more as acts of
solidarity with the struggles of working people worldwide, to stay connected to the tradition of revolutionary Marxism that has shaped my way
of understanding the world for nearly forty years now.
I am grateful to the editors of this volume for providing the occasion
to think about how personal affiliations influence public rhetorics and
published work. To do this, I want to shift away from the autobiographical questions of why I—as an individual—take part in the public rhetorical performances of the demonstration, the petition, and the letter of
appeal or how I’d like my published work to push my field of study, rhetoric and writing, to the left. A more interesting question, as I see it, is
why would anyone remain a Marxist in an apparently post-Marxist time.
The answer, I hope to show, is that Marxism, in the first instance, is a tradition to keep revolutionary memory alive.
Now, I must say at the outset that the account I present of Marxism as
an endangered tradition of revolutionary memory runs counter to what
you read in the newspapers. After all, if you believe the syndicated
columnists, op-editorialists, and cultural commentators ever since
Richard Bernstein coined the term political correctness and set off a moral
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panic about leftist “thought police” putting free speech, white males,
and the Western tradition under siege on college campuses, you might
well think that American universities are dominated by Marxist ideologues. Through the culture wars of the 1980s and 1990s, writers at the
Weekly Standard and New Republic, not to mention radio talk shows and
fringe Web sites, refashioned the anticommunism of the cold war era to
turn it on radical literary critics, feminists, and multiculturalists, finding
an infiltration of alien and anti-American ideas in the academy at just
the time the old Soviet threat seemed to be fading away.
I do not mean that this ideological struggle to discredit leftist ideas—
and to deflate the pretensions of postmodern scholarship—is just a matter of the opinion makers needing an enemy, an other, a species of “unAmerican activities” to delineate a coherent, mainstream version of the
American nation-state. There really was and continues to be something
genuine at stake in the culture wars, as this country tries to understand
itself as a pluricultural, polyglot, racially mixed, and complexly gendered society in the vortex of a globalized economy that is everywhere
making and remaking the relations between working people and international capital. There is no question that a cultural Left did indeed
form in American universities during the 1980s and 1990s, joining race,
class, and gender to continental thought in its various poststructural
manifestations. The resulting mix of cultural studies, feminism, critical
race theory, queer theory, and postcolonial theory produced an invigorating effort to rethink teaching and learning and research and curriculum in the American academy, drawing generational and ideological
lines in departments and fields of study that divided, often in painful
and conflictual ways, traditional scholarship from the new thing and
called into question the very meaning and nature of intellectual work.
Writing and rhetoric were no exceptions, and I doubt that you will be
surprised I consider all of this a good, even remarkable, development,
an altogether fitting response to a national culture dominated by the
free marketeering, deregulating ethos of the Reagan/Bush/Clinton
administrations, the now burst bubble of the “new prosperity,” and the
social irresponsibility of “personal choice” (for the consuming classes)
and “personal responsibility” (for the poor). Nonetheless, I must hasten
to add that what the cultural Left did not do, despite all the charges of
Marxist hegemony on campus, was to prepare a fertile ground for the
revolutionary Marxism of the Old Left.
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This is not to say that the academic cultural Left did not draw on
Marxism for theoretical insights to maintain a properly cultural materialist attitude and approach. Rather, the cultural Left appropriated
Marxism from a post-Marxist perspective, a sensibility that is not anticommunist in its allegiances but is not exactly devoted to class struggle
or the historical mission of the proletariat, either. To my mind, two decisive events shaped the post-Marxist sensibility of the academic cultural
Left: the emergence of postmodernism as a pervasive structure of feeling in the 1980s and 1990s and the fall of the Stalinized worker states in
1989. I want to look at each in turn to explain what I see as the present
position of revolutionary Marxism in contemporary intellectual life.
As everyone knows by this point, the characteristic sensibility ascribed
to postmodernism—its catchword slogan—can be found in Lyotard’s
“incredulity toward metanarratives.” This incredulity, it is crucial to
note, does not amount so much to an outright repudiation or disproof
of modernist metanarratives, such as the Marxist tale of the emancipation of the working subject, though it is sometimes, mistakenly in my
view, taken this way. Instead, Lyotard’s postmodern incredulity is a distancing mechanism that props up modernism by making us “post” to it.
This sensibility, for example, is not at all like The God That Failed days of
the 1950s and McCarthyite anticommunist witch hunts, when writers
and intellectuals who had been party members or fellow travelers
denounced Marxism through public confessions and reintegrated into
Eisenhower’s America. As a rule, postmodernism does not produce
renegades such as the notorious provocateur David Horowitz, who has
turned infamously from his Old Left background and the New Left
activism of Ramparts magazine, the antiwar movement, and support for
the Black Panthers into a red-baiting gadfly. On the contrary, postmodernism offers an ironic detachment that puts the keywords of Marxism
in quotes, unavoidable perhaps for the analysis of contemporary culture
but never quite spoken with a straight face.
The second decisive event, the fall of the Soviet Union and the
Eastern European workers’ states in 1989, intertwines with the postmodern sensibility to discredit further the historical legacy of revolutionary Marxism. At face value, it seems hard to lament the fall of the
Stalinized workers’ states, with their secret police, gulags, psychiatric
prisons, and totalitarian regimes. Still, it should be pointed out how the
results of 1989 have affected working people and the oppressed not only
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in Russia and Eastern Europe but worldwide. What occurred was not
simply the collapse of a parasitic bureaucracy but a victory for capital
internationally. Russian and Eastern European workers are paying dearly for the sins of Stalin and his successors. Instead of ushering in a new
era of democracy and freedom, the fall of the Iron Curtain has made
available to the world market the socialized property that Stalin and his
henchmen maintained at least in a degenerated form, thereby instituting a kind of anarcho-capitalism that is breathtaking in its corruption
and venality. Moreover, the fall of Soviet Union and its sphere of influence removed a critical buffer between the third world and the capitalist metropolis, clearing the way for the imperialist expansion of NAFTA,
GATT, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade
Organization. The possibility of neutrality, national autonomy, and
indigenous development once imagined in Nehru’s India, Nasser’s Arab
socialism, Nyerere’s Tanzania, or postapartheid South Africa has been
profoundly constricted. To put it bluntly, the bosses are winning the
class struggle worldwide.
Combined with the Reagan/Bush offensive against labor, the equation of the stock market’s performance and national well-being during
the Clinton years, the conservatism of the American trade union movement, and the absence of a workers’ party in the United States, postmodernism and the fall of the Soviet Union can be seen as an actual and
psychological Thermidor, a waning of revolutionary energies and the
hope for social transformation. In this context, Marxism does not seem
revolutionary or dangerous but corny and sentimental, left over from a
prior time with little relevance to the present. Unlike the 1930s, when
writers, intellectuals, and workers turned to Marxism as a guide to theory and practice—or even the early 1970s, when a fraction of antiwar New
Leftists regrouped into Old Left tendencies, whether the Communist
Party or Trotskyist and Maoist sects—Marxism appears not so much to
have been overturned as to have withered away.
So why remain a Marxist in this post-Marxist world? As I mentioned
earlier, the continuing pertinence of Marxism to our current situation
can be described best in terms of revolutionary memory, the desire to
keep alive the Marxist romance of history where socialism looms as not
just the overthrow but the culmination of capitalist development, the
design of a social future dedicated to the elimination of scarcity and the
full participation of all in determining our common life. As I see it,
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revolutionary memory constitutes the psychological “interior” of
revolutionary Marxism, where it figures as a personal and affective
investment in the long-deferred dream of an international workers’
commonwealth. For Marxists, theory amounts to the codification of past
struggles, and revolutionary memory in turn embodies theory at the
level of lived experience. There is a certain nostalgia, to be sure, that
inflects revolutionary memory, not a wistful longing for a lost past but a
personal affiliation with past struggles that seeks to realize their meanings and potentialities. To put it in rhetorical terms, revolutionary memory is a storehouse of knowledge—the lessons of the past that link memory, the fourth canon of rhetoric, to invention of a better future.
By convention, Marxism is often divided into its humanist and scientific wings, with the early Marx of the Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts and The German Ideology counterposed to the late Marx of
Capital. In certain respects, of course, this is a useful distinction to map
the terrain of Marxist thought, but it misses nonetheless the actual “interior” of revolutionary Marxism I am trying to describe. It may be easy
enough to see how the humanist side of Marxism, in the work, say, of E.
P. Thompson, Raymond Williams, or Richard Ohmann, extends Marx’s
vision of eliminating alienation, exploitation, and oppression and of
replacing the individualist fragmentation and self-interest of bourgeois
society with what Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto calls an
“association, in which the free development of each is the condition for
the free development of all” (53). But even the “scientific” designation
must be seen as part of the pathos of Marxism, where the term scientific
refers to neither the chilling power of a Stalinist bureaucrat nor the supposed disinterestedness of the bourgeois technocrat but instead to a
process of immersing oneself, experimentally, in a history of struggle.
The “science” of revolutionary memory begins, in my account, not with
the desire to manage or observe but with the desire to make history, as
Marx says, in conditions not of our own making. This kind of optimistic
experimentalism is all the more valuable today when history appears, in
fact, to be going in the wrong direction.
Let me put it a different way. Revolutionary memory is a Januslike,
backward- and forward-looking maneuver that links lives to lives in the
history of actual struggle. Revolutionary memory universalizes the particular moment when one does not cross a picket line, when one
observes a boycott or goes to a demonstration by linking that moment
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to past picket lines, boycotts, and demonstrations. It makes one accountable
to the struggles and sacrifices of the past—the Paris Commune in 1870,
the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917, the Spanish Civil War, the
Hungarian uprising in 1956, the Chilean Unidad Popular in the early
1970s, and the antiapartheid movement in South Africa. Revolutionary
memory provides access to a tradition of heroes and martyrs, gains and
betrayals, in an unfolding and now endangered narrative of emancipation.
This “interior” of Marxism, I should be quick to note, has its own historical circumstances. It has long been an axiom among liberal historians and social scientists that the appeal of Marxism in the United States
is in large part due to the fact that it offers deracinated intellectuals, displaced immigrant workers, and others caught up in the turmoil of social
change a way to deal with the demands and uncertainties of modernity.
In this view, Marxism provided a means of acculturation for immigrants
to the United States in the first half of the twentieth century to adjust to
the new world of the capitalist metropolis, in the ethnic class cultures of
industrial cities. Similarly, the “class treason” of Marxist intellectuals during, say, the Great Depression is often pictured as an alternative path of
upward mobility, when other outlets were blocked for economic reasons.
At one time, when I was studying American history as an undergraduate
and graduate student, I thought this liberal view of Marxism’s appeal
was the worst kind of psychological reductionism, which made its revolutionary tradition of theory and practice into a compensatory gesture.
But today, I must say, there is an important grain of truth here, though
one that needs to be reformulated.
My sense is that, indeed, the “interior” of Marxism—the felt sense of
revolutionary memory I’m trying to delineate here—does provide intellectuals, workers, and others with a means of dealing with the limits and
pressures of modernity. But I want to highlight the positive side instead
of the negative connotations. In other words, given the flux, fragmentation, and loss of traditional beliefs in the modern era (the shift from
gemeinschaft to gesellschaft in the literature of the social sciences), I
believe Marxism offers in the first instance not so much a compensatory
gesture as a constructive reidentification. The uprootings of modernity,
in which, as Marx says, “everything that is solid melts into air,” brought
with it the conditions to imagine a larger human community—no
longer the family, neighborhood, village, or even nation-state but the
bonds of working people worldwide.
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Revolutionary memory is inseparable from revolutionary internationalism, the belief that workers have no fatherland and only their
chains to lose. This is the profound (and poignant) side of “scientific”
Marxism, that points out how unfettered capital creates simultaneously
a world market and an international proletariat whose historical mission
is to transcend national divisions and to remake the world. To my mind,
revolutionary memory depends on this commitment to the international solidarity of working people. The precedents are clear enough: the
revolutionary internationalism of Lenin and Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg
and Karl Liebknecht, and Eugene Debs during World War I, which held
to the traditional Marxist view that war among the capitalist nation-states
was no more than a matter of dividing the world market and political
spheres of influence. The revolutionary internationalists, unlike their
former comrades in the Second International who supported the war
aims of their respective nations, urged intellectuals and workers to see
they had no stake in the conflict among ruling classes.
At a time when the United States has embarked on a “war against terrorism” whose aims and boundaries are difficult to determine, it is helpful to recall this principled opposition. Don’t get me wrong. It is hard to
see the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center as even a
deformed response of the oppressed and exploited to American hegemony. Certainly, the conditions of the attack have been prepared by
such U.S. policy as the Gulf War, the blockade and bombing of Iraq, and
the tacit and explicit support of Israel’s refusal to grant Palestinians selfdetermination. But, to me, the upshot is simply “commit a crime, do
time.” I’d even be willing to accept extraordinary police measures to
bring the terrorists to trial—in an international court and not Bush’s
kangaroo military tribunals. But the bottom line, as I see it, is that working people have no interest in this war.
This volume of essays, of course, is not the place for my personal views
of current events; it is about how personal affiliations and public
rhetorics, in my case what I describe as revolutionary memory, influence
published work. What remains to be seen—and what I take up in the
next section—is how revolutionary memory influences the questions I
think are important in my field of study, rhetoric and writing.
First of all, the revolutionary memory I describe suggests a particular
orientation toward postmodernism in the realm of cultural and rhetorical theory. As anyone who reads the journals in rhetoric and writing
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knows, postmodernism has turned into an honorific term, a warrant to
distance intellectual work from the supposed illusions of modernism,
whether Enlightenment rationality, the autonomous subject, or the historical mission of the proletariat. If anything, the label “modernist” has
become a convenient and now thoroughly conventionalized rhetorical
gesture to critique, discredit, and dismiss. In my view, however, postmodernism does not offer the theoretical leverage it claims. Instead,
postmodernism must be seen as an intellectual, artistic, and cultural
trend within modernity, not the articulation of a new historical epoch
but a sign of the persistence of late capitalism.
From this vantage point, there is less than meets the eye to postmodernism. Its postiality, when linked to such notions as globalization, postcapitalism, postindustrialism, post-Fordism, and postnationalism,
amounts to a type of presentism that mistakes conjunctural developments (such as the unprecedented incorporation of information into
the means of production, the shift from manufacturing to service
economies in the metropolis by outsourcing production to the third
world, niche marketing, and flexible specialization) for deeper, underlying changes in the relations between capital and labor. For Marxists,
postmodernism’s characterizations of the present moment are not only
insufficient historical accounts but implicitly an accommodation to the
current lull in the class struggle internationally. Revolutionary memory
enables the view that it has not been changes in the “objective conditions” of capitalism that have blocked the path to socialism so much as
it has been the defeats of the Left (in France in 1968, in Chile in 1974)
and the consequences of Stalinism in 1989 that have bottled up revolutionary energies.
The now common claim that globalization has dramatically changed
economic relations through the transnationalization of capital, rendering national markets and economies irrelevant and creating in their
place an interconnected world economic system of immediate communication and exchange, ascribes to late capitalism a capacity it simply
does not possess. As Paul Smith says, globalization embodies a kind of
magical thinking: of a “fully global space replete with an ecstatic buzz of
cyber communication,” an “instantaneous mobility of people, goods,
and services,” and a “global market place hooked up by immaterial
money that flashes around the globe many times a minute”—a world
where time and space have been overcome and the “necessary navigational
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and communicational means so fully developed and supremely achieved
that they can eclipse even reality itself” (13).
Behind such millennial dreams of a new postcapitalist, posthuman
order, the very notion of globalization remains what Samir Amin calls a
“reactionary utopia,” a neoliberal fantasy that the world market can
overcome the contradictions inherent in capitalist production. For all
the breathlessness in theories of postiality, what appears to be a novel
rupture with the past is, in fact, capitalism’s familiar and relentless urge
to maximize profits by revolutionizing the means of production. Despite
the tendency toward universalization inherent in capitalist development, as Amin puts it:
Capitalist globalization remains truncated, generating, reproducing and
deepening global polarization step by step. The historical limit of capitalism
is found exactly here: the polarized world that it creates is and will become
more and more inhuman and explosive. (75)

Globalization does indeed seek to dismantle national borders for the
free circulation of capital—but not of human beings or the products of
their labor. The Marxist contradiction between use value and exchange
value remains a key site of struggle, as is evident, for example, in the
pharmaceutical industry’s attempt to maintain patent rights and intellectual property claims against AIDS-stricken third world countries’
demand for affordable generic drugs to alleviate human suffering. In
this regard, the revolutionary memory of international solidarity—the
imaginary community of working people worldwide—can remind us
that the choice is still, as Trotsky put it in the shadow of fascism and
World War II, “socialism or barbarism.”
The fascination with postmodernism in rhetoric and writing studies,
I must say, is both understandable and alarming. It is understandable
because postmodernism, as an intellectual and artistic trend within
modernism, is interesting in its own right. Postmodern notions of
hybridity, border crossings, and nomadic subjectivities, for example,
provide important correctives to orthodox Marxisms by showing how
complicated racialized and gendered identities figure in the dynamics of
class formation and reformation. Along similar lines, only the sternest
Stalinist commissars of culture would deny the pleasures of such postmodern artists and architects as Cindy Sherman and Frank Gehry. In
this regard, I agree with Trotsky in Literature and Revolution that the
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experimentalism of the artistic avant-garde, and not a narrow socialist
realism, must be encouraged and appreciated.
Still, as you have probably detected, I want to hold such postmodernism at arm’s length—and to subject it to the scan of revolutionary
memory. There are two problems I find insurmountable. First, as I’ve
already suggested, postmodernists posit a break with the past that makes
revolutionary memory irrelevant. Its aggressive presentism wants to style
history as rupture and discontinuity. Second, this desire to see the present as novel and unprecedented, instead of as the product of a knowable
past, reveals the interests of a particular fraction of the professional
managerial class—the consultants, artistic directors, information designers, editors and publishers, media specialists, human relations staff, public relations experts, and trend watchers, whose perspective is cosmopolitan, politically liberal, consumerist, gentrifying, and relentlessly hip.
These are the sign and symbol managers in the culture industry and the
information economy, professional semioticians whose cultural capital
resides in their ability to interpret and explain. In certain respects, the
predispositions of this postmodern fraction of the professional managerial class have insinuated themselves into curriculum design and textbooks for writing instruction, especially the cultural studies approach to
composition, with its emphasis on the student as a knowing consumer,
viewer, and spectator, and community service learning, with its emphasis on doing good work for the less fortunate.
Revolutionary memory calls for something different than informed
and critical consumerism or community service learning. Both are important but inadequate alone. The critique of consumerism, for example,
threatens to lead not to a reevaluation of production for profit instead of
for human needs but to a hipper advertising message, what Robert
Goldman and Stephen Papson call the production of sign values by
addressing alienated and media-savvy spectators. Along similar lines, community service learning may well reinforce an old story of middle-class
benefactors providing for the needy instead of leading to a critical and
active understanding of class formation in contemporary America. I do
not mean to suggest that either outcome will inevitably follow from these
pedagogical and curricular practices. My point is that without the international solidarity of revolutionary memory, both cultural studies and
community service learning remain at risk of accommodating critique
and service to the postmodern middle classes’ bid for cultural authority.

Keeping the World Safe for Class Struggle

57

What is to be done? That is the question Lenin posed when the revolutionary forces in czarist Russia split into Bolshevik and Menshevik
camps. I do not pretend I can answer this question in any kind of satisfactory way, given our present circumstances in contemporary America.
But Lenin’s insistence on intellectual elucidation and ideological clarification can be useful here. Within the confines of my field of study, I
want to close by raising the issue of access to higher education and
advanced literacy.
Rhetoric and writing studies have been shaped in many respects by
the long-standing allegiance of writing instructors, theorists, and program administrators to democratic education, in particular to the aspirations of basic writers and to affirmative action and open admissions
programs. Mina Shaughnessy’s Errors and Expectations, the work of David
Bartholomae and Patricia Bizzell, Mike Rose’s Lives on the Boundary, and
Tom Fox’s Defending Access all affirm the educability of ordinary people
and attack the class privilege of higher education. These works have
played a central role in defining the identity and social affiliations of the
field. Still, as the title of Fox’s book indicates, we find ourselves currently fighting a defensive battle against a conservative backlash that has
restricted access in the name of “standards.” In my view, this is a necessary struggle, but it can also be one that keeps us in a holding pattern,
trying to preserve the limited gains of the past, and it wears people
down. For this reason, I believe there is an urgent need to articulate a
program to extend literacy and the access to higher learning.
There are various ways to do this. At elite colleges and universities,
the demands to institute need-blind policies and end legacy admissions
can be raised to point out the class bias in the supposedly meritocratic
premises of “selectivity.” In a broader sense, given the unaffordability of
private college for poor, working-class, and many middle-class families
and the tracking system in higher education that distributes resources
and life chances unequally to community colleges, state colleges, liberal
arts colleges, and research universities, I think we should demand the
right to a college education for all who wish it by democratizing higher
education “through open admissions to all colleges and universities, free
tuition, and a livable student stipend” (Trimbur, “Literacy” 294).
At least, as you can see from this citation, that is what I wrote over ten
years ago, and I hold to its relevance today. The idea of overturning the
prevailing class system of higher education, of course, is not a popular
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one, but to my mind, the issue is a matter of socializing education by
removing it from the “free market,” in which colleges and students compete with each other, and making it a thoroughly public and democratic institution. Such a demand, moreover, provides a way to point out how
existing social arrangements in capitalist America cannot realize the
most basic democratic task of educating all its inhabitants—native-born,
documented, and undocumented—according to their talents and
needs. Teaching in community colleges and adult literacy programs for
recent immigrants, I have been struck forcefully over and over again by
how class society wastes human potential and popular intelligence
through its divisions of mental and manual labor, experts and laypeople,
official and vernacular literacies. Class society not only erects barriers to
the development of all its members, it also amounts to a system of subsidizing the children of the professional and upper classes. The issue, I
am trying to persuade you, is not simply that this is unfair but that it
also—and crucially—means we cannot solve the problems of poverty,
exploitation, oppression, and environmental degradation that face us
because we cannot activate the human ingenuity required. I have no
doubt that the needed ingenuity is there and that it can be tapped. But
to do so, I believe, would involve thinking beyond national borders, and
that is why the revolutionary memory of international solidarity—the
vision of how working people worldwide can remake society—gives me
some measure of hope in an otherwise dark time.

5
MARY PUTNAM JACOBI AND THE
SPEAKING PICTURE
Susan Wells

Mary Putnam Jacobi was a remarkable nineteenth-century physician and
medical researcher. As a writer and speaker, she was always fascinated by
the promise and difficulty of seeing the inside of the body, of representing dynamic bodily processes. Since medical illustration is a relatively
well-documented field (Cazort, Kornell, and Roberts; L. Dixon;
Herrlinger; Jordanova; Petherbridge and Jordanova; Roberts and
Tomlinson; Rousselot; Stafford, Body Criticism), an analysis of Jacobi’s
practices of visual representation can help us trace the relation between
her personal absorption in such images and the ways they are used to
construct scientific facts.
We can conveniently begin by recalling two stories Jacobi told about
failed encounters with the human heart. Jacobi dated the beginning of
her medical career from a discovery she made in the family stables at the
age of nine. The discovery is reported in a family memoir, written in
1902:
I found a big dead rat and the thought occurred to me that if I had the
courage I could cut that rat open and find his heart which I greatly longed to
see. I had it in the corner of the stable but in the course of the day, thinking
of this my courage failed me but with the sophistry of childhood I didn’t propose to back out of this venture on my own initiative but put the responsibility on my little mother as often afterward. That evening I told my mother
what I proposed to do hoping to elicit an expression of admiration at my daring. Instead I only aroused her fright and disgust and she promptly forbade
me to touch the rat. I professed great disappointment but I was secretly
[excessively?] relieved at the forcible delay of my anatomical studies. (autobiographical manuscript 5)

Not until Mary Putnam had persuaded her parents to let her leave
home and attend medical school at the Women’s Medical College of
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Pennsylvania would she be sanctioned in her desire to see inside the body
and learn what those images might say to her about health and sickness.
Jacobi wrote her second story of an inaccessible heart some seventeen
years after her discovery of the rat, in 1868, while she was a medical student in Paris. Paris had provided Jacobi with a densely woven fabric of
connections, linking her scientific and political interests with her personal life. So close were these connections that, for Jacobi, privacy and
publicity were mutually determinative. Her politics, her friendships, her
very presence in the medical amphitheater were all interdependent. In
Paris, Jacobi was a very busy young woman, attending all of the lectures
she could manage and writing extensive anonymous reports on Parisian
medicine for the New York Medical Record. Of these reports, medical historian John Harley Warner observes: “It is quite possible that Putnam,
during her time abroad, wrote more on Paris than any other nineteenthcentury American physician—in private letters, in professional journals,
in popular periodicals, and in newspapers” (328). Her interests were not
limited to medicine: she participated in the politics of the Commune and
supported herself with additional journalism, and, in her spare hours,
wrote fiction and political essays. Within that context, Jacobi’s short story
“A Martyr for Science” returned to the theme of the hidden heart.
In this story, a physician mourning his wife and child becomes fascinated by his own death and undertakes a project of opening his own chest
to display his beating heart. He trains a young medical student and pressures him to comply with the project: the physician will be paralyzed with
woorara; his chest will be opened with acid cautery (a process expected to
take several days); and his heart will be exposed, for at least a short period. The student will therefore become the first person to study the action
of a beating heart. The heart itself is understood, and presented to the
reader, as mysterious, tantalizingly close but irreducibly invisible. In its
published form, the story ends with the student consigning his mentor to
an insane asylum—the youth, like Mary Putnam’s disgusted mother,
stands between a potentially self-destructive desire to see and the desire’s
object. Seeing, for Jacobi, carried the thrill of the forbidden; in these stories, the heart, never seen in life, can be invoked verbally.
Jacobi was not the first person to puzzle about the relation between
word and image. Since the Renaissance, an exceptionally vivid or
provocative picture was seen as “speaking,” while a very good poem
could hope to work on the reader’s imagination as if it were a picture,
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ut pictura poesis. And some of the more interesting forms of visual culture—emblem books that juxtaposed pictures with poems, allegorical
paintings, book frontispieces, map cartouches—as well as a group of
very interesting literary genres—place poems, shaped poetry, travel writing—investigate these boundaries between text and visual representation, between delight and instruction. While the concept of the speaking picture risks reducing words and images to a thematic lowest common denominator, it also draws our attention to the connections
between words and images, to their specificity as forms of representation. Medicine has traditionally explored those boundaries: the sixteenth-century emblem books often included images of the heart or the
skull that anatomists reworked for their own books, adding new mottoes
and explanatory texts (Cazort, Kornell, and Roberts 30). Nor is the idea
of a speaking picture completely archaic: in John Law and John
Whittaker’s account of how they designed a graphic representation of
current research on acid rain, they speak of the need to make a picture
that would, “so far as possible, make some qualitative sense . . . [; the
image] should, as it were, ‘tell a story’” (168).
Medical writing has drawn on what Simon Schaffer calls “literary
technologies,” which include “the design and use of instrumentation,
the social organization of the scientific community and the assignment
of credit and status,” to give verbal representations the force of images:
these mediating devices seemingly transform the text into a direct representation of the working of nature. Such technologies “help fashion
the bearer of knowledge as authoritative and competent, and the item
of knowledge as independent from the contingencies of human judgement.” According to Schaffer, literary technologies “make authors and
they make facts” (183). Mary Putnam Jacobi made facts and made herself as an author by using the technologies available to her, particularly
by traversing boundaries between text and image. Jacobi was deeply
interested in literature, and although she does not seem to have had any
talent at visual art, she had a strong interest in visual representation.
While Jacobi hated having her own picture taken—we have only three
photographs of her—she was intrigued by the emerging technologies of
visual display.
She wrote a great deal throughout her medical life—her bibliography
includes nearly 140 items—and her medical writing was always marked
by vivid and precise description. She was never one to leave the
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Figure 1. Mary Putnam Jacobi, circa 1863. The
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard
University.

resources of a genre in the relatively undeveloped state in which she
found them, and so her writing was also marked by formal experimentation, by a search for new ways of presenting complex information. Very
often, those experiments focused on ways of presenting visual information, of mediating between word and image. It would be wrong to celebrate Jacobi as particularly adept or artistic in her use of images: the
illustrations in her books and essays are in themselves unremarkable.
But her practices of representation, in both writing and in oral performance, tell us a great deal about how medical writing developed as a
specific professional and disciplinary form in the late nineteenth century, and they complicate our understanding of how that form was gendered
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and how it was developed by particular writers. In that development, the
writer’s singular desire intersected with new medical practices of visual
representation.
Steven Peitzman calls Mary Putnam Jacobi “probably the most brilliant
of America’s nineteenth-century women physicians” (27). After finishing
high school, Jacobi cast about for her life’s work—in the mid-nineteenth
century, women did not exactly look for careers. She did some private
teaching and tutoring; during the Civil War, she traveled to Union-occupied New Orleans to nurse her sick brother, and she preached to the
“contraband” escaped slaves. Throughout her late teens and early twenties, she struggled with the evangelical beliefs her beloved grandmother
had encouraged, finally declaring herself a “disbeliever” but resolving to
abstain from the theater and the opera for ten years to prove that her disbelief was not motivated by a desire for amusement (Life and Letters 58).
She studied chemistry and attended lectures at the New York Pharmacy
School, eventually prevailing upon her father to allow her to attend the
Woman’s Medical College of Pennsylvania, reminding him of the “large
liberty” that had always marked their family life (110).
The new Woman’s Medical College and young Mary Putnam were not
well matched; the school’s atmosphere of Quaker piety and its openness
to irregular medical practices tried her patience. Unlike more compliant early students, she applied to take her examinations after hearing
the course of lectures for only one year: the faculty met several times on
her case and wrote to New York for confirmation that she had attended
lectures there. Mary Putnam, never very punctilious with institutional
regulations, produced a scattered collection of lecture tickets, made
some rude comments about the quality of lectures at the Pharmacy
School, and turned in the second Latin medical thesis the Woman’s
Medical College faculty had seen. The faculty passed the thesis
around—there is no evidence of it having been read through by anyone—and admitted Mary Putnam to examinations, which she passed. A
few days later, Dean Edwin Fussell wrote a letter to the faculty protesting
this action. He summed up his reasons: “And, lastly, firstly and all the
time—because in my opinion we are not therein true to our own professions—we violate our long published standard of rules—degrade the
College, injure the cause in which we labor—give reason to our enemies
to rejoice at our dereliction, and to our friends to mourn over our weakness” (Woman’s Medical College minutes, March 10, 1864).
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In later life, although Jacobi participated in the Woman’s Medical
College Alumnae Association, she was sometimes critical in her accounts
of the school, describing its early students, for example, as “really, and
in the ordinary sense, illiterate,” a charge that was simply not true
(“Woman” 162). When she finally was permitted to register as a medical
student in Paris after graduation from the Woman’s Medical College,
she was completely taken with her education, attending lectures and
clinics at various hospitals, training herself in therapeutics and in the
techniques of anatomical preparation. She also negotiated a visually rich
environment: Paris was rich in wax models, celebrated for adept anatomical preparations, and also the center of publication for massive,
detailed, anatomical atlases (Roberts and Tomlinson 538). Putnam
became politically active through her friendship with the Réclus family
of anarchists–after she overcame her shock at seeing Mme. Réclus clearing the table herself. Her friendship with the Réclus family brought her
into the political life of the Paris Commune; she handily survived the
siege of Paris on jam, wine, chocolate, and coffee, reassuring her mother that as long as these were provided, “one can not be very miserable”
(Life and Letters 276). The Commune interrupted Mary Putnam’s medical studies, but the bloody repression that followed—and perhaps the
end of her engagement to a communard soldier—led her to finish her
degree quickly and return to New York, where she taught at the
Blackwells’ school, the Woman’s Medical College of the New York
Infirmary.
The seventies and eighties were an enormously productive time for
Mary Putnam. She published widely, entered a broad range of professional societies, and successfully joined the world of New York’s academic and clinical elite medical institutions. Mary Putnam married
Abraham Jacobi, a German socialist physician, one of the defendants in
the Cologne Communist trial, who was practicing medicine in the
German neighborhoods of the Lower East Side and also making his own
way into the scientifically active professional associations of New York
physicians. The two physicians shared commitments to the emancipation of women, scientific research, and radical politics. In New York as
in Paris, Jacobi’s professional life and her personal relationships were
densely interconnected.
Recognition came quickly to Jacobi. She won the Boylston Prize for
medical writing in an anonymous competition, became an honored
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member of the faculty of the New York Medical College, was inducted
into a bristling handful of honorary professional societies, and published in the most prestigious journals. Her research broadened in
scope: she followed her book On the Use of the Cold Pack Followed by
Massage in the Treatment of Anaemia, an obvious, if tacit, critique of S. Weir
Mitchell’s work, which had been published in 1877, with a compelling
collection, Essays on Hysteria, Brain Tumor, and Some Other Causes of
Nervous Disease in 1888. She treated C. P. Gilman, the author of “The
Yellow Wallpaper,” with a regimen of structured intellectual work, regular doses of phosphates in wine, and periodic galvanic treatment; she
encouraged Gilman’s participation in a women’s basketball team. All in
all, Mary Putnam Jacobi’s medical career was exemplary. Hers is an individual story worth telling, if only to direct our attention to the singularity of her engagement with science and medicine.
But, of course, this story did not take place in a vacuum. By the 1880s,
a sturdy corps of women doctors had been educated in the United
States, mostly in women’s medical schools. Where these women were not
integrated into the male profession, they organized themselves to share
medical information, often through their alumnae associations. Women
physicians were also integrated with a vast network of reform-minded lay
women interested in questions of health and medicine—only a score of
women practiced as regular physicians in mid-nineteenth-century
Boston, for example, but over 250 women attended meetings of the
Boston Ladies’ Physiological Society, where they might look through the
society’s treasured collection of skeletons and anatomical preparations
or consult its library. Lectures on health, including the display of
anatomical images, were very popular, and popular anatomical texts
were broadly distributed (Sappol). And many nineteenth-century
women testify in letters and diaries that, at least in reform circles, curiosity about the interior of the body was common, accepted, understood as
an edifying pleasure (Wells, Out of the Dead House 193–226).
Jacobi took her own writing seriously, and it was seriously read. She
insisted on the highest scientific standards, and she pioneered a number
of significant research strategies, including the use of survey information in medical writing. Her use of images, whether evoked by verbal
description or graphically displayed, was not the least of her concerns as
a writer. Throughout her medical life, Jacobi found ways of giving free
rein to her desire to see; as time went by, she made fewer concessions to
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the convention that ruled a searching medical gaze inappropriate to
women. As Jacobi’s medical career developed, the medical technologies
of the visible also advanced, and she took full advantage of them.
Taken together, Mary Putnam Jacobi’s practices in deploying visual
representations are an anthology of the ways in which late-nineteenthcentury medical culture came to terms with the image. Looking at these
practices quite specifically, we can begin to recognize the inadequacy of
the two current lines of research in gender and visual scientific representation. One research program has understood the development of
visual apparatus as a critical strategy in the construction of a modern
gendered subject; to learn to see the objectified world through the
developing armamentarium of scientific apparatus was to learn a practice of vision that entrained an immobile subject to an alienating apparatus. In this view, the early modern understanding of vision as a male
penetration of female nature is mediated by new, industrialized, means
of objectification (Jordanova; Crary). The other line of research on the
scientific image, associated with Barbara Stafford, understands the
image as a source of instruction and delight; in this view, the loss of visual literacy, the decline of visual education, and the valuation of text over
image have been tragic losses.
Looking closely at the particularity of Jacobi’s visual practices suggests
that neither of these two lines of investigation does justice to the complexity with which medical images were displayed, understood, and appreciated in the nineteenth century, or to the very nuanced ways in which
such images were gendered. Mary Putnam Jacobi associated medical
images with transgression and with pleasure; her experiments with images
met with resistance. But these pleasures, unlike those associated with
other feminine practices of visual representation, like botanical drawing,
were not oriented to producing an image that represented things that the
eye could see: she was interested in abstractions, in relations, and above
all in change. Her experiments do not map, in any easy way, onto the
known gender markings of the territory of visual representation: she herself would have taken any suggestion that she saw “as a woman” as an
incitement to satire. Nor was Jacobi alone among her sex; women whose
visual practices diverged from a received feminine norm are continually
lost and discovered. Consider, for example, the anatomical wax artist,
Anna Morandi Manzolini, who shared Jacobi’s interest in the movement
(Messbarger), but who worked in a relentlessly realistic medium.
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Let us consider an early Medical Record letter from Paris in which Mary
Putnam gives an uncharacteristically enthusiastic account of a device
“too good, or at least too striking, to pass over in silence,” the somatoscope—essentially, a lightbulb that a physician would insert into a body
cavity (48). The young Mary Putnam was fascinated by the somatoscope’s ability to turn the walls of the body from curtains into screens,
displaying what was inside. It is difficult to imagine a more convincing
reversal of the usual logic of anatomy, which has been understood since
Galen to turn on the process of dissection, an opening of the body “in
order to see deeper or hidden parts” (2.3). The very skin that hides the
interior organs becomes a means for visualizing them. Although the history of the somatoscope was brief and inglorious, this tool offered the
young Dr. Putnam a model for medical representation: the object of representation would remain intact; the image would be directly produced
by the object, but in an abstracted form (here, the shadow of the organ);
the display would offer both instruction and pleasure.
When Jacobi began to teach at the Medical College of the New York
Women’s Infirmary, she experimented with visual display as a mode of
medical education. In her lectures on Materia Medici, she would ask students to directly observe the effect of a drug on a patient and reason out
its mode of operation. The demonstrating patient became, as it were, a
picture of the drug; Jacobi, as lecturer, would tease out the medical information implicit in this picture from her class. One of these lectures, “On
Atropine,” was reprinted in the Medical Record and is included in Jacobi’s
collected works. Jacobi announced that she would not follow the conventional program of the Materia lectures, which “compelled” students to “listen to accounts of the remedial action of drugs, that their ignorance of
pathology rendered completely unintelligible to them” (204). In her lectures, students would learn the “properties of drugs in their natural and
commercial condition,” beginning with that day’s lecture on atropine:
In the three cases where we tested the action of the atropine before your eyes,
we observed a fall of the pulse within ten minutes. In the first case the patient
was a delicate, lymphatic, but not nervous woman, to whom one-fiftieth
gr[ain] of sulph. Atropine was given by the mouth, the pulse then being at
96, probably from some emotional excitement. In ten minutes the pulse had
fallen to 80, and remained at 80 to the end of an hour, notwithstanding the
occurrence of other symptoms of atropism, a slight flushing of the face, dryness of mouth and throat, and very slight dilations of the pupils. (205)
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Jacobi went on to describe the effects of atropine on the other two
patients, to draw conclusions from these demonstrations, and to extend
them to a very comprehensive discussion of the whole clinical and
chemical literature on atropine. All this is well and good to read as a finished text; it is painful to imagine this information, or the subsequent
analysis, being elicited from a group of reluctant students. If, as the
astronomer William Herschel claimed, “seeing is in some respect an art
which must be learned”(qtd. in Schaffer 190), these students did not
especially want to learn to see what Jacobi was showing them. They
rebelled, demanding more accessible instruction. This lecture is a rare
example of Jacobi attempting a direct display of the physical processes
she wanted to explain: the effects of atropine and the changes in the
patient that students were directed to observe were one and the same
thing. There was no abstraction, no distribution of information, no
redundancy: there was simply brutal, dense, information. However
much Jacobi herself might have enjoyed such a display, she did not often
attempt it again.
Sometimes, she textualized the image. While it is generally acknowledged in science studies that words and images are not translations of
each other, Jacobi, at certain stages in her career, strove to make them
equivalents by deploying the richly developed medical vocabulary for
physical description. In an address originally given to the New York State
Medical Society in 1874, “Remarks upon the Action of Nitrate of Silver
on Epithelial and Gland Cells,” Jacobi began by reviewing the literature
on experimental use of silver nitrate and then outlined a series of experiments that she had performed herself. Jacobi was able to bring with her
a number of tissue samples from the stomachs of dogs and rabbits that
she had treated with silver nitrate. She describes these preparations as
seen under a microscope—itself a fairly advanced piece of medical apparatus—noting especially any differences between her observations and
those recorded in the literature, and her descriptions are vivid, precise,
and comprehensive. For example:
In the dog I have remarked one detail, not mentioned by Heidenhein or
Rollet. The epithelial border seemed to consist of two layers of cells, of which
the external was deeply spiculated. The lower part of the cell, deeply colored,
was thus surrounded by a broad, clear, border. This appearance suggested an
analogy with the spicules described by Frey on the pavement epithelium of
the mouth and pharynx, and that as in this locality the epithelium is held
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more firmly in place, the clear space below the epithelium is much less distinct
in the dog; the gland tubes larger, and the polygonal cells larger and more
distinct. (251)

Besides bringing the experience of viewing the epithelial cells that she
had prepared directly and vividly before her audience, Jacobi is here
using verbal description to do specific intellectual work, work that we
would today do with various enhancements of the visual image: Jacobi’s
verbal image demonstrated the relations between parts, including the
attachment of the epithelium and the clear space below it (see also Baym
192–93). And Jacobi also inserts her verbal image into a conversation
with other researchers: this sample shows something that Heidenhein
had not seen, and it reminds her of something that Frey had seen in a different context. It is entirely possible, of course, to stage a visual conversation: contemporary advertisements are in many ways arguments among
images, and the history of anatomical art includes many instances of
illustrations that are specifically designed to argue with received opinion.
However, citation of a previous researcher by name is quite difficult in
visual conversations, and in this talk, a demonstration of Jacobi’s membership in the New York Medical Society, direct citation by name would
have been an important marker for intellectual affiliation.
Mary Putnam Jacobi’s apprenticeship as a writer, her way of teaching
herself to describe objects in their relations, argue about them, and
compare them to each other, had been organized in unlikely locations,
including fashion reporting. Her letters on French fashions, possibly
written for the New York Herald Tribune or the New Orleans Times in the
late 1860s, were precise in their designations of color, position, size, texture, material, and attachment, the traditional rhetorical topics for
descriptions of objects. Consider this description of bonbon boxes:
But the highest art of the master is not expended on the sugar plums. The
boxes that hold them furnish a field for infinite ingenuity. The paper bag has
been replaced by a box of enameled pasteboard, white, blue, rose or magenta colored, tied with a ribbon of the same shade. The Lancret basket is composed of a handkerchief of point d’Alencon, the four corners of which are
raised by four bouquets of flowers, and are held by two handles covered with
satin. The Trianon basket is coquettishly pretty, made of rice straw, garlanded with branches of roses, or of straw of gold, lined with white satin ornamented with grapes made of pearls. (“Our Paris Correspondent”)
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If Ludwig Fleck was right in arguing that facts are constructed in the
spaces between the practices of the laboratory and the assumptions and
beliefs of popular culture (111–24), the young Mary Putnam offers us a
remarkable instance of a physician negotiating those spaces, moving
from bonbon boxes to epithelial cells.
Further, for the young Mary Putnam, images of the body were politically significant and consequential—emblems, as it were, for the nineteenth century. In a short descriptive essay she wrote for Scribner’s
Monthly, “The Clubs of Paris,” she joins fascination and unease in her
description of the raucous and democratic political clubs of the
Commune:
Such an impression is made by a human fetus scarcely formed,—with its
immense head,—its exaggerated nervous system,—its shapeless, powerless
limbs,—its huge uncouthness,—in which, like pearls hidden in a mantle of
rough skin, lie concealed unlimited possibilities of power, and beauty, and
grace. (107)

It was very unusual for a writer in an American magazine to treat the
Commune so sympathetically; for months, subscribers had been reading
laments for the vanished gaiety of the Parisian boulevards. The embryo,
an organism full of possibilities, however ungainly and disproportioned,
would have offered such readers a new way of thinking about social
movements and social change. What is of interest is not the “huge head,”
but the process that the embryo suggests, the changes it promises. Jacobi
is fascinated here, not by structure or position, but by relationship,
process, possibility. These complex ideas are concentrated in an analogy, a form which Barbara Stafford identifies as an “uncanny visual capacity to bring divided things into unison or span the gap between the contingent and the absolute” (Analogy 28). Putnam was able to link disparate registers, to resolve divisions, and to activate the visual capacities
of her readers in an extended verbal analogy.
Jacobi also found nonverbal strategies for bringing processes and
changes before her readers, for making them speak: her favorite strategy
was that of abstraction, especially as mediated by the sphygmograph. The
sphygmograph made pressure tracings on a spinning roll of paper, allowing physicians to trace changes in pressure as a result of treatment or
experimental interventions. Like other graphic tracings, the sphygmograph
mediates between the optical culture of early-nineteenth-century science
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and the digital culture we are now learning to navigate (Drorr 361).
Jacobi included a number of sphygmographic tracings in her first book,
The Question of Rest for Women during Menstruation (1876). In her second
book, On the Use of the Cold Pack Followed by Massage in the Treatment of
Anaemia (1880), the long strips showing the effects of cold packs on anemic patients’ blood pressures were tipped into the book, so that they
could be folded out and compared with one another. Jacobi found, in
this relatively simple modification of the conventional form of the book,
a way to bring one picture into conversation with another. Any medical
reader, even one uninformed about technical innovations, could see the
differences in tracings laid out in a row. Moreover, since the sphygmographic tracing presented an image of change over time and could be
read and interpreted as a representation of a process, it was very closely
adapted to Jacobi’s scientific preoccupations. Like the early but ultimately unsatisfactory somatoscope, the sphygmograph did not lay open
the structure of the body: brain, heart, and veins stayed where they were,
intact. Sometimes, the sphygmograph was applied to wounds, as in a
series of experiments performed on “Josie Nolan, aged ten, a very
healthy Irish boy” with a convenient head fracture that exposed the membrane covering his brain. (Jacobi reassures her readers that Nolan has “so
far, never experienced the least inconvenience from this partial exposure
of the brain” [“Sphygmographic” 300].) Like the shadow of the somatoscope, the sphygmographic tracing was produced directly by the organ
under investigation. Like the somatoscope, the sphygmograph was a
technique that spoke to Jacobi’s own preoccupations, to her desire to
visualize what was hidden without destroying it.
Although the sphygmograph and similar instruments were sometimes valued for their ability to circumvent language, to get directly at
physical processes, Jacobi often offered a very full discursive translation
of her sphygmographic tracing. She would describe each tracing, interpret the description as evidence about what was going on in the system
being studied, and draw some conclusion from the analysis. It is important to realize that Jacobi had to work out the linguistic means for writing these descriptions; there were no received forms for translating
sphygmographic tracings (Drorr 374). Sometimes, Jacobi compares one
tracing to another, giving verbal expression to the conversation between
images. Always, she uses the single line of the sphygmograph tracing to
support a verbal picture of the effects of the drug, as in this description
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Figure 2. Sphygmographic tracings

of the effects of atropine on exposed brain tissue: “relaxation of cerebral
blood-vessels; consequent diminished intra-cranial resistance to percussion stroke; more rapid collapse of arterial walls; diminution in mass of
blood retained in brain” (“Sphygmographic” 307). The sphygmographic tracing works as a displaced and mediated picture, as a spatialized representation of the passage of time; Jacobi makes it speak to her reader
about the invisible interior of the brain, heart, and veins. There was no
optical reference, no model, for the processes that the sphygmograph
traced; the pictures that it suggested were evoked by comparing one
tracing with another (Rheinberger).
It took longer for Mary Putnam Jacobi to learn to use more direct,
unmediated images, images that did correspond to optical experience—
simple pictures of physical structures. Her “Studies in Endometritis,” a
relatively late work, is among her first illustrated articles. The work was
published serially in the American Journal of Obstetrics through 1885 and
1886. (Illustrations appear in the “Studies in Endometritis” on 126,
262–63, 266–67, 269, 811–16, and 923. Other significant illustrations
occur in “Case of Absent Uterus” and“Remarks upon Empyema.”)
Medical journals, of course, had long included small inset graphics:
from midcentury, woodcuts and other engravings appeared in monthly
journals such as the Archives of Medicine, although never in the weekly
medical bulletins. But by 1879, images had appeared even in the weekly
Medical Record and “illustrations” or “cuts” were common in the American
Journal of Obstetrics throughout the 1880s. These pictures might show a
surgical procedure, a design for bandages or other apparatus, a pathological specimen, or cellular structures. The “Studies in Endometritis”
are profusely illustrated, including a score of woodcut engravings from
microscopic slides. Some illustrations were copied from other texts, but
others were apparently produced for this essay.
The figures extend Jacobi’s prose argument: they are often arranged
in series to facilitate comparison (“Studies” 814), and are labeled obsessively: the illustration’s title identifies a sample of cells, the caption
repeats that information, and the text will repeat it yet again. The
redundant text, caption, and label imply that readers could not be
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expected to see what Jacobi wanted them to see: she had, perhaps,
learned the lesson of her early Materia lectures all too well, compromising her usual brisk exposition. In contemporary scientific illustrations,
captions are normally interpretive rather than descriptive: “They orient
viewers to similarities, contrasts, and other relevancies; . . . they supply
metaphors, extrinsic connections, and genealogies which instruct viewers’ understanding of what they are being shown” (Lynch and Edgerton
202). In contrast, Mary Putnam Jacobi’s use of what was for her a new
technology of the visible was less assured than her use of text or demonstration; the textual deictic is multiplied and repeated. In fact, these
images are among the least interesting representations of the body that
Jacobi used: wooden and flat, they are redundantly and insistently interpreted by the accompanying text. The hallmarks of Jacobi’s visual practices—abstraction, representation of change, relation to other images—
are missing. The picture presents a version of the stained and foregrounded microscopic image; it shows what, under certain circumstances, we might see ourselves.
Jacobi found much more interesting images that represented broad
forces and abstract relations. One instance of her use of such images is
recorded in her remarkable essay, “The Practical Study of Biology,” originally an address to the Massachusetts Medical Society’s annual dinner
in 1889. After arguing that a medical student must be changed in “his
whole mind” so as to “insensibly . . . blend with the phenomena they can
profoundly contemplate” (461), Jacobi offers a personal anecdote. So
unusual is this gesture for Jacobi that her introduction to the story is
uncharacteristically diffident and awkward: “I should like, Mr.
Chairman, to mention an incident that occurred to myself in the course
of a very simple laboratory experiment” (462), as she was examining the
circulation in a frog’s lungs.
I happened to so focus my lens that all the outlines of the capillaries and
blood corpuscles disappeared, leaving visible only the spaces between the
epithelial cells. Nevertheless there remained a vision of the streaming movement of the invisible blood through the ramified spaces. The streaming was
so rapid, so energetic, so ceaseless, it seemed as if it were pure motion or
force divorced from the accidents of matter. The microscopic shred of tissue
from the insignificant animal seemed for the moment to give a glimpse of a
mighty vision of endless life, streaming with infinite energy into the minutest
particles of an infinite universe. (462)

Figure 3. “Ribbon-like fibres with nucleus, from
uterus eight days after delivery”
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Jacobi found this perception “indescribably powerful.” No wonder.
The ghostly image of the hidden, moving, and clearly indicated blood
represented for her the intellectual energies that had animated her
work: an overarching theory (“mighty vision of endless life”) joined to
detailed, concrete, and precisely located physiological structures
(“spaces between the epithelial cells”), which were, after all, not material objects, but gaps between them. Such an image could speak of nothing but force, motion, will. She repeatedly reproduced this figure for
her students: “Since then I have confronted students with this same
impression,” offering it deictically as “the horizons towards which they
were henceforth to keep their eyes directed” (462).
For Jacobi, neither the surface nor the interior was the domain of
truth. Truth was mobile; truth inhabited the space between the spectacular image and the awed spectator. The medical truth that Jacobi sought
in these verbal images and speaking pictures was a truth about the
tempo and structure of complex bodily processes, particularly as they
were actively constructed by human beings in displays and experiments.
While her experiments in visual representation were modest, the logic
behind them was individual, startling, and premonitory. These experiments open to knowledge a body that has been transformed, whether by
treatment or disease. It is that transformation which is the object of
Jacobi’s desire—it was perhaps the deadness of the rat, rather than the
visible structure of its heart, that so excited her interest. And she was
compelled by dynamic transformations, both in their relation to the normal state of the organism and in their relations to other images, other
descriptions. Jacobi’s images join a babble of scientific voices and pictures that debate the effects of nitrate of silver, the relation between arterial pressure in the brain and blood volume, and the interactions of
atropine and belladonna. Whatever specific physical process these
images, verbal or visual, represent, their ultimate reference for Jacobi
was to that “endless life” that so fascinated her, a force that was neither
a visible object nor an idealization.

PA R T T W O
Confronting the Public and the Private
in Written Language

6
T H E C O L L E C T I V E P R I VAC Y O F
ACA D E M I C L A N G UAG E
David Bleich

P R O B L E M S W I T H ACA D E M I C L A N G UAG E

This essay considers the following thought: in the history of the academy, only one sense of privacy has existed, the collective privacy of the
male group. As a social institution, the university and other academies
have been, over the past eight centuries, groups of men, separated from
the rest of society, bound together by a language few others in society
knew, and, except in extreme cases, exempt from civil laws and constraints that applied to nonacademic citizens. The groups of men were
privileged by their occupation of learning—reading, repeating, and
interpreting texts again and again so as to contribute to the development of civil and sacred laws, principles, morals, and to the training of
physicians. People who emerged from the academy did not hold power,
but advised those, such as churchmen and governors, who did. This
arrangement, strong and stable in itself, drew considerable strength
from prevailing unconsciousness of, and resignation to, the principle of
the androcentric rule of society.
This history is related to fundamental language problems we continue to face: (1) the complaints about academic writing as obscure; (2) the
treatment of writing pedagogy as a relatively unimportant propaedeutic
subject; and (3) the censorship of personal, subjective, and intersubjective genres. My path of presentation is first to note briefly the sense of
the foregoing complaints, then to characterize the history of the university and how it may have led to the complaints, and then to consider
in more detail how to think about them.
Inherent Obscurity

There have been complaints lately about the obscurity of academic
work, especially its language. The 1996 Sokal hoax, in which gibberish
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was mistaken by a respected scholarly journal for serious academic work,
brought this complaint to the fore (see Sokal). But as Alain de Botton
has written, the same complaint was made by Rabelais in the sixteenth
century and by many before and after him: academics were “writing
needlessly obscure books, ignoring simple truths, teaching nothing of
value and abusing the respect of the population.” I stipulate the truth of
the complaint and ask why academic work, and especially its language,
has seemed so antisocial for so long. Sometimes the complaints have
been so intense that Gerald Graff had to write in PMLA, the principal
professional journal of English and language teachers, that “academic
difficulty” was a myth and that succinct instructions regarding stylistic
adjustments in writing can be given to critics and scholars to dispel the
appearance of obscurity (1041). However, those familiar with academic
treatises know that obscurity is not just in appearance, and that many
academic texts are needlessly difficult and not comprehensible to most
people, even those who are well educated.
The Degrading of Rhetoric and Composition

The field of rhetoric and composition, characteristically open to a variety
of approaches, was on its way to becoming a forceful, active, and new sort
of discipline, involved in both literacy and rhetoric, and expanding its
interests to genres found in many parts of society. Abruptly, however, it
has been constrained toward obsolete goals: teaching undergraduates to
write “for their other courses.” Large, complex, intellectually sophisticated writing/graduate programs were reduced and placed under the stewardship of either staff reporting to deans or English faculty believing in
the “service” role of writing pedagogy, as Frances Condon has described:
Comp/Rhet professionals in that Department (people whose work stands out
in the discipline of Composition and Rhetoric as being of extraordinary, pivotal value . . .) were systematically attacked, vilified and disenfranchised.
Under the guise of “complicating” understanding and developing more “rigorous” curriculum, members of the [English] Department hailing from
other “sub” disciplines in English Studies imposed a vision of Comp/Rhet
that, for all its pretension to cutting edge theory, reconstituted traditional,
top down writing instruction and consigned Composition and Rhetoric as a
discipline to a service and skills model, eliminated a visionary undergraduate
writing program that was years in the making, and eviscerated an extraordinary doctoral program. (WPA Listserv, November 29, 2001)

The Collective Privacy of Academic Language

81

Such development, apparently mysterious, is perhaps less so in the
context of the history of the university, of which more shortly.
Discomfort with Genres of Subjectivity

In postsecondary English, “reader response” criticism has gained some
currency, but few related this style of criticism to teaching (see Bleich;
Flynn; Steig), and even fewer saw it as a broad approach to the subject
of language and literature. As feminist criticism grew in scope and reference, “life writing,” autobiography, autoethnography, and genre mixing in academic writing became accepted formal practices. More people
understood why “the personal is political,” and this understanding
helped to produce a broader spectrum of genres from the private to the
individual, to the collective, to the universal public. There are extant
new genres that tackle the heretofore taboo “personal” and “private”
experiences of scholars who are members of a wide variety of groups in
society. Patricia Williams, Robin Tolmach Lakoff, Naomi Scheman in the
fields of law, linguistics, and philosophy, respectively, have written personal, mixed-genre essays that bear directly on how they conceive their
principal subject matters (see also Holdstein and Bleich). The resistance
to the latter effect is what I consider in this essay as the key to the emotional and social paralysis of academic writing. Truly subjective styles are
“feminized” in the pejorative sense.
T H E U N I V E R S I TA S A N D I T S S O C I A L P L AC E M E N T

Charles Homer Haskins, in his useful volume The Rise of Universities
(1923), outlines Hastings Rashdall’s earlier observation that the Western
university has been a remarkably stable institution, unchanging in its
basic relation to the secular and religious governments of society.
Mainly, the university is a protected society of masters and scholars. Until
modern times, its main protection came from the Roman Church, but
various local and national governments also protected it. Today it is protected by national governments in Europe and by state governments and
corporations in America. What, actually, is being protected?
The history of the (oldest) universities of Bologna, Paris, and Oxford
demonstrates the rationale of university protection. As some may erroneously infer today, “university” does not allude to something like “universal knowledge,” but to a living social arrangement of male students
and teachers. The term universitas is cognate with the present-day term
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union, as in labor union. In twelfth-century Bologna, Paris, and Oxford,
the masters and scholars needed rent protection. As a group, these men
from all over Europe were gauged as foreigners—“nations” in the historical literature—and sometimes in response to their disruptive carousing habits, they could not exist stably enough to pursue their studies,
which were liberal arts, law, theology, or medicine. Thus, in the middle
of the twelfth century in Bologna and Paris, and at the beginning of the
thirteenth century in Oxford, the governments and, mainly, the Roman
Church, stepped in to secure from the local landlords rent agreements for
the housing of students and masters. Usually oversight went considerably beyond just housing. In return the universitas—the group of students and masters—was protected and came more directly under the
dominion of the church. This agreement also led to the students and
masters occupying the same space, which, in turn, developed into the
“college,” the place where all both lived and worked. In the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries, universities were founded throughout Europe
on this model of sponsorship (see De Ridder-Symoens).Though all students had preliminary study of the trivium, the principal advanced university subjects were civil and canon law (both based on Roman law),
theology, and medicine. The church had established in the various universities sites of training that ensured its own continued dominion in
society. As is the case today, however, men of various other interests were
admitted to the university: there were high levels of secular interest in
all the universities. Bologna was a center of civil law, Paris a center of theology, Oxford a center of theology and philosophy. The history of
Oxford University is particularly interesting in that its early forms were
concerned with secular civil law, especially its practice, but when the universitas needed protection, theology become the main subject (see
Aston). Because of the “deal”—the sponsorship of the university as a
whole—that guaranteed the training of future church leaders, prospective secular leaders were also welcomed as trainees. The ties between
these two types of students ultimately led, in the rebellious American
colonies, to the principle of separation of church and state. Yet, as was
the case in medieval Europe, today in America most religiously sponsored universities make it their business to admit a variety of students;
the separation is not complete.
Until the nineteenth century, it was essential to know Latin to enter
the university. All lectures were delivered in Latin from the twelfth to the
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sixteenth centuries, and most were delivered in Latin from the sixteenth
to the eighteenth centuries. Students were certified as bachelors and
masters by going through a Latin disputation—a debate with a master.
The lectures themselves (lecture means reading), most of which were
termed “ordinary” lectures, were oral readings of the main texts, always
in Latin. The lecturers sometimes commented on these texts. Access to
the texts themselves was limited, especially before printing, and so there
was a strong oral component to the processes of learning. The trivium—
rhetoric, grammar, and logic—was comprised of the elementary subjects
which were meant to cultivate the students’ proficiency in Latin. The
study of rhetoric had at least two main functions: to learn how to conduct oneself orally in order to win certification and to master the established Latin texts about rhetoric, such as those of Cicero and Quintilian.
Given that the early universities’ studies of law and theology were aimed
to create learned church leaders, it seems clear that the trivium was
essential as a tool or a path to the main university subjects—canon and
civil law as derived from Roman law, theology, and medicine. Latin was
thus the “language of knowledge,” which meant something like this:
real, formal, or “official” knowledge had to be articulated in Latin.
However, even this statement is misleading. I want to emphasize that
Latin was the language of status and power, and it was more important
to know Latin in the sense of being proficient in it than it was to know
anything else about it. The use of Latin was tied to the essential functions of church, to essential language in medicine and law, and to essential acts of crowns and dukedoms. The great majority of citizens did not
know Latin, and it was, in practice, a “secret” or collectively private language spoken only by a privileged class of men. All authority, including
the authority of knowledge, was articulated in Latin. To know Latin was
to be a member of a privileged, exclusive male society, which, by virtue
of its special knowledge of Latin, could regulate admission to membership.
One of the more important language events of Renaissance humanism was the discovery and study of vernacular literatures, enhanced by
printing; vernaculars and printing became part of the academic scene
together. Vernacular writing and literary language became, like Latin
had been, something to be mastered rather than studied in a critical
style. In any event, because the universities remained protected institutions, the subject matters most important to the protectors were the main
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subjects. This meant that literature was less important than law and theology, whose practitioners were not very interested in humanism and its
tendency toward encouraging an individual-centered sense of morality,
not to mention access to the knowledge of a variety of languages, a
knowledge that would put outsiders in position to challenge established
practices. As a result of these dangers, language as an aspect of society
was not a subject, but specific languages had to be mastered in order to
read the texts written in those languages. The subject of language had
weight only because knowledge of languages, and especially Latin, was
the path of access to the positions afforded for university graduates.
Before printing, learning meant going through the difficult process of
mastering texts that one could not own or read easily. Just before but
also considerably after printing, it was the texts themselves, more than
their language, that had to be learned. The “skills and service” status of
rhetoric and the liberal arts thus dates back to the founding of universities as we know them and is the result of the principal university subjects
serving the interests of the protectors of the universities.
From the twelfth through the fifteenth centuries, the curricula
remained stable: the three main subjects preceded by the liberal arts.
When in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the advocates of humanism studied vernacular literatures and brought them into the university,
this period represented, perhaps, the point of greatest respect achieved
by the humanities and the study of language in the university. Humanists
were what we might call “cutting edge,” and for a while they helped to
open up the atmosphere and the scope of scholarly work on language
and literature in universities. A case in point is that of the fifteenth-century Italian professor of rhetoric, the humanist Lorenzo Valla
(1406–57). He has been characterized by modern scholars as being
more expert in Greek than most of his contemporaries and as dedicated, more than other humanists, to advocating the greater importance of
rhetoric and ordinary language over scholastic philosophy. Jerrold
Seigel writes that Valla wanted to “model philosophical discourse on the
language of business or politics . . . [and] align [his] conclusions with all
the usual notions of common sense” (166). If philosophers try to “refine
common language or criticize common ideas of morality, Valla’s answer
was ready: ‘Let the people respond that the rules of speech and all decisions about it lie with them’” (167). Gradually, even in the use of the vernacular, a wide split developed between the language of the academy
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and speakers of the vernacular, reminiscent of the split between Latin
users and everyone else before the humanistic influence. Charles
Trinkaus, referring to Luciano Barozzi’s 1891 opinion, characterized
Valla as “nearer to modern positivist and statistical methods than to
rationalism[;] . . . like the positivist philosophers Valla was concerned
with human liberty” (154). Similarly, Seigel writes:
Valla denied that [syllogistic logic] could ever aid in the pursuit of knowledge. One could not decide about the truth or falsehood of simple statements by any logical test, but only by means of some independently acquired
knowledge. . . . He made it quite clear that he did not believe reason, by itself,
could add to this knowledge. . . . He did not think that dialectic [i.e., disputation, the means used to certify masters in the university] was any more rigorous a procedure than rhetoric. (167)

Valla had an unusual (for the time) respect for ordinary language,
and in that regard his stance has something in common with
Wittgenstein and other twentieth-century philosophers like Austin and
Bakhtin, who began taking natural language use very seriously.
According to Walter Ruegg, Valla studied “spoken discourse” and interpreted authors in terms of “his understanding of language and his situation” (456). He was one of the earliest annotators of the New
Testament. He “analyzed the Latin language as a living expression of the
changing self-understanding of human beings” (457). He tried to create
a logic derived from the grammar of ordinary speech. One may describe
his approach as “contextualist,” as he clearly responded to language as
something living in a variety of social situations. Ruegg describes how
Valla’s reaching out beyond the faculty of arts came “into conflict with
the other faculties”:
As a result of such expansion, Valla had to flee from his professorship in Pavia
because of the physical danger arising from his violent persecution at the
hands of the members of the faculty of law; in Rome he was protected from
the attacks of theologians only because he enjoyed the favor of the pope.
(457)

Valla was considered dangerous because his subject, rhetoric, when
pursued freely, implicated other subject matters. This amounted to an
academic heresy, an overstepping of boundaries. The momentum of the
Renaissance was carried forward by the discovery of new texts and by the
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increasing ease of reproducing existing texts. Should a scholar of rhetoric follow the manifest implications of the subject, all texts in all subjects
were eligible for critical study. Those scholars most comprehending of
grammar, logic, and rhetoric and who had the most languages at their
disposal were in the best position to recast the received texts in new
lights. Valla’s views on the importance of language did not prevail and
still do not today: universities still behave as if full engagement in the
study of language as it affects other subjects and as it releases disenfranchised populations is not in their interest.
During the Enlightenment of eighteenth-century England, we might
guess that language study would be even more liberated than it was in
the Italian Renaissance. But the opposite is the case, as described by
Miriam Brody in Manly Writing. In the eighteenth century, following
from the prestige of a science whose picture of the universe was deemed
proof of the existence of God, “philosophers” did try to establish standard spoken and written forms and to affirm the superiority of one privileged dialect over others, but “the people” were unable to follow Valla’s
recommendation to decide on these rules. Traditional androcentrism
established certain values that were sought in students and promoted in
textbooks. Once again, as when Latin was the standard that limited
access, the so-called King’s English rendered language as a subject once
more compulsorily and myopically propaedeutic: it was separated from
the other subjects that depended on it, and it was confined to the status
of a preliminary tool.
T H E C O L L E C T I V E P R I VAC Y

These remarks are meant to open a discussion of how the history of the
university helps to explain its social psychology as we live through it
today. The three aspects of academic language I cited above—obscurity,
the skills and service role of rhetoric and composition, and the eschewing of personal, affective genres—emerge from the collective masculine
psychology that has developed in the university. In part this psychology is
related to military values inherited from Roman law, passed on through
the church, and then instituted by the church as it took over sponsorship
of universities. However, monarchies functioned under the same male
group psychology. It is not a great leap to say that this psychology marks
a wide variety of male groups in society, such as athletic teams, legislative
bodies, police forces, businesses, professional organizations, and so forth.
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We know very few institutions, in fact, that do not function using this
same androcentric social psychology. Our interest has been in how this
psychology affects the use of language in the university. The instances I
cited above are symptoms of mores, behaviors, and values that did, of
course, precede the university and then were put to new uses as this institution formed in the twelfth century.
The key elements of masculine-exclusive social psychology are hierarchical government and leadership, competition, stoicism in the face
of pain, concealment of weakness and vulnerability, and the use of language in the service of these principles.
Inherent Obscurity

This amounts to the agreement to use an “underlying code of the professorial message,” a language that appears to students and to the public to be a secret code, as suggested by Pierre Bourdieu in his reflection
on academic discourse in the university. As already noted, the first university code was Latin, the language one had to know to be admitted to
the university (Bourdieu, Passeron, and de Saint Martin 5). When vernaculars were/are used, jargon and related specialized vocabularies
become the underlying code. The perspective of members of the university had been that the subject matters themselves were extremely distant from the interests of the population. Yet this could not be the case
if the subjects were law, theology, and medicine, since everyone was
affected by the law, the church, and the need to stay well: the subjects
taught in universities have always mattered to the rest of the population,
a situation that justified their pursuit in the first place. It is only that the
language of these subjects could not be acquired by the public, which, as a
result, had no access to the university or to the means by which the subjects affected society. In this way, the language of academics maintains its
separation from the public, using the false explanation that the subjects
themselves are remote from public interest. Socially motivated study
became antisocial in the university.
The case of Martha Nussbaum and Judith Butler could be seen as a
challenge to the view I am advancing. Nussbaum, in her hard-hitting critique of Judith Butler, observed that Butler may have overtaken the
“extremely French idea that the intellectual does politics by speaking
seditiously, and that this is a significant type of political action” (38).
Derrida’s writings tend to bear out Nussbaum’s claim: American academics,
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influenced by French post-structuralism via the Yale critics, imagine they
are taking political action by speaking in obscure ways, using an arcane
vocabulary, and making strong, anthropomorphic claims about the
social action of abstract ideas. Certainly, Judith Butler has a clear political purpose in her books, and her writing is cited repeatedly for its needless obscurity. Both women are members of the academy and have
acceded to its most honored positions. Thus, when a dispute is carried
out exclusively among women, it might be said, the traditional agon continues and therefore may not be identified as “male.” I don’t think this
argument can be made, however, as the academy itself is still being protected by the almost exclusively male corporations and legislatures functioning under traditional hierarchical rules. As Carolyn Heilbrun has
recently detailed, for her to be accepted at all into the academy, she had
to find a way to learn from her male role models yet create a new identity for herself. She learned from her male teachers how not to be
obscure in her writing and scholarship:
”Jargon” was their [Lionel Trilling’s and Jacques Barzun’s] favorite pejorative
term. Its misuse arose from the inclusion in prose for a general audience of
the specific, technical terms of a particular discipline. When it came to writing, even all those years before the incomprehensible “theory” took over,
Barzun and Trilling taught us how to write without shame or condescension
for an audience as intelligent as we, though not perhaps as professionally
trained. (12)

I bring this case up because it may seem as opposed to my point as the
case of Nussbaum and Butler, yet it is to be explained with reference to
the same consideration. In her book, Heilbrun spends many pages documenting, not merely reporting, the profound misogyny of all three of
her teachers—Fadiman, Trilling, and Barzun—and the ways in which,
buried in their own minds but emerging through various modes of
speech and judgments of literature, was the assumption that she (their
student) did not really belong in the academy. Thus, while her teachers
had socially generous views about writing and language—views that still
obviously do not prevail—they participated actively in the traditional
animus to keep the academy an all-male society. Perhaps Nussbaum’s
and Butler’s work enters a society that is, as it listens to Heilbrun, available to their voices. Yet both figures are strong feminist advocates who,
as is clear from their work, are moving uphill in the same cause that
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Heilbrun describes: changing the academy. They exemplify the “master’s
tools” debate articulated by Audre Lorde. Butler tried to use the tools;
Nussbaum, like Heilbrun, tried to change the tools and to use similar
tools for different purposes. Yet all three are using both their language
and their discipline to change the academy, to change the character of
the university. Even though these three women have found a respected
place in the academy, it is still run according to traditional male social
psychology: women and others previously excluded from the university
must follow the mores of the men who have run it for centuries: hierarchical leadership, competition, stoicism, the concealment of vulnerability, and the use of language in the service of these values. Academic
obscurity has still not been revoked.
The Degrading of Rhetoric and Composition

The discipline of rhetoric and composition, with its population of more
than half women and its strong interest in pedagogy, has attempted to
change the approach to language in the academy. Members of this discipline have studied the history of rhetoric and have worked many more
hours than other members of the academy observing students’ uses of
language in a wide variety of contexts and genres. Also more than other
disciplines, it has recognized the daily action of pedagogy: the ongoing
need to pay attention to each student and to return to the students
through the process of developing their thoughts. In several programs
in the United States, the discipline has come close to a point that it
could indeed help change the academy and its use of language. In fact,
at this time, a writing teacher, Andrea Lunsford, has presented an initiative to the MLA to change the “adversarial academy” to a “collaborative” academy. But what Frances Condon described as happening in one
department has happened repeatedly in other departments in major
universities: when the program became important and influential, it was
dismantled. In the past decade, several progressive, accomplished writing programs that have gone considerably beyond the narrow conception of academic writing have been “put out of business” for reasons that
are not obvious, given their indisputable success. The only clear facts are
that these programs had momentum, were training writing teachers to
be imaginative, creative, inventive, and active, and that they all had faculty directors who were moved to other jobs, while parties without professional stake in the subject were given the task of running the programs.
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The most widely publicized instance of this development occurred when
the University of Texas writing program was abruptly suspended by the
school administration after the Department of English permitted the
teaching of writing to take place through the study of court decisions
about civil rights. In this series of events, faculty members proposed to
study and teach a specific language—that of the law—with its specific
vocabulary and habits of use and as it was applied to a specific set of
court cases that were of highest importance to the social health of this
society. It would be hard to imagine a way better than this one to teach
the use of language, and it was adopted with the voted support of over
85% of the faculty in a large department in a major university. Yet the
dean peremptorily intervened, the program was canceled, and the faculty member who led it got another appointment at a different university. Is this much different from the fate of Lorenzo Valla? In one way it
is: the faculty member whose initiative it was is female. Could this have
been yet another manifestation of what Heilbrun experienced at
Columbia in the 1950s? It seems similar to me. Linda Brodkey was not
fired: she had tenure, but her position at the University of Texas was no
longer tenable, and she left. Will someone say she was “driven” out, as
Snowball was from Animal Farm? Yes, but then it will be affirmed that
she left of her own accord, which, of course, she did. If writing programs
and departments of rhetoric and composition grow normally, that is, just
as other departments grow and develop, they move into the position of
Lorenzo Valla: the close, careful, and disciplined study of language leads
inevitably to the study of the language of all disciplines, and this language matters. But the sponsorship of today’s university has an overwhelming stake in not disturbing the key disciplines that produce wealth
and maintain authority; sponsors have a stake in teaching language in
such a way—skills and service—that supports what they sponsor, and
that is happening today as it happened in the previous eight centuries
of stable university functioning. Corporate sponsors need compliant
managers and workers as much as the church and the crowns did.
Discomfort with Genres of Subjectivity

The male academy is not uncomfortable with all genres of subjectivity,
only those genres that, if permitted to flourish, would expose the limitations of academic thinking. The roots of this discomfort have been
outlined repeatedly by Walter Ong. He is an advocate of Learned Latin
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and attributes the edifice of modern science to this language and the
discipline it had taken to learn it. Science, he writes, “follows from
scholastic experience” (Orality 114). He associates Learned Latin with
writing itself, which he distinguishes from “orality,” the zone in which we
experience “the emotion-charged depths of the mother tongue” (Orality
114). He advocates the fundamental trope of modern science—“separating the knower from the known” (105)—and presents Learned Latin
as one of the key factors in establishing this axiom of scientific inquiry.
He does not conceal his identification of all of these developments as
characteristically male and at one point, traces back male agonism to the
womb where, he suggests, male children develop in opposition to the
female environment (Fighting 64-65). The value of Ong’s work is that he
takes no pains to mitigate his argument: to him, it is self-evident that
male development and its natural movement into the practices of
Learned Latin through the church and the university are responsible for
civilization as we know it. We may probably grant this argument, oddly
enough, except for one key point: how natural could such a process
have been, given the well-documented systematic, purposeful exclusion
of women from this engine of civilization?
Ong presents literacy as we teach and use it as having derived from
the “Christian clerical culture” that David Noble documents as having
repeatedly, regularly, and often with malice excluded women and
opposed their access to equal citizenship. Certainly women were prevented and discouraged from becoming literate. Ong rightly characterizes this culture as promoting Stoicism and adopting the stance of “male
puberty rites” (Orality and Literacy 113) in which the initiate must show
that he can “take it.” Learned Latin helped to censor the “emotioncharged depths of the mother tongue” (Orality and Literacy 114) while
the community that worked up and molded the privileged knowledge of
this language separated emotion radically from formal study, setting the
stage for the “separation of the knower from the known,” a common
axiom of scientific work. As a result of this radical separation and with
students’ involvement in Latin (learning it for the purposes of certification through debate), life outside the university acquired exaggerated
and antisocial characteristics. Inside the university, intense pressure
built up on the men to succeed and prove themselves; outside, their adolescent wildness was tolerated, overlooked, and understood to be the
result of “boys will be boys” (Rashdall1: 4). Yet both inside and outside
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the academy, the men’s behavior was antisocial—fiercely clubby and
hierarchical in the university and then in the church, yet subversively
and hypocritically undisciplined in civilian life, protected in part by the
law and in part by the church itself.
Jason Berry’s recent book, Lead Us Not into Temptation, suggests the
great effort made by the church to conceal, rather than end, such behaviors. The academic antagonism to feeling and subjectivity may thus be
traced in part to the learning, status, use, and protection of Learned
Latin and to the military discipline usually used to teach it: beatings, as
reported by Augustine and many after him (this is a somewhat unusual,
yet nevertheless plausible, conclusion). The entrance of women in large
numbers into the university coincides with the passing of corporal punishment and has opened up the range of genres and language registers
in which scholarly work may be published. Personal and subjective writing itself has taken forms beyond the simple “confessional,” the one
genre in which formal autobiography existed not too long ago. Now personal, subjective, and emotional writing is clearly and carefully linked to
a series of collectively held issues having to do with social equality,
human rights, disclosure of systematic secrecies such as sexuality and
domestic violence (see Freedman, Frey, and Zauhar; Daly).We do not
know at this time whether these new genres will have the effect of introducing the willingness to face and understand private and subjective
experience in the different phases of scholarship. As anthropologists
have been discussing recently, there are “issues” when scholars introduce themselves into a distant society in order to study it. And there are
“issues” when students decide that yes, they can come out in their classrooms and that they can write and share narratives of parental sexual
abuse, beatings, and alcoholism, as ways of learning that writing means
writing about things that matter, things that will affect and touch others.
THEREFORE

In any event, academic language can no longer claim a collective privacy, though it is not surprising that genres of social disclosure and the critique of scientific language have been attacked and censored (see Gross
and Levitt; Sokal and Bricmont). They are still not welcomed in writing
programs or considered to be part of the study of language. There is still
considerable resistance to the initiatives taken by Lorenzo Valla: the use
of the knowledge of language to consider how all disciplines present
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their authoritative claims for knowledge and understanding. Indeed,
the value of “privacy” is often defended with citations from the U.S.
Constitution, and many members of the academy, referring to themselves as “intellectuals” (Michael) seem unaware of how fluently this
term announces a radical separation of “us” from “them”; the term
“public intellectual” attempts to preserve a private sense of individual
superiority for members of the academy in the process of claiming to
want to reach a general public.
The problem of academic language cannot be isolated from the problems of society that have produced it. On the other hand, the traditional mores of academic language can no longer be assumed to be necessary. There are no longer any justifications for not letting the language
speak of all the constituencies now entering the university and acknowledging that the received uniformities of academic usage are as inimical
to the spread of understanding as the androcentric rule of society.

7
T H E E S S AY I S T I N — A N D
B E H I N D — T H E E S S AY
Vested Writers, Invested Readers
Lynn Z. Bloom

VOICE-OVER: Our telephone was tapped during the eight years it took to write
and publish Doctor Spock: Biography of a Conservative Radical—my hopeful
contribution to ending the Vietnam War. When I’d pick up the receiver to dial
out, I’d hear mysterious clicks, breathing—sometimes even panting, but never a
voice. Sometimes the line would go dead. I have never again experienced the
sense of a palpitating but silent presence on the other end of the line except for
a brief stay in Bucharest during the depths of the Ceausescu regime. Our
approved Intourist hotel was so close to a thicket of radio relay towers that the
spies could have peeped through the window, but they evidently preferred the
phone. It rang at random hours of the day and night to deliver breathing and static. No voice, not even in a language I couldn’t understand.
T H E P R O D I G I O U S P R E S E N C E O F S U P E R S T A R E S S AY I S T S

This chapter will demonstrate that the work of superstar canonical essayists is qualitatively different from that of many other essayists (including
many canonical essayists of lesser luminosity) in one significant
respect—the intensely felt presence of the essayist within the essay. This
ethos is comprised of the author’s ethical and intellectual stance toward
the subject—and perhaps the world—and manifested in the essayist’s
characteristic voice and literary style. These constitute the author’s persona, distinctive and ongoing, sustained from one work to the next.
Verisimilitude notwithstanding, the essayist behind the essay is not necessarily the character, the I, “the singular first person” who appears in
the essay. This essayist-in-the-essay, apparently artless and transparent, is
actually a work of art to which readers—even those sophisticated
enough to know the character represented is a carefully constructed
artifact—react as if it were the real person whom they know and—usually—
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love. Indeed, personal essays that successfully reach audiences year after
year, generation after generation, demonstrate that a writer’s private presence in the essay is most effectively transmitted through a distinct public
persona. As Scott Russell Sanders, himself a canonical essayist, observes in
“The Singular First Person”: “Brassy or shy, center stage or hanging back
in the wings, the author’s persona commands our attention. For the
length of an essay, or a book of essays, we respond to that persona as we
would to a friend caught up in a rapturous monologue” (194).
The appendix to this chapter, “Discovering the Essay Canon,”
explains the research method by which I established the existence of an
essay canon and identified the canonical essayists and their canonical
essays—those most widely anthologized in readers used in first-year
American college composition courses from 1946 to 1996. Readers are
collections of essays and other nonfiction works—speeches (Lincoln’s
Gettysburg Address), fables (Thurber’s “Fables for Our Time”), satires
(“A Modest Proposal,” for instance, is a patently fictional work that is
usually treated as nonfiction), and letters (although Martin Luther
King, Jr.’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail” is in letter format, I would
argue that it is, in fact, an essay)—that are regarded as essays for pedagogical purposes.
Extremely popular canonical essays, those by the twenty superstars
with 480 reprints or more, satisfy the felt sense that they have not only
transcended time, if not culture, but that the canon could not exist
without them. Virtually all of these writers (except two authors of documents that are not essays, Thomas Jefferson as first author of the
Declaration of Independence and Plato as author of “The Allegory of
the Cave”) convey a powerful sense of a human being within and behind
the writing that many other perfectly competent nonfiction writers—
including many canonical essayists of lesser ranking—exhibit less memorably or not at all, even when they are writing on subjects of comparable significance. These are the canonical superstars, like the rich whom
Fitzgerald allegedly told Hemingway are “different from you and me.”
George Orwell heads the list, with 1,785 reprints of such essays as
“Politics and the English Language” and “Shooting an Elephant”, his
work is included in virtually every reader published during the second
half of the twentieth century. E. B. White, with 1,340 reprints—including “Once More to the Lake” and “The Ring of Time”—is a close second.
Then come: 3) Joan Didion, 1,095 reprints; 4) Lewis Thomas, 1,020; 5)
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Henry David Thoreau, 900; 6) Virginia Woolf, 885; 7) Jonathan Swift,
865; 8) Martin Luther King, Jr., 825; 9) James Thurber, 790; 10) Mark
Twain, 715; 11) Annie Dillard, 680; 12) Thomas Jefferson, 660; 13)
Russell Baker, 630; 14) Loren Eiseley, 605; 15) E. M. Forster, 590; 16)
Maya Angelou, 565; 17) Ellen Goodman, 560; 18) James Baldwin, 510;
19) Richard Rodriguez, 495; and 20) Plato, 480.
(A parenthetical observation to keep in mind to contrast with the
canonical superstars. At the bottom of the canon list are twenty authors
with 100–10 reprints apiece: Hannah Arendt, Michael Arlen, Sigmund
Freud, Dick Gregory, Sidney J. Harris, Jane Jacobs, Alfred Kazin, X. J.
Kennedy, Robin Lakoff, Ashley Montagu, Gloria Naylor, Chief Seattle,
Eric Sevareid, George Bernard Shaw, Gail Sheehy, William Stafford,
John Steinbeck, Alvin Toffler, Gore Vidal, and Edmund Wilson. Try this
test. What works of these authors come to mind? Many have reputations
as writers of novels, poetry, drama, psychiatric treatises, urban analysis,
or theology, and it is likely you would identify their best-known works
first. If you can think of essays or longer pieces of nonfiction written by
any of these authors, what works are these? I surmise that if readers do
associate a specific authorial presence or persona with each or any of
these writers, it will be the presence that emanates from their bestknown works in the genres and fields where their reputations lie—fiction for Naylor, drama for Shaw, poetry for Stafford—rather than
through their essays.)
“ T H E S I N G U L A R F I R S T P E R S O N ” : T H E AU T H O R I A L P R E S E N C E O F
S U P E R S T A R E S S AY I S T S

Simply—and subjectively—put, for an essayist to become a canonical
superstar, teachers—and by extrapolation, their students—have to love
the performance. Readers respond vigorously to the work and thus to
the author whose presence emerges in and through the writing. By and
large, they love the writer they come to know as a more or less constant
presence from one canonical favorite to another: the George Orwell of
“Shooting an Elephant,” “Marrakech,” and “Politics and the English
Language”; the E. B. White who emerges in and through “Once More to
the Lake,” “The Death of a Pig,” and “Walden”; the Joan Didion of “Why
I Write,” “On Keeping a Notebook,” and “Some Dreamers of the Golden
Dream.” Yet when the narrator of a superstar essay elicits loathing, as the
monstrously bland narrator of Swift’s “Modest Proposal” is calculated to
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do, readers are expected to recognize and respect the ethical distance
between the actual author and his created character (even though some
naive readers elide the two). For better or for worse, as Scott Russell
Sanders explains: “It is the singularity of the first person—its warts and
crochets and turn of voice” (196)—to which readers respond as if that
first person were a real person.
Essayists themselves are under no illusions about the illusory characters they create, nor about why they do so. The author’s self-presentation
as simple and unadorned is as old as the genre, invented by Montaigne,
who artfully began the tradition of artlessness, as well. He slyly explains
“To the Reader” of Essays: “I want to be seen here in my simple, natural,
ordinary fashion, without straining or artifice; for it is myself that I portray. My defects will here be read to the life, and also my natural form.”
Custom permitting, Montaigne says he would “very gladly have portrayed [himself] here entire and wholly naked” (qtd. in Sanders 195).
Contemporary canonical superstars have addressed this subject in a
comparable vein. Thoreau opens Walden—of which textbook excerpts
are treated as essay—by observing: “In most books, the I, or first person,
is omitted; in this it will be retained; that, in respect to egotism, is the
main difference. We commonly do not remember that it is, after all,
always the first person that is speaking [whether or not the pronoun is
there to send that signal].” Adds Thoreau: “I should not talk so much
about myself if there were anybody else whom I knew as well” (3). E. B.
White introduces his own selected Essays by acknowledging that although
the essayist “can pull on any sort of shirt, be any sort of person, according to his mood or his subject matter—philosopher, scold, jester, raconteur, confidant, pundit, devil’s advocate, enthusiast,” he must tell the
absolute truth. Lest readers suspect that this multiplicity of roles might
lead to artifice and role-playing, White—drawing again on the example
of Montaigne, who “had the gift of natural candour”—confidently asserts
that the essayist “cannot indulge himself in deceit or in concealment, for
he will be found out in no time” (vii-viii). Although George Orwell in
“Why I Write”—a literary manifesto written near the end of the author’s
short life—concludes that “one can write nothing readable unless one
constantly struggles to efface one’s own personality,” he acknowledges
that all writers—members of a small class of “gifted, willful people who
are determined to live their own lives to the end”—are driven by “sheer
egoism.” Ego motivates the “desire to seem clever, to be talked about, to
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be remembered after death.” Essay writers also share three other motives:
“(2) Esthetic enthusiasm . . . [;] (3) Historical impulse . . . to find out true
facts and store them up for the use of posterity [; and] (4) Political purpose . . . [that is,] desire to push the world in a certain direction” (316).
And in her version of “Why I Write,” Joan Didion, acknowledging that she
stole the title from Orwell, gets right to the point—the egoistic emphasis
of the “I, I, I” sounds in the title: “In many ways writing is the act of saying I, of imposing oneself upon other people, of saying listen to me, see it
my way, change your mind” (44).
Such pronouncements could easily lead readers to expect that superstar canonical essayists are writing autobiography, itself a highly constructed artifact despite autobiographers’ protestations of truthfulness
(see Gusdorf; Mandel; Howarth). However, the only autobiographers
among the top twenty are Maya Angelou (virtually all her “essays” are editorially selected excerpts from I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings) and
Richard Rodriguez, with chapters or excerpts of chapters from the autobiographical Hunger of Memory: The Education of Richard Rodriguez. Indeed,
although the essays’ readers could glean occasional “facts” about the lives
of the canonical superstars, these are insufficient to present even a fragmentary sketch of the writer’s life. For instance, in “Once More to the
Lake,” White tells us about the time the narrator and his unnamed son
spent an idyllic week at an unnamed lake in Maine, doing a variety of
activities (boating, fishing, swimming) that White himself had enjoyed as
a boy vacationing at the same lake. But however ample or minimal, such
autobiographical information is beside the point. The essayist’s point of
view—as signaled by the “I, I, I”—is the focal point of authorial presence,
as Scott Russell Sanders explains in “The Singular First Person” and
Gordon Harvey elaborates on in “Presence in the Essay.”
After modestly claiming that the essayist, in comparison with poets,
playwrights, and novelists, “must be content in his self-imposed role of
second-class citizen,” E. B. White admits that “some people find the essay
the last resort of the egoist, a much too self-conscious and self-serving
form for their taste; they think that it is presumptuous of a writer to
assume that his little excursions or his small observations will interest
the reader.” Acknowledging the “justice in their complaint,” White adds,
“I have always been aware that I am by nature self-absorbed and egotistical; to write of myself to the extent I have done indicates a too great
attention to my own life, not enough to the lives of others” (vii-viii). Not
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so, explains Sanders, for contrary to the autobiographer’s practice of
looking inward, the superstar essayists are looking outward on the creation that is the world. As White says in “The Ring of Time”: “As a writing man or secretary, I have always felt charged with the safekeeping of
all unexpected items of worldly or unworldly enchantment, as though I
might be held personally responsible if even a small one were to be lost”
(143). These superstars know that, as Sanders says of his own essays:
“The public does not give a hoot about my private life.” He adds: “I
choose to write about my experience not because it is mine, but because
it seems to me a door through which others might pass” (197–98).
Indeed, the perspective of the first person singular that dominates
the essay is that of the essayist who opens doors to others’ common experience. (That all essayists are embedded in constraints of class, ethnicity,
gender, physical and emotional functioning, age, time, and culture is
today’s truism; that no writer can claim universal connections with a universal audience does not negate the fact that the work does establish a
great many significant relationships.) This perspective establishes the
authorial presence within the world of each individual essay that creates
the bond with the readers, the ethos, that persists from one essay to
another. It should be noted that presence (amplified below) is a more
robust concept than voice, even as addressed in Carl Leggo’s comprehensive list of ninety-nine “Questions I Need to Ask before I Advise My
Students to Write in Their Own Voices” (ranging from “What is there of
desire in voice?” to “Is voice like a thumbprint—unique?” [145–50]) as
elaborated on in Peter Elbow’s sophisticated discussion of “audible voice
or intonation in writing,” “dramatic voice in writing,” “recognizable or
distinctive voice in writing,” and “voice with authority” xxiv–xxxiii).
When Elbow addresses the last item on his list, “resonant voice or presence,” he finds “trouble—the swamp” because this concept embeds
questions of authorial sincerity, authenticity, and relationship to the
“real character” of the “actual author” beyond the text (xxxiii–xlii). The
answer, he says, lies in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, in which he “clearly implies
what common sense tells us: we are not persuaded by the implied author
as such—that is, by the creation of a dramatic voice that sounds trustworthy; we are only persuaded if we believe that dramatic voice is the
voice of the actual speaker or author” (xlii). (Elbow elaborates: “We
don’t buy a used car from someone just because we admire their dramatic
skill in creating a fictional trustworthy voice. If ethos is nothing but
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implied author, it loses all power of persuasion.”) This presence constitutes the sense of the essayist in the essay; the more powerful the sense
of presence, the more likely the essayist is to be a superstar.
It is this sense of presence that Gordon Harvey anatomizes in
“Presence in the Essay.” In an explanation that reinforces the observations of White and Sanders, he says:
If a piece of autobiographical writing is an essay, it has already moved beyond
private confession or memoir to some shareable idea, for which the personal
experience works as evidence. This move from experience to idea, and then,
through painful revision, from a dull idea and simple, narrative structure to
an interesting idea and structure, bringing general insights out in the particulars and erasing narcissism, is precisely the great challenge and the great
value of the personal essay as a Freshman Writing assignment—this and the
broadened sense it gives of what can count as evidence for ideas. (648)

The “personal” in essays is not necessarily “represented by autobiographical anecdote and image or by explicit self-analysis and introspection,” but rather by authorial presence. Presence, Harvey says, “is the
concept we invoke when we feel life in writing, when we feel an individual invested in a subject and freely directing the essay—not surrendering control to a discipline’s conventions, or to a party line, or to easy sentiments and structures, or to stock phrases” (650).
In general, readers don’t know or care much about the essayist
behind the essay except to assume that figure to be intellectually and
ethically congruent with the writer whose perspective appears in public.
By and large this assumption is warranted to the extent that the author’s
ethos—disposition, character, and fundamental values—is stable in person and in print. And this assumption holds true even when readers
know that an author such as Virginia Woolf is writing on her more cheerful days rather than from depression, or that George Orwell’s unverifiable accounts of “A Hanging” and “Shooting an Elephant” do not
depend on “factual, historical veracity” but on fidelity to the generic
experience of colonial officers in Burma (Crick 85, 95–96, 112).
VOICE-OVER: During the course of my research, Dr. Spock and four others were
prosecuted by the federal government for conspiring to encourage students to
resist the draft during the Vietnam War. The FBI agents who testified were to a
man rigidly erect in posture and testimony, literalists all—with no acknowledgment of the figurative that pervades the language their wiretappers would have
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overheard—metaphor, hyperbole, understatement. What someone said or
wrote, they meant. Thus “Oh, I’d like to kill her” could be construed as an
intent to commit murder, rather than a comment of exasperation.
“ONCE MORE TO THE LAKE” AS AN EXAMPLE OF
AU T H O R I A L P R E S E N C E

Harvey goes on to explain the process and technical means by which
essays, including academic writing, can “be informed by personal experience without injecting personal information” or even the personal pronoun, “a matter of felt life in the writing rather than anecdote or selfanalysis” (649). Although presence is “everywhere” in an essay, it is particularly apparent in the six aspects of the essay that Harvey identifies,
which I will analyze here as they are manifested in “Once More to the
Lake,” using male pronouns to accommodate the male author.
Harvey’s first aspect is (1) motive. Usually in the introduction the
writer establishes, for himself and his readers, why the subject is “interesting enough to pursue,” “why it isn’t simply obvious, why there’s a mystery to unfold”—in brief, why the essay needs to be written (Harvey
650). At the outset White announces that throughout his childhood his
family spent every August at a lake in Maine: “none of us ever thought
there was any place in the world like [it].” Although I have “since
become a salt water man,” says White, “there are days when the restlessness of the tides and the fearful cold of the sea water and the incessant
wind that blows . . . make me wish for the placidity of a lake in the
woods” like the one of the childhood summers (197). To recapture this
“sacred” time and place, he returns to the same lake with his son, and
the story begins. The element of the quest is subdued but omnipresent:
can a father reexperience the past and transmit this legacy, and its
meanings, to his son?
The second aspect Harvey identifies is (2) development. Presence, says
Harvey, “is manifest, along with pleasure, sometimes wonder and even
passion, in a willingness to pursue a topic through twists and turns: to
see in it, and follow it through, its various aspects and complications and
sub-ideas, which not just anybody would think of or predict.” The real
issue “isn’t between orderly and disorderly development, or between linear and nonlinear; it’s between dull, mechanical order and complex,
alert order, whose creation and control manifest presence” (650–51).
White signals this alertness in the second paragraph, when he explains
the associative nature of the juxtaposition of past and present that he
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proffers throughout the essay: “It is strange how much you can remember about places [like the lake, “this unique, this holy spot”] once you
allow your mind to return into the grooves that lead back. You remember one thing, and that suddenly reminds you of another thing.” He
reaffirms this, with a surprise—as much to himself as to the readers—in
the fourth paragraph: “I began to sustain the illusion that [my young
son] was I, and therefore, by simple transposition, that I was my father. .
. . I seemed to be living a dual existence. I would be in the middle of
some simple act . . . and suddenly it would be not I but my father who
was saying the words or making the gesture” (198).
White’s fifth paragraph illustrates all of the remaining characteristics
Harvey describes concurrently:(3) “Control of quotation [when the writer
is responding to other texts] and detail”—through original metaphors,
similes, metonymic details that indicate “the feeling of a mind engaged
in the subject at hand,” not grandstanding razzle-dazzle; “An awareness of
cliché and what doesn’t need saying,” witty allusions to readers’ shared
knowledge and experiences; broadenings of the subject (“It’s a mistake,”
says Harvey, to think that particulars only “particularize,” when in fact
they can broaden out the discussion, perhaps drawing on “the essayist’s
experiential grasp of human behavior, of how life tends to go”); and
judgments and reasons, “Giving specific reasons for one’s general impressions . . . happens also to be its most personal aspect” (651–52).
White’s fifth paragraph illustrates all of the above characteristics concurrently. To establish the convergence of past and present, White
repeats “the same” in detail upon detail of going fishing the first morning: “the same damp moss” covers the worms in the bait can; “the small
waves were the same”—original detail—“chucking the rowboat under the
chin”; and “the boat was the same boat, the same color green and the ribs
broken in the same places, and under the floorboards the same freshwater leavings.” A dragonfly lights on the tip of his rod, convincing him
“beyond any doubt that everything was as it always had been, that the
years were a mirage and that there had been no years.” Despite the comfortable familiarity of these phenomena, White uses no cliches. Nor does
he spell out his interpretations, trusting that if he presents appropriate
information his readers will understand the music as well as the words.
Indeed, he broadens the subject even as he embeds his interpretations in
the telling details: “I looked at the boy [whose name does not matter],
who was silently watching his fly, and it was my hands that held his rod,
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my eyes watching. I felt dizzy and didn’t know which rod I was at the end
of” (198–99). White’s presence here is far more profound than a voice; it
is an active, engaged mind in motion, even in the stillness of the event.
The essay, originally published in the New Yorker in August 1941, recreated for its sophisticated, urban audience the rhythms and events of
a summertime-out-of-time “pattern of life indelible, the fadeproof lake,
the woods unshatterable, the pasture with the sweetfern and the juniper
forever and ever, summer without end” (White 200). Whether or not
White’s readers have ever gone to the woods (with their overtone of
Thoreau’s Walden, where one could live “deliberately”), White invites
them there, to that special segment of the universe in the last tranquil
summer before the cataclysm of World War II, where grandfather and
father and son blend in an indissoluble union. This essay has withstood
sixty years of intervening shifts in reading (and to a lesser extent teaching), and some critical bashing from post-structuralist, postmodern,
neo-Marxist, feminist, multiethnic and a plethora of other critical perspectives. Its survival attests to its resonance in human terms for generations of readers—women as well as men—who value the essay’s real
subject, the human connections White celebrates. Moreover, it is pedagogically versatile and can be taught for its narrative, implied argument,
comparison and contrast, illustration, characterization, tone, structure
(of sentence, paragraph, and whole work), and pace, as well as this myriad of themes.
The actual person of E. B. White, the existential human being, is irrelevant to the authorial presence conveyed within the body of his work.
Readers’ response to the intensely felt presence of the author in this
essay carries over to their reading of White’s other widely reprinted
essays as well; the process is the same for all other canonical superstars,
among them Orwell, Didion, Thoreau, Virginia Woolf, Martin Luther
King, Jr., Thurber, and Twain. This sense of authorial presence, when
coupled with other features of teachable texts identified above (such as
intellectual relevance, accessibility, and length) is predictive of future
canonical superstars as well. These are the contemporary belletristic
writers whose essays are beginning to appear in textbooks in significant
numbers, essayists whom some critical readers already refer to as “canonical” because of the felt sense that their presence is indispensable.
Tomorrow’s superstar shoo-ins (some of whom are already on the
canonical list) include Sherman Alexie, Diane Ackerman, Gloria
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Anzaldúa, Dave Eggers, Anne Fadiman, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Jamaica
Kincaid, Scott Russell Sanders, Shelby Steele, Gary Soto, Amy Tan, David
Foster Wallace, and Jhumpa Lahiri, if only she’d write more essays.
VOICE-OVER: Here’s what the FBI eavesdroppers in Cleveland, Indianapolis, St.
Louis would have heard: Colloquies in disembodied voices. Conversations with
academic colleagues, editors, and students about work-in-progress.
Arrangements with neighbors about car pools, play groups, peace marches, integration efforts, and the elementary school’s annual geranium sale (run, of course,
by the Blooms). One babysitter’s routine calls—on the job—to her bookie.
After my initial call to Dr. Spock—“I’ve recently finished my Michigan doctoral dissertation on literary biography and now I’d like to write a real biography—of you”—we talked only in person. Whether the FBI ever provided a
context for the fragments of lives they overheard, ever sought to assemble
whole presences from the auditory mosaic that tumbled into their tapes, I do
not know. Literalists would leave out the laughter, the fun and effort of the
process, the exhilaration born of the hope that this writer—myself—an author
behind the author of America’s best-known baby book—would and could
change the world.
I S S U E S I N T E A C H I N G C A N O N I C A L E S S AY I S T S

Teachers who distrust personal-sounding writing in the classroom
respond to such texts—particularly student papers—with suspicion and
distrust, and perhaps with readings more literal than the writing warrants.
The authorial presence sends the wrong message in an academic universe,
they say, making little allowance for the literary artistry—shaping characters, establishing a voice and an individual style—that they reward in fiction and poetry (see Bartholomae “Inventing”; Bizzell “Cognition”). Not
so. The essayist’s human presence raises ethical problems (for innocent or
forgetful readers) and possibilities for teaching writing and for reinvigorated academic writing that I have space to discuss only briefly.
Ethical Considerations

Author-evacuated texts, conventional academic articles, appear objective, impartial, as William H. Gass says in “Emerson and the Essay,”
“complete and straightforward and footnoted and useful and certain”
and “unassailable,” and are therefore “a veritable Michelin of misdirection”
(25). Author-saturated texts may be equally misleading. Readers expect
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honesty, openness, intimacy; a writer as personal-sounding as Orwell or
Didion or White is trusted to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. This trust in the personal is paramount, in spite of
what teachers as well as authors know about the aesthetic necessity—and
latitude—in shaping characters, setting scenes, representing dialogue,
and other features common to both fiction and creative nonfiction. In a
variety of circumstances—political, religious, cultural, academic—audiences trust the messenger and so they adopt the message. Thus teachers
have an obligation to make it clear that like all forms of literature all
essays, however personal or impersonal, are constructs. Wendy Bishop
offers teachers “Places to Stand,” saying that as a reflective writerteacher-writer, “I still need a place to write from, a writer’s identity; as a
teacher, I need to ask students to question the self they are constructing
in their physical texts and in the actual classroom” (22). Harvey provides
practical advice in “Presence in the Essay” on how teachers can teach
their students to create such constructs by employing the features of
presence he has explicated (649–53) and that I have used above in analyzing “Once More to the Lake.”
Pedagogical Influence

Personal presence gives essayist superstars, like canonical authors in
other genres, significance in the field disproportionate to their numbers.
Although they are not the rock stars of the belletristic world, because
their essays have been reprinted so widely, their influence has the potential for being profound. Yet we can ask whether these essayists have really affected the way the millions of student readers in the past fifty years
have seen the world. Have these essayists caused their readers to think
and act on the subjects their works address—civil and human rights, education, culture and multiculturalism, science and technology, writing and
the arts? Is the superstar influence actually as profound as its potential?
As many textbooks reveal, students are obliged to read essays as prose
models to emulate, even in process-oriented courses. In courses focusing
on critical thinking, argumentation, or disciplinary issues, students are
expected to read critically, take an intellectual stand, and enter into the
agonistic language and dialectical postures of the academy. But most of
the superstars’ work is reflective, interpretive instead; it invites readers to
enter the writer’s world, look around, deepen their understanding, and
come to their own interpretations and conclusions about that world.
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Some of these interpretations could, however, lead to social action—
even to civil disobedience or more extreme activity—for a number of
the essays by canonical superstars are revolutionary. These include
Swift’s “Modest Proposal”; Orwell’s “Politics and the English Language,”
“Shooting an Elephant,” and “Marrakech”; Thoreau’s “Civil
Disobedience”; Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail”;
and the Declaration of Independence. Yet Americans—teachers and students alike—tend to respond to these as historical documents, rather
than as incitements to social action (see Bloom, “Essay Canon” 419–22).
If essays such as these will make the students more thoughtful, morally
better people (perhaps in emulation of the author’s presence) or move
them to noble or socially responsible action, it is hard to discern such
effects in any given composition class. It is impossible to find any empirical research on the subject other than individual teachers’ claims to success, such as Bruce Herzberg’s “Community Service and Critical
Teaching.” To recontextualize any essay, no matter how inspiring or
incendiary, in a textbook and a school setting is for most college students to blunt the keen edge of the excitement—intellectual, political,
aesthetic—that inspired the author to write it in the first place.
Teachers should expect to expend some effort to override the anesthetic effects of anthologization, to help transform students from passive
readers of entombed works, however canonical, to active responders to living words, the lively presences within and behind the essays they read. If,
for example, students read “Shooting an Elephant” only as a course
requirement or as a personal essay—in this case, an episode of a junior
colonial officer’s humiliation before Burmese “coolies” long ago and far
away—they miss the point. If they read it in isolation from other canonical
works of civil disobedience they miss the point. Teachers can help students
understand a work’s importance in its original and its current contexts—
political, social, intellectual, aesthetic. Thereby teachers can reinvigorate
significant essays by encouraging students to make meaningful connections—among the past and present implications of a given work and
among works on related topics (say, issues of civil disobedience, human
rights, or multiculturalism). As such works come alive to the students, so
will their meaning and their invitations (implicit and explicit) to think—
and to act, to change the world. This transformative potential of literature
is one of the foundational principles of Kurt Spellmeyer’s forthcoming The
Arts of Living: Remaking the Humanities for the Twenty-first Century.

The Essayist in—and behind—the Essay

107

Reinvigorating the Genre

If more teachers wrote essays or academic articles with presence that
acknowledged their authorial investment, they would be better able to
teach students not only the craft but the art. Until recently, composition
studies scholars took the ideas—and indeed the personae—of academic
essayists with presence, such as Peter Elbow, Donald Murray, Mike Rose,
and Nancy Sommers—to heart but dismissed or trivialized the genre in
which they wrote as too obvious, too easy, too confessional: “U.S. composition teachers have created a school genre that can exist only in an
expressivist composition classroom” (Dixon 257). However, now that
more academics have begun to try such writing themselves, they have
realized how hard it is, in the absence of a predictable form and conventional academic language, to present profound ideas simply, with elegance and apparent ease. It is even harder to create a credible persona
of the sort that appears with regularity in such publications as the
American Scholar, Creative Nonfiction, Writing on the Edge, Fourth Genre, and
the serial volumes of Best American Essays, among others. Yet they are also
experiencing the rewards; while conventional academic articles engender citations, personal essays inspire fan mail, dissertation chapters, invitations to parties—and republication.
As writers of the genre, teachers and other essayists can with greater
authority show students ways to convey the presence that can transform
their own worlds and their relationship to their readers from distance
and abstraction to immediacy and engagement. As writers of personalsounding essays, teachers could speak with authority about the
inevitable disparity between the private person behind the work and
ways to translate salient elements of self-characterization to the public
document. They could have students try to consciously control features
such as motive, voice, degree and nature of investment in the subject,
with an awareness that what beats on the page is the vitality of the
writer’s vision, not the bleeding heart of the writer behind the work.
VOICE-OVER: In 1993 the Massachusetts Civil Liberties Union Foundation honored the five defendants of the 1968 conspiracy trial, Dr. Spock included, at
its annual Bill of Rights Dinner. In attendance was John Wall, who had prosecuted the government’s case twenty-five years earlier. Tight-lipped and remote
during the trial, he was now genial, beaming as he introduced himself to me.
“I read your book and I loved it.” He added, “When I saw Dr. Spock and the
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others in person, and came to know them through their presence in the courtroom, I grew to admire their ethics and their courage in speaking out and
being willing to go to jail—for life if necessary—to defend the principles our
country is founded on. The [FBI] agents just didn’t get that on the tapes.”
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APPENDIX
D I S C O V E R I N G T H E E S S AY C A N O N
The Research Method and the Evidence

Several years ago I casually asked, “What essays do people read today?
And where do they read them?” The short answer to a lengthy five-year
research process is this: those Americans who read essays at all find them
reprinted in composition anthologies (a.k.a. readers) intended for
freshman writing courses. Indeed, the twentieth-century American essay
canon is unique among literary canons, for it is primarily a teaching
canon rather than a critical canon. Thus it differs from the canons of
poetry and fiction of any era, and even from that of nineteenth-century
essays, in the way it is formed, transmitted, and changed. The poetry
canon, for instance, as Golding (From Outlaw to Classic) and Rasula (The
American Poetry Wax Museum) demonstrate, is created by an establishment of fellow poets who promote each other’s work. They publish each
other’s poetry in the little magazines and poetry anthologies they edit;
they award each other prizes in contests they judge, appoint each other
to judging panels, elect each other to prestigious literary societies. They
translate and comment on each other’s work, interview each other for
publication, invite each other to give readings and to teach at writer’s
workshops (Golding 70–110; Rasula 415–69). Novelists’ works—potentially far more lucrative than poetry—tend to be promoted initially by
publishers, then by critics who, as Barbara Herrnstein Smith explains,
judge, review, interpret, rank-order, evaluate and reevaluate them. The
critics’ esteem has traditionally influenced professors, who then create a
teaching canon by putting these authors on reading lists, teaching them
in their courses, and including them in the literary anthologies they edit
(42–53). However, while the teaching canon is but one way for fiction
and poetry to become mainstream, it is the only venue for essays to
become canonical in the twentieth and twenty-first century.
This has not always been the case. In the nineteenth century, the
works of essayists such as Lamb, Ruskin, Carlyle, Mill, Arnold, Emerson,
and Holmes arrived in the literary canon through the same cultural
processes as novels and poetry—their admission enhanced by a reading
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public that would “purchase, preserve, display, quote, cite, translate, perform” imitate, and discuss them (see Smith 42–43). But for a variety of
reasons (see McQuade; Connors; Bloom, “Essay Canon”; Bloom, “Once
More”), in the twentieth century the essay became relegated to a school
genre, its status reduced to that of the unreal, unreasonable “five-paragraph theme.” At this turn of the millennium, despite the distinctive literary presence of essayistic critics such as Susan Sontag and William H.
Gass, Americans have no tradition of buying single-authored collections
of what they regard as essays. Sometimes such collections get reviewed,
but except for the AWP and a few less prestigious creative nonfiction
prizes, they are seldom the objects of promotion by other essayists,
acknowledgment by critics, or extended treatment by biographers of the
authors, such as Orwell (see Root). Thus although compilations of
essays (on science, travel, sports, religion, food, and general subjects—
sometimes regarded as creative nonfiction) are now being published, only
the teaching canon ensures the endurance and widespread reading of
essayists in our time. No matter where an essay first appeared—whether
in the New Yorker or in a little magazine or on a newspaper’s op-ed page,
if it is to survive in the hearts and minds of the reading public, it must
be reprinted time after time in a textbook reader, where it has the
chance to reach a significant number of America’s three million firstyear college students. As Rasula observes: “Anthologies . . . are the
steroids of canon-building” (481). Consequently, the authors of those
essays that appear consistently in these readers become canonical.
To determine who were the canonical essayists, I decided to examine
the most influential readers, reasoning that the most widely read
authors would appear repeatedly in the most widely adopted collections—all books published in four or more editions over a fifty-year
span, from the end of World War II to the present. These turned out to
comprise fifty-eight titles published in 325 volumes, an 18.6% sample of
the total number of readers published during this period, the most
robust titles of the total number of 1,600-plus books that could be identified. A database of their complete tables of contents—21,000 items—
includes some 4,300 essayists, the authors of the 9,000 titles reprinted.
Of these, the works of only 175 authors have been reprinted more than
100 times, a scant 4% of the total number of authors but nearly half of
the total reprints. These 175 authors—from Agee to Zinsser—are the
canonical essayists. Note that because I’m using a sample approximating
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20% of the total number of books available, the numbers in my published canon tables (Bloom,”Essay Canon” 426–28; Bloom, “Once More”
35) have to be multiplied by five to obtain a more exact estimate of the
actual number of reprints. The figures I am citing here represent that
multiplier.
All essays in a teaching canon, irrespective of authorial presence or
voice, need to have the following characteristics that make them teachable. The essay needs to be intellectually appropriate for the course, in this
case first-year composition (a.k.a. Freshman English). It has to fit the
subject(s), level of difficulty, and orientation—social, political, philosophical—to reading and learning the course promotes, without being
so immediately topical that it will quickly go out of date. It has to appeal
to the teacher, for overt good reasons (is it intellectually challenging?
aesthetically engaging?) and covert bad ones (can it stimulate a good
discussion even if the teacher hasn’t read it beforehand?). It has to be
reasonably accessible to the students, with or without a lot of explanation in class.
In addition, a canonical essay must exemplify various formal features. It
must either be short enough (usually under 5,000 words) to be discussed in one or two class periods or capable of being excerpted without
undue violence to attain that length. A canonical essay should be well
written, a good model of organization, style, and vocabulary as well as of
one or more rhetorical modes, such as argument or description; the
more versatile essays exemplify a multitude of rhetorical and stylistic
techniques, as we have seen in the case of “Once More to the Lake.”
Additional influences on canonicity include the author’s reputation (a
plus) and the essay’s cost (a potential minus to canonical status because
every popular—and therefore pricey—author erodes an editor’s royalties; unknown writers are much cheaper).

8
U P O N T H E P U B L I C S TAG E
How Professionalization Shapes Accounts of
Composing in the Academy
Cheryl Geisler

In the late-nineteenth century, concepts of public activity were reshaped
by the emergence of the modern professions. Before the second half of
the nineteenth century, the term profession was reserved almost exclusively for the three classic professions inherited from the Anglo-Saxon
tradition and largely restricted to members of the upper class: law, medicine, and the clergy. By the end of the century, however, the rise of the
modern professions had transformed this upper-class solidarity based on
social ties into a middle-class solidarity based on ties of occupation
(Collins).
As occupation-based alliances formed to protect professional privilege, professions became players on the public stage in two senses. First,
professional associations assumed numerous roles, both formal and
informal, in shaping the regulatory conditions under which their members worked (Freidson). Second, individual members of professions
assumed the role of public representative of the profession itself, taking
on the burden of public trust by virtue of professional training and oversight. The actions of individual professionals, for good or for ill, were no
longer a strictly private matter but reflected, as a matter of public
record, on the entire profession.
The professionalization process entailed not simply the emergence of
a new set of privileged occupations but also a redefinition of individuals
as professionals with lifelong “careers” (Larson). In the academy, this
redefinition of the private self as public professional played itself out on
the stage of publication. Through texts, individuals created the ethos of
professional participation—invoking professional values, declaring their
own allegiance, and “making a contribution to knowledge” that substantiated the profession’s claim to privilege.
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In this chapter, I explore the dynamics by which writers construct professionalized selves during composing in the academy. My basic question
is “What story do participants construct in their accounts of composing?” In particular, how do they understand themselves and others as
players on the public stage of the professions?
BACKGROUND

The link between literacy and professional identity has been well established by two decades of research on writing in the disciplines. Learning
to write in school, for example, not only requires one to acquire specialized knowledge and vocabulary but also to rearrange one’s sense of
self and relationship to others (Berkenkotter, Huckin, and Ackerman;
Haas; Prior). Writing in the professions also has consequences for identity and relationships (Bucciarelli; Susan Katz; Myers; Winsor). Perhaps
as a result, the transition from one setting to the other is often fraught
with confusion and conflict (Clark and Doheny-Farina; Geisler, Rogers,
and Haller). Educational efforts to make the transition easier have had
limited success (Dannels; Freedman, Adam, and Smart).
In the academy, identity issues are shaped by the great divide between
expert and layperson (Geisler, Academic), a legacy of the professionalization movement, which sets the academic professional apart from and
above the general public. Through long training, the academic professional is expected to transcend the common misunderstandings of the
laity and to generate the specialized knowledge that enables other professions to work for society’s improvement. The general public becomes
both a source of misconception to be corrected and a market for those
corrections. For external validation, the academic professional looks
instead to the discipline.
In academic texts, the effects of professionalization are most obvious
in the citation practices that began to emerge in the second half of the
nineteenth century and still dominate academic writing today. In
research article introductions, the “gap” opened up through a literature
review (Swales and Najjar) often originates in a public misconception
about the topic that the disciplinary community has been trying to
redress through a program of research or scholarship. Citations to specific individuals are seldom to members of the general public but to
members within the disciplinary community, and progress is defined as
disciplinary progress.
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T H E S T U DY

In this chapter, I extend work done previously with two individuals writing academic argument with different degrees of professionalization
(Geisler, Academic; Penrose and Geisler): Janet, a college freshman who
had not taken an introductory philosophy course, and Roger, a Ph.D.
candidate nearing completion of his degree in philosophy. These two
worked for over a month on a writing project that led to the construction of an original argument about the issue of paternalism in philosophical ethics.
Extensive analysis of the protocols these participants produced as
they worked has been reported elsewhere (Geisler, Academic). From
looking at these protocols, we know several things about Janet and
Roger. First, they both completed their task by moving through the same
set of activities: Reading, Reflecting, Outlining, Writing/Revising.
Second, Roger was more specialized in what he was trying to accomplish
within these activities than Janet appeared to be. He interacted with
other authors’ texts only in the early activities and did not refer to them
later; he thought through just a few specific cases of paternalism, and he
did this thinking almost exclusively during the activity of reflecting.
Janet pursued things differently. She interacted with other authors’ texts
throughout her working time; she thought about many more and varied
cases than Roger, and she did this thinking throughout her working
time. These differences were suggestive of an increasing specialization
in Roger’s work, and they could with some logic be linked to Roger’s
greater participation in the profession of academic philosophy.
The protocol analysis alone has not, however, given us a firm grasp on
the actual mechanism by which these participants were seeing—or not
seeing—themselves as public figures in organizing their private efforts
at composing. To pursue this issue, I have analyzed the interviews each
participant gave following each working session—a total of ten for Roger
and twenty-two for Janet. Since my focus was on accounts of past actions,
sections of interviews were selected in which participants spoke about
the work they had accomplished so far. By and large, these responses
were in answer to one of the following questions (Geisler, Academic
appendix C):
• At what point did you stop in your last session?
• Can you describe the process you went through?
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• What problems did you encounter in your last session?
• Why did you stop your last session?

Using techniques for the analysis of verbal data (Geisler, Analyzing), I
examined these accounts for differences in the ways in which Janet and
Roger characterized public action and how this characterization played
out as they moved through the composing process. The specific analytic
procedures I used were as follows: I segmented the accounts into clauses, each with its own inflected verb. I selected from these clauses those
with human agents. I eliminated from analysis any clauses that dealt with
paternalistic situations (“the doctor interfered with the patient’s
rights”), with the situation of the interview or study (“I ran out of tape
yesterday”), or with repetitive back-channel expressions (“you know?”).
I then coded the remaining clauses as expression action in either the
private or the public realm. If the clause was in the public domain, I
looked at the agents of the actions and the actions themselves. Further
descriptions of the coding procedures and their results can be found in
the discussions that follow. All of the differences to be discussed were
found significant using the Chi-square test for homogeneity (Geisler,
Analyzing).
T H E L AY E R I N G O F P R I V A T E A N D P U B L I C

In their accounts of themselves and their work, both Janet and Roger
tipped the balance of their accounts more to the private than to the public. Some of these private accounts were descriptions of managing the
work process itself: “I stopped at the end of the section.” Others were part
of descriptions of literate actions: “I was just reading it / and taking . . .
some notes / and jotting notes down next to the paragraphs . . . in the margins in the booklet / as I was reading it.”And many of them were accounts
of thinking itself: “what I thought to be important . . . / just what I want
to remember.” Such private accounts attempted to give the interviewer
access to the private cognition of the participants. Neither Janet nor
Roger assumed we could infer these actions from the texts they had written; they needed to be explained.
On this base of private action, both Janet and Roger layered accounts
of action in public. That is, they both attributed actions to themselves
and others in ways that could be directly observable. A few of these
actions took place in the world: “Jamie [a friend] and I talked about this
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at great length.” Most of them took place in text: “Komrad [an author]
is talking about a blanket justification.” These public accounts of action
in text attempted to give the interviewer an understanding of what the
author of a text was doing, to characterize its accomplishment.
Although both Janet and Roger tipped the balance of their accounts
to the private, the nature of this balance and the way it played out over
the time of their work was significantly distinct according to a Chi-square
analysis, where the sum of Chi-squares was 38.09 with 1 degree of freedom and significance at p<.001. To begin with, Roger’s accounts drew
nearly as often from the public realm (45%) as from the private realm
(55%), whereas Janet’s accounts were predominately private (72%).
Figures 1 and 2 indicate how these different balances played out over
time.
For Janet, accounts of public action spread in an even layer over a
large base of private activity throughout the accounts that she told of her
composing. For Roger, however, accounts of public action pile up in the
middle period of his work, beginning at the close of reading and continuing in the period of reflection that preceded outlining or
writing/revising.
P L AY E R S O N T H E P U B L I C S T A G E

The Authorial “I”

For both Janet and Roger, the most common human agent in their
accounts of public action was “I.” This authorial “I” was one who spoke
in text: “I’d just like say that in my introduction . . . say something about
that . . .”; an “I” who discussed things: “I have already discussed . . . Ms.
Carter’s straight consent approach . . . actual consent approach . . .”; an
“I” who engaged in critique: “I made three criticisms of her.” In the public realm, then, this authorial “I” was the animator of the text, the agent
who moved through it and, with it, accomplishing his or her purpose.
Others

The world of Janet and Roger’s public accounts contained others, however. Not unexpectedly, a great many of these others were the authors
they were reading: “he [Childress]’s the one with the simple-minded one
[definition] . . . just crossing anybody’s will about anything.” Some were
the friends they talked to about the project: “I started talking to this kid
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Figure 1.

Figure 2.

/ I knew from my hometown / and he told me / on the side of his school
work, he’s reading all these books on psychoanalysis and psychology.”
Others were agents from the reference group they took as their base
community. For Janet, these were agents in school such as her composition instructor: “Like one time, he asked us to write down / how much
time we spent on a rough draft.” For Roger, these disciplinary representatives included the “we” who reads: “we don’t get the next move”; the
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“we” who deals with issues: “we’re dealing with justification now / we’ve
gotten out of the definition business”; and the “you” who considers
cases: “but when you consider cases involving some blood transfusion . .
. kidney transplants . . . and whatnot . . .” These other agents, the authors
they were reading, the friends they were talking to, and the members of
the communities that formed their reference groups, were the agents
with whom they saw themselves interacting on the public stage.
The Dance of “I” and Others

In keeping with the general tendency of Janet to work in private, the
majority of the actions she accounted for were her own even when she
moved onto the public stage. This pattern was significantly different
from Roger’s pattern of agency, according to a Chi-square analysis,
where the sum of Chi-squares was 52.73 with 3 degrees of freedom and
significance at p<.001. Both Janet and Roger referred to the authors
they were reading and the friends they were talking to with about the
same relative frequency (28% and 8–9% respectively). For Janet, a small
percentage of her remaining agents came from her school reference
group (9%), while the majority was attributed to her authorial “I”
(54%). For Roger, however, the use of the authorial “I” was much less
common, replaced by the disciplinary “we” or “you” about one-third of
the time, leaving the “I” with a bit less than one-third of the public
agents (30%).
As the graph in figure 4 indicates, Roger’s references to his disciplinary reference group played itself out over time in much the same way
that his public accounts did in general. Most of them piled up in the
period that closed his reading and continued through reflection. Other
agents had more delimited appearances on the public stage. Friends
came on stage early and then dropped out entirely. Authors were a presence through session 6, after which they nearly disappeared. The authorial “I” only played a major part from session 6 onward.
The dance of figures on the public stage was significantly different for
Janet (see figure 3). Authors appeared throughout. The authorial “I”
didn’t appear until the middle sessions, making a second major appearance at the end. School and friends seem to have served in a complementary role: they came on stage when “I” was absent; they left the stage
when “I” returned.
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Figure 3.

Figure 4.
AC T I O N O N T H E P U B L I C S TAG E

In their accounts, Janet and Roger portrayed significantly different kinds
of actions on the public stage, according to a Chi-square analysis, where the
sum of Chi-squares was 137.33 with 4 degrees of freedom and significance
at p<.001. By and large, Janet concerned herself with what was “said” (54%)
and how things were “orchestrated” (32%) and to a lesser extent with what
was “claimed” (11%). Roger had a comparable level of interest in “orchestration” (26%) but significantly less interest in “saying” (11%) and more in
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“claiming” (48%). He was also interested in “considering” ideas (8%), an
action in which Janet took no interest. [Note: some totals exceed 100% due
to rounding.] In the following discussion, we look at each of these actions
in turn. Complete definitions and examples can be found in the appendix.
Saying Things

Actions “to say” are foundational verbs of articulation. Some of them
were literal: “Jamie and I talked about this at great length.” But most were
metaphorical, describing giving voice in text: “that I . . . I said was impurely paternalistic.” “Say” was the preferred action for Janet who used it in
more than half (54%) of her public accounts. Figure 5 suggests that she
used it both to describe her own actions and the actions of the authors
that she read, and that “saying” occurred in accounts throughout her sessions. Roger portrayed himself and authors as “saying” things a lot less
often (11%). Figure 6 suggests that, for Roger, “saying” was a minor part
of periods of generally high activity on the public stage.
Orchestration

Actions “to orchestrate” involved managing the arrangement of text.
This often included actions of putting things in or leaving them out: “I
put as my definition”; actions whereby ideas were elaborated: “somebody
was developing an account in terms of rights”; actions by which the agent
moved around in text: “maybe I should just move on to the next section”;
actions that did something with an author: “I did Komrad . . . before I
got to Childress”; and actions that did something with an example: “and
then I tried to give an example.” All of these actions of orchestration
involved the text, concerned themselves with arrangement and elaboration, and set aside the issue of belief. Orchestration was a major concern
of both Janet ( 32%) and Roger (26%), without significant difference
between them in how they played out over time.
Making Claims

Actions “to claim” involved the public expression of belief. This included actions of believing: “I disagree strongly”; actions of argumentation:
“and she does this by wording her definition in such a way as to involve
some kind of interference with . . . the subject by the paternalist”;
actions that lead to the accomplishment of work in text: “they . . . made
something up”; and actions that provide elements of an argument: “so
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Figure 5.

Figure 6.

you have to provide piecemeal justification of whatever.” Verbs of “claiming” go beyond simply “saying” by implying the expression of belief in
text; they are foundational to the activity of argumentation. “Claim” was
the preferred mode of action for Roger, who used it nearly half of the
time (48%) in his public accounts. Interestingly, for the most part, it is
others rather than Roger who make claims, perhaps because he has associated most of the claims with which he would agree with disciplinary
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agents. By contrast, the relative frequency of “to claim” in Janet’s work
was low (11%). For Janet, claiming was not something that she or her
authors did very often.
Discussion

Actions “to discuss” involved interacting with others: “and he was telling
me / about a debate he had.” Unlike actions “to say” discussed below,
actions of discussion imply the presence of other interlocutors.
Surprisingly, discussion played a relatively minor role in the accounts of
both Janet (4%) and Roger (7%). Neither one seemed to see others,
particularly authors, as interlocutors with whom they interacted.
Consideration

Finally, actions “to consider” involve thinking publicly about an idea:
“imagine a case.” Verbs of consideration invite others into a process of
thinking that otherwise would be done in private. “Consider” was not
very common in Roger’s accounts (8%), but was entirely absent from
Janet’s. Thus, it was only for Roger that verbs of cognition moved onto
the public stage to be shared with others.
H O W P R O F E S S I O N A L I Z AT I O N S H A P E S T H E P U B L I C S TAG E

What can we say about the public stage across which both Janet and Roger
play out their accounts of composing? For Roger, the public stage
emerged in the activity of reflection through which others (authors,
friends, and the discipline) used the actions of argumentation (“to
claim”) and cognition (“consider”) in the service of developing the position that Roger’s authorial “I” emerged to claim as his own by the closing
act. For Janet, early scenes on the public stage were dominated by the “saying” of others (authors, friends, and school); in the middle scenes, the
authorial “I” began to “say” things for itself; and in the closing scenes, both
“I” and others were on stage together, still “saying” for the grand finale.
Professionalization has shaped the accounts of both Janet and Roger,
though from quite different perspectives. For Janet, the story of paternalism is a story told from the perspective of the layperson who attends
to the public stage in order to hear what others have said about the topic
and then orchestrate some of those things into a text for her own readers. For Roger, the story of paternalism is told from the perspective of
the expert who projects a series of claims onto the voices of the discipline in an effort to create a position for himself.
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While it might be tempting to see Roger’s accounts of composing simply as a contrast to Janet’s, we can also understand them as developmental in several ways. To begin with, it’s important to note what they
have in common. Both base their accounts on a solid layer of private
work. Both interact with authors, friends, and their particular reference
group. Both concern themselves with the orchestration of text and
somewhat less with discussion with others.
Furthermore, the differences between them, though striking, are not
surprising. Roger’s disciplinary reference group can be understood as
an extension of the school-based reference group that Janet used,
though its role has grown tremendously. His authorial “I”, rather than
simply disappearing, seems to have been transformed into a disciplinary
“we” that has now taken over much of its work. His “claiming” can also
be understood as an extension of Janet’s weaker “to say”; in fact, the relative frequency of “say” declines in Roger’s work (54% to 11%) in direct
proportion to his increase in the use of “claim” (11% to 48%). And finally, his use of actions “to consider” is not wholly without precedent in
Janet’s work; what may have happened is that cognitive actions moved
out of the private realm where they are found for Janet and onto Roger’s
public stage. The accounts that Janet and Roger offered thus show them
to represent, at the same time, two sides of the great divide that separates the laity and the public and two ends of a developmental spectrum
through which academic expertise develops out of school literacy.
It is important to recognize, however, that the sense of “public” for Janet
and Roger is much reduced compared to the visions of public that shaped
the oratorical tradition before professionalization (Clark and Halloran).
Janet’s public is a public trained to listen to what the experts “say,” not to
think about it. Roger’s public is his discipline, which, through the give-andtake of argumentation, develops the knowledge that the Janets of the world
are waiting to hear; they do not expect to hear from her.
It might be tempting to consider Janet as a representative of an alternative way of knowing (Belenky et al.), one who, under an epistemological stance often more frequently associated with women, seeks to build
community and extend knowledge, rather than “do battle” in argumentation. In academic philosophy, the division between professional and
layperson is fraught with issues of gender. Men dominate the field and
the gender bias in the kind of ethical thinking with which Janet and
Roger were dealing has been questioned by feminist philosophers
(Noddings). Janet’s epistemology does not, however, so much represent
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an alternative to Roger’s as its complement. That is, Janet’s stance is
dependent upon the Rogers of the world; she cedes knowledge-making
power to the players on the public stage while she is content to remain
in the audience. Thus, if Janet’s way of knowing has been shaped by gender, it has not yet been transformed by it—at least, in some of the ways
called for by feminist critics.
In fact, much has been written in critique of the model of professional expertise that we have seen underlying these accounts of composing. Many concerned with the public sphere have decried the impoverishment of the public forum and its replacement with disciplinary
expertise (Bender; Farrell; Phillips). Many in the academy have
renounced the foundationalist assumptions shoring up disciplinary
claims to expertise (Bauman) and have begun to explore alternative
relationships to the public and to members of other disciplines. What
this analysis has suggested is the ways in which professionalization has
shaped the very language with which we account for our work, the daily
stories we and our students tell of our progress in the academy, the stories through which we shape our identities. What will be interesting in
the coming years is to see is how such programs of reform reshape our
language, the identities that underlie it, and the scope of academic
action on the public stage.
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APPENDIX
V E R B A L CAT E G O R I E S A N D D E F I N I T I O N S

Category

Definition

Verbs found in interviews

Say

To say or give voice to

Articulate, mention, remark, say, talk,
talk about, tell

Orchestrate

To orchestrate or manage the
arrangement of ideas, including

Claim

To include

Bring in, drop, get in, have that,
include, incorporate, leave out, limit,
put, put in, shove, spend, stick in, take
in, take out, throw in, throw out, use,
write in

To elaborate

Call attention to, deal with, describe,
develop account, emphasize, expand,
explain, give feeling, go into depth,
list, make variations, relate, repeat,
skim, skip, stick to, summarize

To move

Come, finish, get out of, get to, go
along, go back, go from, go on, go
through, move into, move on, move
toward, pass on, start, step back

To use an author

Be imbedded in, do author, quote, use
author

To use example

Bring up examples, give example,
have examples, make case work, make
use of example, use

To claim or express an opinion or
develop an argument, including
To believe publicly

Agree, be against, believe, be with,
disagree, justify, regard as, subscribe
to, suppose, take, think

To claim

Argue, call, claim, come up with,
define, give definition, have as, have
point, make criticism, make statement,
make up, point out, show, take a
stand, waive, word definition, write

To accomplish

Cook definition, do, do something,
have flaw, make much of, make plausible, move toward definition, prime to
do

126

T H E P R I V AT E , T H E P U B L I C , A N D T H E P U B L I S H E D

To provide an argument

Accommodate belief, appeal, apply
defense, give definition, need justification,
offer definitions, provide, provide justification, supply definition, supply justification, take definition, want argument

Discuss

To discuss or interact with others

Address critic, ask, discuss, have a
conversation, have a debate, have discussion, love to hear

Consider

To think about publicly

Allude to, consider, do with, find features, get move, imagine, look for definition, make of it, parse

9
E T H I CA L D E L I B E R AT I O N A N D T R U S T
I N D I V E R S E - G R O U P C O L L A B O R AT I O N
Geoffrey A. Cross

Public interaction can expose private beliefs. In deliberating a public
policy, discussants may have to reveal personal values or privately held
information. This disclosure can make them vulnerable because some
people in positions of authority are not trustworthy recipients of sensitive information and may punish dissensus. How does one determine
when to reveal personal values or proprietary information in public settings? The answer to this question has important implications for solving
problems—particularly ethical problems—when writing and speaking in
collaborative groups. For instance, if group members are reluctant to
reveal differing private values, how can they work publicly to resolve an
ethical dilemma?
The question of when to reveal private beliefs in public settings is of
particular relevance today. Survey researchers report that while ethics
indicators are improving and a majority of employees are positive about
ethical standards in their organizations, one out of three American
workers in 1999–2000 observed behaviors that violated either the law or
their organizations’ ethical standards. One-third of the survey respondents also said that if they reported their observations, they would be
treated as “troublemakers by management or snitches by their coworkers” (Daigneqult). Although managers play a significant role in setting
the norms of ethical behavior by example (Pettit, Vaught, and Pulley),
flattened organizational hierarchies have distributed more responsibility for ethical policies across individuals and teams (Sanders, “Technical”
111). More companies today have developed ethical standards than in
1994 (Daigneqult), yet an examination of forty codes of companies
recruiting at Cornell University revealed that such written codes provide
little guidance to employees regarding potential ethical dilemmas
(Stevens 79). This finding is consistent with those reported in three
other studies conducted within the last twenty-five years (White and
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Montgomery; Cressey and Moore; Matthews); researchers here found
that written ethical codes are focused upon legalities and profits rather
than “community, personal character issues, or values” (Stevens 79).
In collaborative writing groups, different people are brought to teams
chiefly to share their different viewpoints and resources. With such
diversity, conflict is nearly inevitable. As Clark notes, we need to value
differences so that groups can cooperate as equals—“competing viewpoints must be recognized and attended to” (Clark, “Professional
Ethics” 38, cited in Sanders 111). Although everyone may not get his or
her way in the end, research suggests that groups that engage in substantive conflict (conflict over ideas) are more productive than groups
that try to smooth over differences (Burnett; Karis; Putnam). Yet “affective conflict,” conflict involving personal or emotional issues, has been
found to be disruptive to the group’s goal (Cross, Collaboration; Falk;
Guetzkow and Gyr). Private conviction with its accompanying emotions,
however, cannot always be neatly separated from public action.
Habermas has advanced an approach to ethics that addresses the
problem of stakeholders with diverse values in public deliberation
(McCarthy, Critical). Instead of relying upon principles that are not universally acknowledged, this approach requires that the group provisionally arrive at a governing set of common interests and rationally settle
moral issues by using a method of argumentation and analysis of argument that is closely related to Toulmin’s.
The goal of this approach is agreement that the group outcome has
been arrived at fairly. To enter into ethical dialogue, participants must
adhere to several ground rules. Group members must hold the premise
that the best argument will prevail, even though this triumph of reason
may not occur. Members must start with this assumption or their search
for the best solution is invalidated. To achieve consensual action, participants also have to assume that the other group members know what
they are doing and why, that their beliefs and goals are intentional, and
that they can support them with reasons if necessary. Group members
must assume this even though it often may not be true. Another prerequisite is that discussants choose language that will allow them to discuss the subject precisely and as much as possible without biases such as
sexism or ethnic prejudice. Such language is crucial to ethical deliberation, as Rentz and Debs have noted.
Having established the necessary attitude of participants toward the
dialogue and toward each other, group members must next consider the
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nature of the statements in the arguments. For a statement to be valid,
it must meet the following standards:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The statement must be comprehensible.
The statement must have true content.
The speaker must express his or her intentions truthfully.
The utterance must be right in the light of the existing norms of the
group.

Norms are “binding reciprocal expectations of behavior” (McCarthy,
Critical 313). An easy way to capture the function of norms in arguments
is to see them as “warrants,” as proposed in Toulmin’s argumentative
scheme. Norms are backed, in Toulmin’s sense of “backing,” by their
essential role in satisfying generally accepted needs that are related to
the issue at hand. So for all collaborators there is “something in it for
them” in adhering to the norms. An example of a norm might be the
ground rule “silence means dissent.” If one agrees with the point at
issue, one says why. If not, one reveals one’s position. The ostensible
advantage for all here is that competing viewpoints are expressed.
Of course, to set up these norms for group participation so that following them becomes mutually beneficial, people must be capable in
the situation of “nondeceptive recognition of common needs and interests in the light of adequate knowledge of existing and effectible conditions, likely consequences, and so forth” (McCarthy, Critical 315).
Habermas asserts that we need the condition of the “ideal speech act”
for his method to work—that is, unlimited discussion that is free from
open domination, strategic competition, and/or communication problems caused by self deception (McCarthy, Critical 306). Therein lies a
part of the rub: to speak the truth in dialogue and reveal our true intentions we make ourselves vulnerable. How forthright can people be when
responding to authority? Results of the survey cited earlier suggest that
a significant number of actions in the workplace are unethical and/or
illegal. If superiors and/or peers abuse their positions of authority and
mistrust is logical, then taking the rational approach to a “consensus
ethics” outlined earlier is not wise.
Consensus and logic per se are not enough to assure ethical outcomes in deliberation. A problem with Habermas’s reliance upon logic,
pointed out by Couture (190), is that in an extreme case a circumscribed, pragmatic logic may override ethics, as Steven Katz has shown
in his evaluation of the rhetoric of a technical document recommending
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the improvement of portable gas chambers during the Holocaust. The
recommendations in the document, if followed, would make the gas
chambers more efficient, but here logic and efficiency only advance the
monstrous. Another factor supporting the Holocaust was consensual
judgment—what Popper called “juridical positivism”—or mistaking
norms for facts (Open Society, 4th ed. 71). Just because a group of people
find something is acceptable or “true” does not make it so: the Nazis’
holocaust, egregiously wrong, was accepted by many. With this example
in mind, we must be careful about accepting any group’s consensus as
“truth.” Yet, we must also be aware that a diverse group, that is, one with
divergent and conflicting values, may still assess something truly. Most
countries and their inhabitants agree that there are crimes against
humanity that can be identified; thus, there are underlying values of
right and wrong that we all share at some level that may be ignored or
voted out but not erased. A diverse group of individuals may be able to
speak their minds and illuminate the subject in full relief because of
their multiple perspectives. Group diversity can, in fact, be insurance
against the juridical positivistic groupthink that destroyed both the Nazis
and their divergent victims.
So aside from avoiding obvious breaches in ethics, an organization
should not demand agreement but instead thrive on constructive dissensus, productive “collaborative fighting” (Cross, Collaboration 133). But
for conflict to produce more than a pugilistic catharsis, for it to achieve
mutual understanding depends, as Habermas notes, upon “a capacity
for learning, both at the cultural and political level” (Between Facts, 324).
Sometimes a cross-functional group includes members of such different
departmental/disciplinary cultures that members find it difficult to create a common mental model and translations are needed before deliberation can be productive (Cross, Forming). More important than translation across divergent groups is the political climate established for collaboration: people have to trust the organization they are in sufficiently
that they do not fear losing face when speaking out and learning from
one another. In short, the organization where they work must be in
touch with core values of humanity.
The conditions for trust that I have described are straightforward, but
they are not always apparent in real situations: what does one do when
it is unclear whether we should extend trust or not? Let’s consider a
hypothetical “real-world” situation. People are working on a business
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plan in a company that has recently acquired another company. The
finance professionals in the acquired company are reluctant to collaborate on the plan—to share their techniques and knowledge of operations with the finance people in the parent company—because they fear
that they will become expendable once their knowledge is no longer
theirs only. Not only are they reluctant to work on an intercompany business plan, they also are thinking about getting their former president
(now a vice president of the parent corporation) to lobby against this
plan, employing the rationale that the parent company doesn’t need to
micromanage them. In working together on the intercompany plan,
should they try to come up with a common set of ground rules, perhaps
considering rules such as “what we say won’t be used to replace us?”
The outcome is quite uncertain: on the one hand, perhaps the
acquiring company will indeed fire the acquired financial professionals,
but on the other hand, perhaps they will bring them into the company
more substantially, promote them, otherwise empower them, and financially reward them. Should the acquired employees trust the acquirers
enough to reveal intentions? Or even enough to reveal their distrust by
recommending ground rules that prohibit knowledge transfer leading
to the firing of those who shared their knowledge? Is Habermas’s
approach applicable here? The essential problem that this example illustrates is that trust is needed for collaboration to work, but it is not always
clear to individuals whether they can safely extend trust. To help solve
such dilemmas, we first need to define what is meant by trust.
Baier observes that trust is a cooperative activity in which we assist one
another in the care of goods or, I would add, people for whom we are
responsible. To be specific, allowing someone else to take care of our
goods (or people for whom we are responsible) is trust. Because we cannot alone take care of everything valuable to us, we all must trust or rely
upon others to some extent. As Baier notes, trust changes the power
relations between people, causing the truster to depend upon the
trustee, risking disappointment, betrayal and/or harm to self. A good
deal of responsibility is thus given to the trustee, who may or may not
accept this responsibility, explicitly by refusing the role requested, or tacitly by accepting the role but not fulfilling the responsibilities. Problems
with trust often result from power imbalances, imbalances that occur in
many of our personal and professional relationships. Power imbalances
in the workplace become amplified for those people who trust authority
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too readily, adding the vulnerability of trust to the vulnerability of the
subordinate position. Those in positions of power must guard against
unintentionally taking advantage of trusting subordinates, as Potter
notes (unpublished manuscript).
It is not surprising, as H. J. N. Horsburgh has identified, that, on the one
hand, full trust can be extended to one person just for a particular situation, and, on the other hand, extended to another person absolutely (353).
In many situations what occurs is not trust but reliance: we are uncertain
what the person will do but trust them to some degree anyway (Potter).
When should we not entrust someone else with our intentions and
needs or accept their trust? As Baier notes, it is when people have
motives and loyalties that conflict fiercely with ours. These conflicting
motives and loyalties may be the result of conflicting organizational
goals, or they may reflect individual priorities. For example, Maccoby
has identified “jungle fighters” as workers who in their lust for empires
not only always try to best their competition but also eliminate them
from the organization. Because of the possibility of untrustworthy
acquisitors—to come back to our workplace example—the acquired
company may want to probe the acquiring company to find out its leadership’s motives. Logic suggests that we also probably should not extend
trust to people who have betrayed trust in the past, even though they do
not have conflicting motives, loyalties, or ethical codes. A company can
adopt very impressive ethical codes, but they will not be engaged if
employees do not have integrity, that is, the moral will to act on these
ethical principles. In the case of the employees in our example, the
acquired employees should scrutinize the acquiring individual employees’ track records in dealings with others. Such scrutiny may reveal
whether they can be predicted to act with integrity.
When the institution of which any group is part is corrupt, it would
be unwise to extend its representatives full trust. Aristotle asserted that
we are by nature political, and how good we are is determined by how
good our institutions are. I would think that Thoreau, Gandhi, and King
would disagree to an extent, but institutions clearly influence people’s
behavior, as is indicated by even these nonconformists’ attacks on institutions. To apply this principle to our example, the acquired finance
employees should go beyond scrutinizing the ethical behavior of a few
individuals and check out the acquiring institution’s track record in
dealings with the acquired company and with others.
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Habermas points out that in cases where we cannot extend trust, typically we choose to break off communication, resort to force, or engage
in strategic competition (perhaps less euphemistically known as
“bureaucratic infighting”) (McCarthy, Critical 289). Thus, it is not surprising, as Potter tells us, that chronic distrust can be demoralizing, divisive, and contagious in organizations. When groups with diverse identities, values, and goals interface in a company, distrust may dominate,
undermining cooperation, self-respect, and moral action. Widespread
distrust is a major problem because, as was pointed out before, trusting
some people is necessary since we cannot care for all that we are responsible for all the time.
Having noted now when distrust is appropriate, when is it most favorable to extend trust? I propose these conditions:
1. When the trustee cares about what I care about—shared norms are
already operative.
2. When the trustee loves us (perhaps not always the case in every workplace).
3. When the trustee places a high priority on being trustworthy.
4. When the trustee’s past actions have indicated trustworthiness.
5. When the trustee has a genuine interest in others’ successes.

While these conditions for trustworthiness are fairly clear, often we do
not know people well enough to tell if they will or can meet them, so we
begin with some reliance and take baby steps toward full trust. This
approach exemplifies what Wiggins calls the temporal aspect of trust:
trust is often a quality and a process that develops over time. Trust
resembles induction; the degree of trust develops as data accrues to the
one considering extending trust.
How may we agree and get anything done in an American society of
increasing diversity? Rather than try to overtly engage universal principles that all members may not acknowledge, collaborators can try to
agree upon Habermassian operating rules that provide ethical direction. But individuals need to determine if the atmosphere is appropriate
for this kind of rational consensus building—by gathering information
about the motives, loyalties, values, and integrity of both the potential
collaborators and the sponsoring institution or institutions. When we
cannot tell whether to extend trust to reveal private values or privileged
information in public, it may be prudent to extend trust gradually. For
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instance, in our example, employees in the acquired company might
choose to work on only a part of the business plan with the acquiring
company. If trust is not merited, individuals should, it would seem, use
other strategies to defend themselves.
Rather than taking baby steps in every unsure situation and frequently lapsing into unconditional bureaucratic warfare resulting from
poor communication and trigger-happiness, there is probably also a
time for leading by extending trust and fully discussing ethical problems. As Potter notes, if we value responsibility and responsiveness to
others, we need to—within our abilities—encourage moral actions in
ourselves and others to enlarge the sphere of the moral. Because being
trustworthy is a praiseworthy quality, being trusted can build a group
member’s self-image and trustworthiness. Knowing that one is being
trusted can increase one’s desire to be trustworthy (Potter).
If one wishes to achieve a moral world, one may need in some cases
to “act as if” it existed, leading by example, acting in good faith even in
some cases with people whose trustworthiness is questionable. To paraphrase Antoine de Saint Exupery, one cannot just be a dweller in a
moral community; one must be a contributor too. To Saint Exupery, this
contribution allows one to understand others: “I can be bound to no
men except to whom I give. I can understand no men except those to
whom I am bound” (120).
As Ruskin and Saint Exupery have noted, the devotion to a moral
humanity and sacrifice of a diverse group of people has given the great
cathedrals of Europe their idiosyncratic majesty. These triumphs of
group effort were produced by the community’s entrusting labor, goods,
visions, and lives. A common trust drives successful collaboration, even
more than the remuneration for achieving the group goal because, to
paraphrase an adage, when you are up to your belt in bureaucratic alligators, it’s hard to remember your purpose was to drain the swamp.
Destructive infighting keeps groups from achieving their goals.
Through a rational extension of trust where warranted and through
risking trust in some situations where a positive outcome is less sure, the
collaborative group has a chance to deal with ethical issues and otherwise flourish. Without a common understanding/trust, group diversity
becomes a multidimensional barrier. Diversity without underlying trust
is an empty surrealism: a surrealism without the unifying power of the
subconscious.
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The appeal to our sense of virtue or ethos, as Aristotle said, may be
the most persuasive appeal of all. To motivate group members to achieve
the synergy possible through a common understanding, we must at
times risk going beyond the Habermassian rational—the logos of collaboration—into the ethos—the spirit—of collaboration. Enacting trust
in these situations risks the private for the improvement of both the private and public, which in the end are but two sides of the same life.
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IDENTITY AND THE INTERNET
The Telling Case of Amazon.com’s
Top Fifty Reviewers
Douglas Hesse

Shortly after the publication of his memoir A Heartbreaking Work of
Staggering Genius, Dave Eggers announced a contest whose rules were
simple: 1) post a review of the book on the Amazon.com Web site that
2) awards the book five stars (the top rating) and 3) bears no resemblance to the book itself (“McSweeney’s”). Within a week the Amazon
site for A Heartbreaking Work featured several cleverly wrought evaluations of how the book treated strategies for hanging sheetrock, the
Netherlands/Bhutan trade imbalance, or the relative merits of crotchet
versus spot welding, all of them headed with five stars. Clearly not appreciating the spirit of the contest, the Amazon.com Webmasters took down
the whole lot shortly thereafter, and the 400-some reviews that accumulated by the fall of 2001 had little of the whimsy and decidedly fewer top
ratings.
In devising the contest, Eggers parodied several conventions: the socially acceptable ways for authors to promote their own books, the genre of
book review, the reviewer’s stance and function, book-rating systems, the
Amazon.com reviewing/marketing nexus, and the status of Web communication itself. Like all good parodies, this one unveils interesting questions about its subject, and I pursue a few of them in this chapter. The published review has historically been reserved for scholars or otherwise sanctioned (and usually remunerated) reviewers. What constitutes the reviewing impulse and, by direct extension, the impulse to write, especially when
neither money nor career is at stake? If it’s partly an impulse for selfexpression/creation in a public forum, how is identity manifested in the
reviewing space? What role does the medium itself play? And how does
this clarify broader questions of “the personal” in writing whose direct subject is not the experience of the writers themselves?
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Before considering those questions, let me review some facts. As most
readers will know, Amazon.com invites site visitors to review products
sold there, not only books, videos, and music but also items ranging
from scanners to chain saws. Following a description of the product and,
regularly, an “Editorial Review” written by Amazon.com or taken from
publications or the publishers/manufacturers themselves, reader
reviews appear. Each begins with a rating from one star to five, provides
a bit of information about the reviewer (with a link to more information), and then offers comments ranging from a short blurb to several
hundred words. Readers are prompted to “Write an online review” via a
link that compels them formally to log in to Amazon.com’s site; one
does not review without providing credit card information, among other
things.
But having the reviews written, posted, and entered into calculations
(one learns the average reviewer rating for each product) is scarcely the
end of it, for Amazon.com compiles statistics for each reviewer and, in
fact, ranks them. For several months in 2001, the top reviewer was
Harriet Klausner, a retired acquisitions librarian from Pennsylvania,
married, with a twenty-one-year-old son. Ms. Klausner, who has four cats
and two dogs (a cairn and a pom), had written 2,768 reviews for
Amazon.com by Thanksgiving. That was 1,011 more than the number
two reviewer, Donald Wayne Mitchell, an “organizational process
improvement and strategy consultant” who is, among other things,
heading a “noncommercial project to make it possible for everyone in
the world to make progress at 20 times the normal rate.” We know these
things about Ms. Klausner and Mr. Mitchell because they (like thousands of other reviewers) tell us, in personal profiles that are linked
through their reviews or, more conveniently, through a “Top Reviewers”
page that Amazon.com maintains. Given their transitory nature, Web
pages are notoriously problematic citations. The Amazon.com “Top
Reviewers” pages are triply so. By definition, they change. A reviewer
with a certain rating one month may have a different one the next.
Further, reviewers are permitted to modify at any time the information
they provide through the personal profiles. Finally, new reviews for individual products continually are written, and at least occasionally,
Amazon expunges submissions. In writing this chapter, I selected several reviewers and reviews for analysis in early October of 2001. On
November 17, 2001, I revisited those pages on the Amazon.com Web site
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and printed a few hundred screens’ worth, including at least three pages
from each of the reviewers mentioned in the chapter. (Researchers or
other readers who need to consult these pages and who find that they
have changed on the Web may contact me for copies of archived materials. For more information on the reviewing process, see “Reviewers
FAQ.” <http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/subst/community/
reviewers-faq.html>.) In addition to including a personal statement, the
reviewer’s “About Me” space reprints several of his or her reviews, notes
the “featured review categories” in which they work (Ms. Klausner
reviews in over fifty categories), and lists the reviewer’s “favorite people,”
which in this case rather means “virtual favorites”: other Amazon.com
reviewers. More on them later.
My point is that Amazon.com has developed an elaborate technology
for keeping track of thousands of writers and hundreds of thousands of
reviews, and it is worth considering what this technology represents, both
for the company and for at least some writers who are clearly motivated
to compete in the system. A badge icon appears alongside each piece by
the Top Reviewers, indicating their status as in the Top 1,000, Top 500,
Top 100, Top 50, Top 10, or #1. Reviewers’ motivations are undoubtedly
diverse, from writing as a hobby, to writing as an ego exercise, to writing
as a way to influence, however subtly, American material and intellectual
culture. Amazon.com’s motivations for including reviews are undoubtedly diverse, too, from providing helpful advice, to creating an additional marketing mechanism (and also a data source for market research), to
keeping people longer on the Web site, to highlighting the “Internetness” of online shopping by importing features reminiscent of chat
rooms and Listservs. But just as the free territories of the Web promised
in the early 1990s have been colonized, claimed, and regulated, so has
Amazon.com’s review space. Whatever other incentives exist for rating
reviews, the practice creates a corporate ethos of being helpful and
adding value, supplementing the words themselves with one measure of
the reputations of their authors. The whole system of blurbs and ratings
mimics, after a fashion, the academic publishing system.
The ratings are generated through both quantity and quality measures. Site browsers vote whether a published review was helpful, and the
more helpful votes, the higher the reviewer rating. At work, then, is a
crude form of peer review. But it is a numbers game, too. Obviously, the
more items that one reviews, the more readers are likely to see and be
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TA B L E 1 . A M A Z O N . C O M R E V I E W E R S C O N S I D E R E D F O R T H I S E S S AY
Rank Reviewer Name

Number of Reviews Information from personal profile.

1

Harriet Klausner

2780

Former acquisitions librarian and current pet owner.

2

Donald Wayne
Mitchell

1757

Organizational consultant and business book author.

3

Frank Behrens

476

Retired junior high teacher.

4

Michael Woznicki

542

Technical instructor and reviewer of
electronics.

5

Lawrance M.
Bernabo

2008

"Irony is the master trope of the universe." (His entire submitted personal
information.)

6

Angel Lee

360

Recently started a rubber stamp company in Cleveland.

7

Barron Laycock
(Labradorman)

481

Admires Francis McInerny (see #10)
and disdains other reviewers' numbers games.

8

Robert Morris

477

Business consultant who creates content for many websites.

9

Rebecca@Seasoned
with Love.com

792

Personality type is INFJ; working on a
cook book.

10

Francis J. McInerney

515

Has stopped posting; encourages
Laycock (see #7) to keep writing.

11

Rebecca

584

Sixteen years old and likes fantasy,
science fiction, and horror.

12

Petersmaclean

486

Holds diplomas in business management, and wishes all could live in
harmony, free of abuse.

able to vote on them. By the same token, if one reviews relatively fewer
popular items, the latest Harry Potter book, for example, one will be
exposed to a broader readership than if one reviews relatively more but
less popular items, such as the latest Oxford University Press book.
(However, just to complicate this further, a Harry Potter review is easily
lost among hundreds and may go unread and unvoted—unless, of
course, it is flagged by a top reviewer badge that makes it stand out.)
This complex reviewing apparatus suggests a number of interesting
analyses. Selecting a corpus for closer study, I chose, first, the top twelve
reviewers on Amazon.com’s list, next the ten reviewers from the top fifty
who wrote the fewest reviews, and finally the remaining five reviewers
who wrote the most but are not among the top ten. I selected people
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Fewest reviews in Top 50
26

Turgay Bugdacigil

133

Turkish-based human resources manager. Reviews only five star business
books.

27

Doug Vaughn

234

I program computers for profit
because they afford no ambiguity. I
read books for pleasure because they
do.

32

Marc Ruby

219

A pleasantly rounded, somewhat
middle-aged member of the male
subset.

36

maniacmedia

182

Actor and graphic artist.

37

Alex Leslie

221

Reviews tools and books. Graduate
of Peekskill High. Former pilot.

38

Toolpig

180

Reviews tools and hardware.
Carpenter and father of two.

40

Laura Haggarty

229

Likes most things often labeled new
age.

43

Nick Gonnella

231

Account manager in the publishing
industry.

43

Friendly Spirit

163

Quaker, Mother, Booklover.

45

G. Merritt

205

Provides no personal information.

Others with > 800 reviews
28

Jason

849

Grew up listening to 70's and 80's
rock and still likes it best.

31

Thomas Magnum

1094

Provides no personal information.

39

Maximillian
Muhammad

3187

Lists several hundred favorite musicians.

47

Brian D. Rubendall

892

Average Joe type who loves any book
that tells a great story.

50

Bernard Chandler

949

Helps by putting ISBN numbers in his
reviews.

who wrote the fewest reviews because they necessarily had a high percentage of their works deemed “helpful.” I selected those who wrote the
most reviews because a comparatively low percentage of their writings
were judged worthy or they were so obscure as to go unread. Table 1
presents an overview of the group.
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H O W R E V I E W E R S T A L K A B O U T T H E M S E LV E S

Amazon.com’s “About Me” space allows reviewers to introduce themselves directly to readers. One might expect autobiographical information, but practices in the list range from reviewers who provide no information at all, to those who have only disembodied slogans (“Irony is the
master trope of the universe,” from #5 Bernabo), to those who present
what amounts to a résumé (sometimes even in the third person, as with
#26 Bugdacigil), to those who share personal details at levels beyond
Christmas letters (#38 Toolpig, whose daughter Missy loves butterflies).
There are three basic topics in the personal profiles: occupation, personal life, and reviewing itself. Some writers cover all, others only one.
Reviewers appear most likely to dwell on their work when it has some
connection to the kind of reviewing they do. Mitchell (#2), Morris (#8),
and Bugdacigil (#26), for example, write extensively about businessrelated books, and they themselves work as managers and consultants.
For them and others (such as Lee, #6), reviewing constitutes nearly a
form of marketing, of generating whatever name recognition accrues to
this kind of visibility on Amazon.com. When reviewers choose to include
information about their occupations—and about half of this group
did—they tend to put it first, which is hardly surprising given Americans’
general tendencies to introduce themselves in casual conversations by
asking or telling “what they do,” meaning how they earn a living.
Most reviewers include some discussion of reviewing itself, and this
topic subdivides into three areas. First is “why I review,” and the customary answer is to help others. Some confess reviewing because they enjoy
writing, but apparently this reason comes across as egocentric; it is more
palatable to avow liking books or reading, the implication being that you
can best serve by writing about them. To claim an interest in writing per
se counters the site’s ostensible service to reading. The second subtopic
of reviewing deals with “how I review.” Several writers talk about the
kinds of products they treat. A few explain either why their ratings are
consistently high or low (Vaughn #27, for example, says he usually doesn’t finish and therefore review books that are bad), and fewer still
describe their processes (as in Chandler’s [#50] explaining that he
includes the ISBN numbers in his reviews so people can find the books
more easily). The last subtopic is a kind of metadiscourse on reviewing
itself, often with references to Amazon.com and to reviewing practices
there, especially ones deemed suspect.
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The most interesting example of this last is an exchange between
Laycock (#7) and McInerney (#10). Laycock writes, “It is with great sadness that I read about Francis’ [McInerney] decision to no longer post
reviews” and cites his own dismay that quality plays no role in reviewer
ratings and his contempt for “one paragraph throwaway reviews of
obscure DVD and VHS releases” that can thrust a reviewer into the top
ten. McInerney responds: “Barron, I have taken this long to reply as your
thoughts caught me unprepared. Your words mean a great deal, and I
thank you.” He then goes on to comment on the proliferation of
reviews. Beyond the “there-goes-the-neighborhood” nostalgia evocative
of, say, Stanley Fish fretting about the demise of PMLA, and beyond the
direct evidence that at least some Top Reviewers keenly follow their status, what is striking here is the use of the “Personal Profile” space for
direct exchanges; after all, this is not a Listserv or a chat room.
While most reviewers do not directly converse with each other, many
do intimately address their readers. Rebecca@seasonedwithlove.com
(nickname: “cookingrl,” #9) starts her profile with an epigram, the first
eight lines of Shakespeare’s Sonnet 116 (“Let me not to the marriage of
true minds/Admit impediments”), which she attributes to Brush Up Your
Shakespeare. She tells us that she lives in Washington, is thinking about
adopting a kitten, loves castles and towers, has published two recipes,
and has an INFJ personality type. This mode enters her reviews, too. In
comments on J. Budziszewki’s The Revenge of Conscience (a review that five
of six people found helpful), she describes the author as “someone who
became almost an angel to me.”
Another Rebecca (nickname: “rebby,” #11) is less effusive, both in
her profile and her nearly six hundred entries. Sixteen years old and
homeschooled, she lists among her favorite series Dear America and Star
Wars: The New Jedi Order, and her reviews scatter through fantasy, horror,
science fiction, and historical fiction. Her persona is considerably more
guarded than Rebecca@seasonedwithlove.com’s, or to put it another
way, more closely matching traditional conventions of the review, down
to the reviewer’s bio.
Even more guarded, though at the opposite end of the self-disclosure
spectrum, is Marc Ruby (nickname: marcruby, #32). If, in Walker
Gibson’s taxonomy, Rebecca is a “tough” speaker and Rebecca@seasonedwithlove.com a “sweet” one, then Ruby is a “stuffy” one. His profile begins: “I am a pleasantly rounded, somewhat middle-aged member
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of the male subset of the human species. Normally even tempered, I am
subject to pique when I find someone who doesn’t like my reviews (or
who doesn’t appreciate how nice it is to have someone around who is
right all the time).” His reviews have a similarly überpolished style that
closely matches published conventions. (Consider: “Jim Butcher has
clearly created one of the strangest wizards in detective fiction. Actually
he is a wizard/gumshoe with the kind of do-gooder streak that is a cinch
to cause trouble.”) In both style and content, these three reviewers suggest the X and Y coordinates of self-presentation on the “About Me”
pages: the amount of personal information disclosed and the degree of
intimacy or formality with readers.
REVIEWING AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF IDENTITY

The diversity of the reviewers’ “About Me” statements leaves unanswered
the question “why do they write?” As I noted, several foreground business interests to the point of writing as (self) marketing. These reviewers
are relatively few, as are those who openly come out for making the
world a better place. More frequent are the writers who modestly want
to guide other customers. My own first experience with the Amazon.com
reviews came as I researched buying the entire run of National Geographic
on thirty-one CDs, only to be eloquently convinced by reviewers that
poor technical quality made it a bad investment. Finally, however, marketing, altruism, or direct advice accounts for only part of the drive to
review. Rather, and this is especially true for the Top Fifty Reviewers,
there is the motive for self-expression or creation.
In one of the best concise definitions of the personal essay, Edward
Hoagland defined the genre as existing on a line between “what I think
and what I am” (46). The identity pole is typically figured by autobiographical elements in the essay. To the extent that the “About Me” sections or the reviews themselves contain such elements, they make explicit this essayistic impulse. A traditional way to account rhetorically for selfdisclosure is to consider it as an ethos-constructing strategy. A traditional theoretical account would label it the situating of knowledge, the making present of the writer’s subjectivity and situation in order to contextualize her or his interpretation. No doubt both are part of these
reviews. But as Robert Connors noted, epideictic rhetoric (and surely
the review has as its ostensible impulse praise or blame) is a rhetoric of
display, finally a display of the self (30). Consider Friendly Spirit’s
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admission that “I loved Kathleen [a character in Nuala O’Faolain’s novel
My Dream of You] because she is so much like me—a cynical romantic
(can there be such a thing), ever hopeful and yet practical, imperfect,
packed with mistakes and flaws, some painfully obvious to others, some
painful to herself, and yet ultimately lovably human.” Such expressions
are common across the reviews and across the personal statements, but
they are hardly universal.
Even when writers don’t narrate their experiences, the very nature of
these reviews invites self-fashioning. Understanding this claim involves
understanding the genre and discursive nature of these reviews in relation to other Internet textual practices, existing somewhere between a
newsgroup or Listserv posting and a Web page. The Amazon review, or
rather the complex of reviews by a single author, has a closer affinity to
the Web page, especially as the writer produces more reviews and
achieves a top ranking.
Various theorists have explored ways that Web pages serve substantially to construct and assert identity. As Nina Wakeford notes, the subject of a personal home page is the author him- or herself, with the central organizing question being “Who am I?” (34). Charles Cheung
explains that while many home pages answer this question “directly” by
including specific autobiographical information, others do so indirectly
through the nature of the information and links included. Chances are
fairly slim that any personal home page gets found on the Web through
general Web searches (Cheung 47–48). Yet this may not be a barrier. As
Jennifer Petersen explains: “Audience plays an integral, and interesting,
role in these self-representations. Whether or not the sites have many
(or any) readers, the very public nature of the representation presupposes an audience; the self-representations are geared toward the (envisioned) audience” (161).
In the strictest sense, Amazon.com reviews do not constitute home
pages for the reviewer. The reviews, after all, are assimilated into the
Borglike site that Amazon.com manages, reviewers creating neither the
physical appearance nor linkages of their contributions. Yet to a large
degree, they do individually and collectively control content, and
through the rating competition, they even control an aspect of the
design. Each posted and read review potentially juggles the rating order,
with implications especially for what shows up on the Top Reviewer’s
opening page. Further, since every posted review has a link to “About
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Me,” “About Me” takes on characteristics of a home page, space that can
be used toward various ends, as my quick review above indicated. Finally,
once readers are on the “About Me” page, they can link to other reviews
that the writer has published, so that each new review adds another
incremental element to the reviewer’s constructed identity, all organized by “About Me”—and by Amazon.com’s apparatus.
I suggest this is quite a new way to construct identity, one dependent
on the intersection of several genres and discursive practices: the review
itself but also Web pages, newsgroups, journals, and Listservs. For traditional reviews, a book’s being published or a product released creates
the epideictic occasion for writing. Usually limited by space (though the
reviewer’s fame buys extra acreage), writers figure themselves primarily
through relating the book under discussion to other books, the references outlining their verbal identities. In print publications, the relatively scarce spaces for people to write to strangers are generally
assigned. In Amazon.com’s space, reviews are elected, and there are no
external space limitations that I can discern, though surely if one tried
to upload, say, a novel into the review space, the site’s Webmasters would
sanction it as they did the Eggers reviews.
Unlike the traditional review, and borrowing a genre feature from
Web pages, Amazon.com reviews can be linked through the writer’s
“About Me” page, with some of them further including a URL to other
author pages (though Amazon.com doesn’t make these links active).
There are additional Weblike features, most notably the “Friends and
Favorites” area. Reviewers can create a list of “Favorite People,” “other
Amazon.com shoppers, friends, and favorite reviewers that you like and
trust.” Whenever someone you designate a “favorite” writes a review,
Amazon.com sends it to you. A step beyond “Favorite People” are
“Amazon Friends” (formerly designated as “Trusted Friends”), people
who “have permission to see a private view of your About You area,”
including not only personal information about the reviewer but also
items from his or her “Shared Purchases Page.” This last is a list that you
choose to share of the items you have bought from Amazon.com.
Fascinating as it would certainly be to analyze the appeals and marketing strategies of these features, there is no space in this chapter. I will
simply note the five strands of identity creation available to reviewers:
what you say about yourself, what you read, what you say about your
reading, who you like, and what you buy.
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None of this information really pertains to the very occasional
Amazon.com reviewer, but all these elements come into play for the Top
Fifty Reviewers. Traditional personal Web pages are hit-and-miss affairs
in terms of whether anyone ever reads them. The structured marketing
space of Amazon.com paradoxically offers a pretext for being discovered that traditional pages do not, and the more one insinuates oneself
into that space, the better one’s chance of being found. If hits mark the
degree to which one is present in virtual space (much as citation indexes
mark one’s influence within some academic disciplines), then more is
better—and more hits mean more links to “About Me.” The drive to
(re)produce oneself textually in the world (and there is not room here
to explore how that drive is both socially constructed and biologically
impelled) is an end to itself, and Amazon.com provides one means to it.
That means differs from other self-fashioning Internet genres such as
the online diary or blog. A blog, shortened from Web log, is “a web page
made up of usually short, frequently updated posts that are arranged
chronologically—like a what’s new page or a journal, [whose] content
and purposes . . . varies greatly—from links and commentary about
other web sites, to news about a company/person/idea, to diaries, photos, poetry, mini-essays, project updates, even fiction” (Blogger). (For an
interesting example, see the diary diligently kept at http://www.slithytove.net.) Unlike the single-author spaces of diaries and blogs, the
Amazon.com site depends on congeries of writers interacting, producing not only reviews but ratings and rankings.
Christine Hine explains how Internet users are engaged in configuring one another, but the idea of “user” is complicated here beyond the
conventional subject position of information consumer. Most business
advice on Internet marketing focuses on knowledge as exchanged
between suppliers and consumers. Of seven strategies summarized by
Davenport and Jarvenpaa, only one explains how to “design electronic
communities for knowledge exchange” (151), although a seller risks
much through this strategy, including losing control of the message
space, as in the case of the spurious Eggers reviews. In the face of postmodernity’s proliferation of information sources and abjuring of final
authority, James M. Slevin observes:
[Internet readers and writers] actively seek to forge commitment and mutuality with others in an attempt to restrict the experiences they have to sample
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in order to develop a coherent self-identity. . . . Individuals are thus routinely engaged in accessing information which often stems from distant sources,
and in making information available to distant others in an attempt to unify
and make sense of their own involvement and the involvement of others. (25)

While grounded in commitment and mutuality, Amazon.com’s “Top
Reviewers” site multiplies rather than restricts writer experiences.
“Coherent self-identity” comes substantially through the sheer number
of writings produced, sometimes to such extreme ends as #39
Maximillian Muhammad’s 3,187 reviews and his “About Me” statement
seeming to list every musician he could possibly name. It is telling that
most Top Reviewers mark coherence through an “About Me” page that
serves as the nexus (as cogito? as strategic persona? as reptilian brain
core?) for their scattered reviews. It is perhaps more telling that some
reviewers decline any personal statement—though Amazon.com does it
for them by reporting their basic data (number of reviews and ratings,
review categories, and so forth).
BEYOND AMAZON.COM: SCHOLARSHIP AS OCCASION
FOR THE PERSONAL

An early commonplace, since challenged in theory and practice, was
that the Internet would provide open spaces for radically democratic
presentations of information and ideas. It is telling that developers
chose browser to name the software for negotiating the Web, for implied
in the name is a relatively undirected mode of use. Early advice for developing Web pages emphasized providing readers links through which
they could seamlessly follow associations to unexpected places. However,
Web use has evolved much differently, toward more purposive searching,
away from more serendipitous browsing.
The transition has had subtle implications for how writers imagine
and place themselves on the Web. Browsing readers may happen across
your home page, vivifying a virtual you. Searching readers likely will not.
Writers therefore have to find or create occasions that will attract readers. Topics or products are such occasions. In creating the reader
reviews superstructure, Amazon.com almost certainly didn’t have the
main goal of offering a pretext for writers to construct and extend textual selves, nor would I assert that reviewers self-consciously intend to do
so. But this Web site enables just that.
In doing so, it functions in ways similar to academic journals. To varying degrees, both reviewers and academicians share the goal of interpreting
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and evaluating texts with the aim of influencing others. But the
advancement of knowledge is hardly the only or even most important
motive. With direct consequences for merit, tenure, and promotion,
professors have to establish textual selves within the discourses of their
disciplines. Obviously, except for those seeking marketing angles,
Amazon.com reviewers don’t have this imperative. Still, the dynamic is
instructively similar, as writers in both situations need official spaces to
which readers turn.
But there is more, and it has to do with manifestations of the personal in the academic. Three common, entwined rationales for autobiographical elements in academic discourse are rhetorical, epistemological, and political. Writers include personal materials for reasons of ethos
and pathos or for Burkean identification. Or writers do so to mark the
contingencies of knowledge: who I am filters what I perceive and how I
understand it. Or by dramatizing experiences that represent or evoke
certain subject positions, writers call attention to groups that must be
taken into account. All three strategies are no doubt true. But as a list
they are incomplete.
We ought not overlook the plainer desire to put ourselves textually
into the world, our interpretations and ideas, yes, but also some fuller
identity. Those autobiographical elements collectively recognized as
“the personal in the scholarly” are metonymic of this broader desire. Just
as reviewing gives Amazon.com writers a pretext to write themselves
where personally unknown readers might read, so does academic publishing. Yes, to advance knowledge and a career. But also to establish a
self. Scholarship’s “About Me” equivalent has traditionally been the
author’s bio, its personal home page the curriculum vitae. Because print
lacks hyperlinks, “About Me” has been stealthily making its way into
printed texts themselves. In standing the conventional order on its head
(the scholarly serving the personal rather than vice versa, personal identity being the ends rather than the means), I confess exaggerating for
effect. But only to a certain extent, perhaps one similar to Richard
Miller’s assertion that ours is now “a world where all writing—from the
achingly personal confession to the finely tuned literary exercise to the
resolutely indifferent bureaucratic memo—competes on a level playing
field for our attention.” He concludes: “The world is now awash in writing that no one reads” (49).
In such writing times, when the circle of readers we know personally
is too small to accommodate the selves some of us would put forth, we
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look for bigger circles. As decades of vanity press books and, more
recently, Web pages make clear, individuals widen those spheres themselves, especially when texts proliferate, and bookmarking, not browsing, becomes the preferred user mode. Finally, it is the space that editors, publishers, and even retailers control that is our best hope for readers. But it isn’t enough to fill this space with mere information. In his
provocative analysis of life-writing’s role in an age of “data fatigue or
data nausea” (146), especially as caused by the Internet, Charles Baxter
muses that “the memoir is memory’s revenge upon info-glut” (151). To
write oneself into the information—or against it—is an act of self-constitution not only for the writer but also the reader. The burgeoning
enrollment in MFA writing programs, especially the thirty-five new ones
in creative nonfiction that have sprung up in the past half dozen years,
is but one sign of a cultural push to expression through writing.
Another, more mundane, is the thousands of Amazon.com reviewers
and a vast realm of discourse—perhaps less about books than about me.

11
T H E I N F L U E N C E O F E X PA N D E D
AC C E S S TO M A S S C O M M U N I CAT I O N
ON PUBLIC EXPRESSION
The Rise of Representatives of the Personal
David S. Kaufer

The concept of a public is contested territory. We can’t even decide on a
preferred part of speech. Noun or adjective? Is the public an entity in
search of properties? Or a property in search of entities? When we think
of public in the entity sense, we usually think of it as a mass of citizens.
A politician says, “The public is behind me,” meaning that there is constituent backing. But how much backing? The difficulty in answering
this question is that public, as entity, is a mass, not a count, noun. It is
more like air than sheep. You can count the sheep in the field. But
counting air? Of course, you can count people in a poll. Unfortunately,
publics are not people polled. Our tradition of Whig liberalism celebrates politicians who make unpopular decisions, who speak to a public
that includes excluded voices, future generations, and not just the voters that pollsters sample.
In American public address, publics as entities reference the speaker’s
perception of his or her backing—the public is behind me—when
charging into a rhetorical situation or the barriers he or she must
cross—what the public needs to understand—to address a situation
effectively (see Cramer for a discussion of how the public is used within
art controversies). Within both discourse conventions, the public as
entity fills in rhetorical slots rather than draws out specific references to
persons.
My interest in this chapter is more the adjectival sense of public, particularly as a modifier of the noun expression. What is public expression
and what properties does it confer to ordinary expression? With Brian
Butler, I have already addressed this question at some length (Kaufer
and Butler) but will briefly summarize our answers here. Public

154

T H E P R I V AT E , T H E P U B L I C , A N D T H E P U B L I S H E D

expression is expression that meets the speaker’s goal of on-the-record
predictiveness. By virtue of being predictive and on the record, a speaker is able to claim standing as a representative of a community’s felt condition. The notions of on the record, predictiveness, and representativeness reinforce different sides of the same basic speech attributes. Onthe-record expression means that the speaker permits the audience to
hold his or her utterances to future review. The speaker going on the
record allows audiences to archive his or her present expression and
compare it for consistency with his or her future statements.
Predictiveness refers to the speaker’s self-imposed constraints in granting the audience this permission. It puts the speaker under pressure for
constancy from past to future. Unlike promising, which obligates future
action to a specific other, on-the-record predictiveness creates only a
presumption, to nonspecific others, of constancy from present to future.
Representativeness refers to the reasons why the audience claims these
rights over the speaker and why the speaker feels bound by them. The
speaker’s words are meant to stand in, be a mouthpiece for, the audience’s interests. The audience thus has a natural interest in the speaker’s on-the-record predictiveness. A public speaker can say, “We will
spend the surplus on social security” on the record and then contradict
that statement months or years later (“We will spend the surplus on war
with terrorists”). The speaker has not broken a personal promise. Still,
the speaker must account for the inconsistency even if the shift from
present to future is perfectly justified. That is the burden of public
expression.
The term public expression is now often used interchangeably with mass
expression. This practice is understandable but also a mistake. The adjective mass references the mathematical ratio of speaker to audience. The
Greek amphitheater allowed for the one-to-many communication marking the tradition of oratory and public address. But a child babbling in
a crowded amphitheater, though not forfeiting the environment of mass
expression, never claims the title of public speaker in the sense of
mouthpiece for others.
Extensions in mass expression wrought by technology correlate with
changes in public expression. However, if we blur the two concepts, we
lose any possibility of understanding their mutual influence or their
joint and separate influence on new media. In the next section, I will
turn my attention to the influence of the new media on mass expression,
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putting us in a better position to understand how public expression may
be changing as well.
N E W M E D I A A N D T H E O P E N I N G O F AC C E S S TO M A S S E X P R E S S I O N

New media have significantly opened access to individuals seeking to
participate in mass expression. In traditional rhetoric, the many of mass
expression had to fit into a single space, sharing propinquity growing
out of shared proximity. Under new media assumptions, the disruption
of proximity also weakened the assumption of propinquity. This is not
because, with enhanced technological support, communication precludes strong ties between speakers and audiences. It is because with
such support, communication no longer requires such strong ties
between sender and receiver (Kaufer and Carley). The many of mass
expression need share nothing but a remote wire. No assumptions need
be made about social or spatial ties as a requirement of communication.
Contemporary rhetoric (Farrell; Harris; C. Miller, “Idea”) has, for this
reason, focused on communities of divergent backgrounds, interests
(Zappen, Gurak, and Doheny-Farina), and discourses (Bakhtin), where
the right to speak (and be heard or read) is open to negotiation and
interpretation.
Barriers have also lowered with respect to the entitlements required
to participate in mass expression. In traditional rhetoric, participation
relied upon speaker entitlements that gave access to a forum. These
entitlements were accumulated in life as a precondition for public
expression. A speaker’s ethos in classical rhetoric was achieved, artistically, in the speech. But the speaker still relied upon claiming a material status in life (viz., lawyer, legislator) as a condition for displaying ethos
in art. The speaker’s capacity to create public expression was measured
by the (prior) power to assemble a mass audience.
Under new media assumptions, by contrast, expression is taken for
granted, irrespective of entitlements accumulated in life. Community
groups, on- and off-line, participate in special interest discussions, where
speakers self-select based on an expressed interest in a forum to speak.
Whether the expression rises to public discourse is an act of legitimation
left up to the community (Eberly). The competition to hold attention as
a public discourse is fierce, as private interaction can exist in a cacophony of voices. The situation resembles that described by Zappen, Gurak,
and Doheny-Farina: “seventeen ‘voices’ from different places all ‘speaking’
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at once in the same ‘place’ and ‘speaking’ in fragments rather than complete discourses” (400).
Mass expression, many-to-many communication, can as easily involve
the instant messaging of teens as subsidized political speech. Modern
technology severs the ancient tie between mass communication and institutional infrastructure. For reasons to be applauded, many contemporary
rhetoricians have raised questions about how the lowering of barriers to
mass expression can lead to collective democratic action. These questions
involve delicate balances describable in many overlapping ways: balancing
the communitarianism of collective action with individual rights and privacy; balancing the prudence to listen only to what is worthy with the egalitarianism to say (and listen to) what is available to hear, balancing deliberateness with the speed of spontaneous expression. The delicacies of
these balances have occupied many rhetorical theorists investigating contemporary assumptions (Gurak; C. Miller; Harris, “Idea”).
Nonetheless, the outstanding problem this literature has yet to
answer—and for which I confess no answer—is how to leap from the
quantitative expansion of mass communication to the qualitative
improvement of public communication in the sense of representative
speech. Because an expansion of mass communication tempts, without
guaranteeing, an expansion and improvement of public discourse, the
path of one to the other becomes all the more problematic.
Conundrums Posed by the Technological Access to Mass Expression

When access to mass communication is so abundant today, even in the
absence of strong ties, what do speakers and listeners readily share that
still defines a community of interest in need of representatives? What
makes your private expression representative of my own and others’
thoughts and beliefs? When, in the absence of so much shared physical
context, does speaking about (ordinary reference) also become speaking
for (public discourse)? What makes the expression that comes from my
mouth worthy of shared attention—that is, worthy, necessarily, of my
attention and the attention of others? When the many-to-many communities of interest to enter are so numerous, how does a single speaker or
a single listener hold attention with any one?
While these questions are fundamental and predate technology, the
fact that technology now (in principle) grants anyone both a printing
press and a microphone to the world makes these questions especially
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pressing today. As technology makes speech universally assessable in
principle, it becomes necessary to seek other grounds, beyond cultural
privilege, that make it public and representative. What are those
grounds?
Representatives of the Personal: Personal Identity as a Rising Public Trope

My own lead on this question is to follow Elbow, Billig, Ritivoi, and other
writers in rhetoric who, in various ways, have noticed that the personal
has become an increasingly central trope of contemporary rhetorical
behavior. In traditional rhetoric, a speaker seeking representative power
had to have an ongoing story of identity to be predictive from past to
future. A shaper of ethos, the identity story girded the speaker’s call to
judgment or action in a world of shared proximity. In contemporary
rhetoric, marked increasingly by long-distance mass expression and
weakened social ties and attention, the identity story has found its way
more and more into the foreground of public expression. Because of
the impact of contemporary mass expression, the common denominator left for us to notice and share, as a rhetorical resource, may be our
very personhood. As a public trope, personhood is not just referencing
a single life but telling life stories that claim to speak for others, to win
adherents about a life that is worth learning from if not imitating.
A CA S E S T U DY: T H E N E W YO R K T I M E S ’ S W R I T E R S O N W R I T I N G S E R I E S

For the rest of this chapter, I use a case study to briefly illustrate my point,
both of the rise of personal life stories as a rhetorical trope and their popularity in the culture. I analyze the Writers on Writing Series, published by
the New York Times since 1997. The column regularly appears every other
Monday on page 1 of section E of the Times. The series was the brainchild
of the Times’s culture editor, John Darnton. A Pulitzer winner for fiction
and a Polk Award winner for journalism, Darnton reports that he had
struggled with his first novel and found himself endlessly curious to know
the secrets of successful writers. He thus devised the Writers on Writing
series to satisfy his own and what he expected to be the literate reader’s
curiosity about writing. At the time I was completing my analysis (July
2001), the series had accumulated some fifty-seven contributions, each
between 1,300 and 2,000 words (see the appendix to this chapter). In the
early summer of 2001, the Times also published a hardcover book edited
and introduced by Darnton, containing the first forty-one entries.
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The Times’s series contributors feel under no pressure to create, or to
spur the creation of, public discourse. They explain their personal craft
through their subjective eyes. They speak only as individuals. They do
not try to communicate truths from the authority of the other contributors. The authors never cross-reference one another. But, as I show,
there are still traces of a collective perceptiveness and bids to win adherents about preferred life stories relative to learning or teaching writing.
The Times’s Series Viewed as Personal Expression

Rather than encouraging the analyst in search of a tidy synthesis of public discourses, the assumptions of the contributors about literacy seem as
individualistic and quirky as they are in the profession of English. I shall
map out here, in more detail, the divided attention of the series, viewed
as multiple individual expressions.
Some contributors in the series see the Western literary tradition as
the sine qua non of literacy. The education of the writer, according to
these contributors, properly includes Shakespeare, Wordsworth, Defoe
(Goodman), Proust (Epstein), Joyce (Turow), Woolf, Eliot, and Pound
(Howard), along with citizenship within an elite “Republic of Letters”
(Bellow). Others emphasize a linguist’s eye and ear for everyday language (Erdich; Salter), spoken and written, beyond the narrowly literary. Still others insist that writers of today need to understand writing as
a form of media studies, noting that the visual media of the twentiethcentury have profoundly influenced our current sense of the literary
(Doctorow). Other contributors praise the dogged archival skills that
draw writers not only to dusty library shelves but also to basements,
attics, and garage sales (Proulx). Still others feature the teaching
(Bernays; Delbanco) or study (Wolitzer; Vonnegut) of writing as an intellectual pursuit of its own.
The education of the writer portrayed in the series is wide-ranging
and diverse. Yet the writer’s formal education is only part of the divergence at issue. The series’ contributors also have many divergent things
to say about the life experiences shaping writers and their writing. Illness
and suffering are notorious for cutting short a writing career. But some
contributors single out these same factors as helping to inspire writing
success (Hoffman; Stern). Other contributors emphasize the importance
of the writer cultivating a cultural awareness of politics, history, and class
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(Koning; Paretsky). In some contributions, this takes the form of urging
writers to unearth from the culture interpretations that are poorly
understood, misunderstood, or unknown among majorities. The Native
American Ojibwe language taught Louise Erdrich how to notice relationships in nature that English conceals. Close observation of his dog,
Colter, taught Rick Bass that the summons to hunt is a natural calling
that others, perhaps less sensitive observers of their own pets, have too
frequently failed to notice. The lack of explicit sex in so-called serious
literature tantalized Barbara Kingsolver to explore, and break, this
taboo in her own work.
The series’ writers make clear that writers are nourished by personal
obsessions. Yet, here again, the obsessions are diverse and fit no uniform
pattern. Writers are obsessed with putting an order on life’s disorder
(Leavitt), with lives they wish to know (Howard), lives they wish to
escape (Banks), and lives they wish to transform (Aciman). They are
obsessed with current events in the popular culture (Hiassen) and with
the characters they meet in daily life (Shields; Miller). The obsession
intensifies when the characters are drawn from their own families
(Aciman; Tan; Kincaid; Robinson). And, overall, the obsession spills
over into a sense of love for the characters and the worlds they see coming alive on the page (Smiley).
Finally, the series calls attention to the fact that the sublime art of writing is always dependent on the mundane daily sustenance of the writer.
Although writers need high-minded objects of attention to wield their
craft, they also need the bare necessities, necessities that writers, one of
history’s most fragile occupational workers, seldom take for granted.
Besides an income, these necessities involve a shelter to write in, tools to
write with, and methods to write from.
There exists much variability about favorite shelters, tools, and methods. With respect to shelter, the writer must have a habitat. The habitat
may be a room adjoining the kitchen (Rosen), a coal room in the basement (Haruf), or an attic with an old typewriter (Chute). It may be “the
same chair” at “the same hour” (Mosley) or simply a “little room”
(Kincaid). It may not be a permanent but an occasional habitat, like a
table in a library surrounded by shelves of books (Goodman). The habitat need not be stationary nor even enclosed. It may involve moving feet,
the writer as runner (Oates; Kincaid). Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley,

160

T H E P R I V AT E , T H E P U B L I C , A N D T H E P U B L I S H E D

Thoreau, and Dickens regarded their long walks as part of their literary
habitat (Oates).
The writer too must have equipment, whether a computer (Mosley)
or a Waterman pen with black enamel and gold trim (Gordon). And the
writer must have technique. It may be consulting one’s internal muse
(Smiley), turning off one’s internal critic (Goodman), entering a reverie (Mosley), nocturnal dreaming (Fleming), or rereading what has been
written before (Sontag). It may require turning on Bach’s Christ unser
Herr zum Jordan kam as background music to get going each morning
(White). It may even require watching TV and goofing off, accumulating enough life experiences to decide when enough can be harvested to
resume writing once again (Ford).
The Times’s series calls up a set of divided themes surrounding the
nature of literacy and its fundamental relationship to language, the literary, culture, class, media, politics, and everyday ritual. I want to be
careful to distinguish divided objects of attention from divisive objects of
attention. The attention of this series is deeply divided but not divisive.
Most contributors enter different topics. And when they do enter the
same topic, they seldom make observations that question the truth of
other observations. The spirit of the series is pluralistic and nonagonistic, even when true disagreements are broached.
The Times’s Contributors Viewed as Representatives of the Personal

I would now like to examine the Times’s series from the other side of the
private-public duality. We will now read for an interest in providing public representatives of the personal, models of a writer’s personal life that
can represent, speak for, and win the adherence of certain readers.
As a rhetorical theorist, I am struck by the fact that the series marks a
common solicitation for roughly comparable accounts (about writing)
and is addressed to a roughly common rhetorical situation: The Times’s
series invites market-proven authors to talk about their craft. What are
the possibilities of responding to this rhetorical situation? In light of the
fact that each respondent must produce a text of a relatively similar
length and format (a short feature article), can we say something systematic about the choice points and the actual choices that underlie the
rich variety of responses we can read? Let us then turn in more depth to
the rhetorical situation the New York Times has defined and to the structure of the responses the Times has thus far elicited.
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The writers invited to participate in the Times’ s series are emblems of
artistic and commercial success in letters. This is not insignificant to the
mass readership of the Times. Textbook publishers put out hundreds of
dry books on writing each year that never draw the mass reader. What
draws Times readers to the Writers on Writing series is the ethos of the
writers. Each of the contributors boasts success in a field where odds for
success approximate the lottery. The mass-market reader is likely to construe the invitation to successful writers to discuss writing as also an invitation to discuss beating the odds. Like devoted concertgoers who come
to hear a favorite artist’s underground notes and back stories, readers of
the Times’s series are drawn to understand the accounts of those who,
against great odds, have “made it.”
While aspiring artists might be expected to focus on a future still
hoped for, established artists are challenged to address the startling fact
of success when success is rare. The writers’ accounts in this way are
accounts of agency. Given the nonrandom barriers standing in the way
of market success, readers will not accept an account that bases success
solely on random accident. They will seek to find agency in the writers’
accounts even if the writers themselves are reluctant to provide it. A
writer claiming to be the beneficiary of dumb luck or a friendly muse
will invigorate the mass reader to look for how the writer nevertheless
managed, below the radar, to rein in luck or court the muse. No matter
how much an account focuses on how a writer “fell into” success, massmarket readers, seeking agent-based explanations, will keep a watchful
eye on what the writer relied upon to make his or her own success. The
mass-market reader looks to the Times’s series for positive role models of
writers, not simply arid explanations of writing.
One need not take my word to accept this analysis of the mass-market
reader of fiction. Rosellen Brown reports running into such readers all
the time, who complain to her when her characters are complex human
beings rather than role models imagined for self-improvement books. She
describes one encounter with a female lawyer who had hated one of her
characters, also a female lawyer. The reader complained to her, saying:
”Well, look, I’m a lawyer, too, and a woman, like your character, but”—and
her expression became urgent as if she had clamped her hand to my arm—
“the book was no help to me. It didn’t tell me how I should live my life.”
(Brown, as cited in appendix)
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In addition to seeking potential role models, the mass-market reader
also seeks out themes or lessons as specific points to learn from and follow.
The image of the mass-market reader hungry for “themes” does not
originate with me, but with Diane Johnson, who observes that the
“themes” of a text are something readers of fiction are much keener to
look for than authors are to spoon out. To illustrate the point, Johnson
remembers the following tale:
In Seattle a man asked me what the theme of rescued cats and dogs in my
books meant. I had to think about that, because I hadn’t really noticed them
there. Freud would say those cats and dogs are children, but that doesn’t
seem quite right to me. (Johnson, as cited in appendix)

Johnson cautions that a novelist too invested in themes may end up
with a novel weighted down with more ideas than can be investigated
through action. She suggests that themes are a reader’s device for holding in memory some of the various layers of a layered text. Themes do
readers more good than writers.
Returning to our rhetorical analysis, let us suppose that readers are
drawn to the Times’ s series in part for role models and lessons about
writing. Let us further suppose that the contributors to the series accepted the invitation to participate with some knowledge of this mass-market
expectation. Each writer, that is, knows he or she has been selected as an
example of success and has been asked to write for an audience that is
likely to be interested in picking up some of the secrets behind that success. Each contributor may have chosen, of course, to meet this expectation to a greater or less extent. But the fact that the expectation lurks
in the background of the invitation probably had some constraining
effect on all the contributions.
The writers of the Times’s series needed to adapt their writing to a
common occasion and expectations. From the patchwork of texts we
reviewed in the earlier part of this essay, we will be able to discern how
the authors work systematically to portray themselves as public representatives of the personal.
The invitation to participate in this first person series is based on reputation. The writers know that readers want to learn about an “I” that
has built a successful career from past to present. To let readers in on
their secrets, the writers of the series will want to help readers consolidate their past and present selves into a single career image.
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CONCLUSION

From traditional to contemporary rhetoric, we have witnessed a dramatic growth of the ordinary individual’s access to a mass audience. This
growth has spawned much conjecture about the relationship between
increased individual access to technology and changes in public address,
the language making bids to represent others and to form groups. I have
restated the evidence that our increased access through technology has
weakened the ties between ourselves as individuals and has further weakened our attention to one another’s messages. I have conjectured that
these weakenings themselves account for an increased focus on personal life stories in our public discourse. No matter where in the culture we
are situated and no matter how fragmented our affiliations and attention, we are still persons invested in life stories that are told to us from
the point of view of those we perceive as role models. In the second part
of the chapter, I used the New York Times’s Writers on Writing series as a
case study to explore and to try to explain the popularity of this contemporary form of rhetorical behavior. For those of us grappling with
the problem of defining democratic collective action in the face of the
new technologies, we may be advised to start with the assumption that
speakers and their audiences have, at least and perhaps at most, selves
in common to bring to a public sphere of representation.
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P R I VAT E W I T N E S S A N D P O P U L A R
I M AG I N AT I O N
Marguerite Helmers

Father, don’t you see I’m burning?
Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience

Beck screamed helplessly as the wind blew his tent doors open, then blew
the sleeping bags from his body.
David Breashears, High Exposure

On May 10, 1996, a sudden storm stranded several climbers on Mount
Everest. By all accounts, the mountain was crowded with over fifty amateur and professional climbers that day. The traffic caused slow movement toward the summit and a bottleneck of climbers at the Hillary
Step, the last hurdle before the slope toward the summit. When the
clouds lowered, the wind picked up speed, and the temperature
dropped. It was already past the safe turnaround time for the climbers,
the time that is imposed to avoid the hazards of climactic changes that
are common in the mountains. No one knows why, but some climbers
continued to ascend. By the time they began to descend, they were lost,
blinded, and frozen. Six climbers were dead by the next morning. Two
were professional climbers who lead groups of clients, the term for paying customers, to the top. Two succumbed to frostbite and lack of oxygen. Two had simply disappeared.
One of the clients on the mountain that day was a Texas pathologist
named Beck Weathers. Weathers was an experienced, nonprofessional
climber climbing with the New Zealander Rob Hall’s team. Like the others in his group, he had paid $65,000 to have a shot at the summit of
Everest, the tallest mountain in the world and the legendary icon of
dreams. Due to the storm and the incredible events that unfolded over
the next day, Weathers became something of an icon himself.
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Professional climber and photographer David Breashears notes in High
Exposure: “If I can be one tenth of what Beck was that day, I will have
been a worthy man” (274).
On May 10, on the way to the summit, Weathers had stopped climbing earlier than most of his team. A year and a half earlier, he’d had a
radial keratotomy operation on his eyes to correct his nearsightedness.
However, he remarks: “At high altitude a cornea thus altered will both
flatten and thicken . . . rendering you effectively blind. . . . That is what
happened to me about fifteen hundred feet above High Camp in the
early morning hours of May 10, 1996” (Weathers 32). The team leader,
Rob Hall ordered Beck to remain where he was and wait for the rest of
the party until the afternoon descent, when they could return to High
Camp together. Weathers did what he was told, but the hours dragged
on with no sign of Hall, until in the dark at 6:00 p.m., with six other
climbers, he began to descend, roped to guide Neal Beidleman. Within
an hour, they were engulfed in a roaring wind and a wall of white clouds.
Lost on the mountain, the group huddled together to stay warm. Search
parties sent out from High Camp over the night and into the morning
rescued five of the seven at this camp. Two clients were so badly frozen
that they were left for dead: Yasuko Namba and Beck Weathers. With
their faces covered by inches of ice, they were amazingly still breathing,
but “were judged so near death as to be beyond help” (Breashears 270).
It was an act of triage, part of the mountaineers’ code to leave behind
those who are so close to death that a high-altitude rescue by physically
exhausted and oxygen-depleted climbers would endanger other lives.
Yet Weathers did not die. He opened his eyes, struggled to his feet,
and began stumbling forward in the direction he believed was High
Camp. He fell repeatedly and began hallucinating:
Both my hands were completely frozen. My face was destroyed by the cold. I
was profoundly hypothermic. I had not eaten in three days, or taken water for
two days. I was lost and I was almost completely blind. (Weathers 52)

At camp, someone radioed down the mountain that “the dead guy”
had just walked in, like the lurching Frankenstein monster of the old
films. Recalled climber Todd Burleson: “This man had no face. It was
completely black, solid black, like he had a crust over him. . . . His right
arm was bare and frozen over his head. We could not lower it. His skin
looked like marble. White stone. No blood in it” (Weathers 54).
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Weathers was put into a tent. Climbers at High Camp were told to leave
him there and not attempt to bring him back to Base Camp, as he was
certain to die anyway. During the night, another storm furiously struck
the camp. The wind ripped open the doors of the lightweight shelter
and filled the tent with snow. The tent began to collapse around him.
Alone in the tent, helpless from the frostbite and exhaustion, he cried
out for help, but the wind roared so loudly that no one could hear his
cries. At some point, as he fell in and out of consciousness, he was blown
from the sleeping bag and left lying on the floor. The next morning,
writer and climber Jon Krakauer popped his head into the tent. “What
the hell does a person have to do around here to get a little service”
Weathers yelled (Weathers 58).
In the book Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History, Cathy
Caruth describes “the address of the voice” that “demands a response”
(8–9). This is the cry of trauma. Caruth recounts Freud’s story of a
father’s dream of a burning child, in which a child dies from a fever and
the corpse catches fire from a candle left burning near the body. The
father, asleep in the next room, hears the boy calling to him in his sleep,
“Father, don’t you see I’m burning?” (9). We should understand from
this narrative, Caruth tells us, that “one’s own trauma is tied up with the
trauma of another” (8), that we must listen to the language and the
silences of trauma, experience, and the cries of the wound. A trauma,
Cathy Caruth posits, is a wound upon the mind, “experienced too soon,
too unexpectedly, to be fully known and is therefore not available to
consciousness until it imposes itself again” (4). Survivors of trauma must
revisit and rewrite the events in order to give themselves a voice in the
events.
Weathers’s autobiography, Left for Dead, is a cry of the wound. It is, in
Caruth’s words again, a story that relates the crisis of death, but also the
crisis of life for, having survived the terrible days on the mountain,
Weathers is rescued by helicopter and returned to the United States,
where he must reconstruct his body, his life, his profession, and his marriage. Readers of his autobiography are enmeshed in a personal narrative
of overcoming the illness of his body and the lifelong mental illness that
caused him to seek climbing as a refuge. I focus in this essay on Weathers’s
memoir because it is part of a larger discourse on high-altitude climbing,
real-life adventure stories, and narratives of disaster in remote areas that
has appeared as a major publishing trajectory in the last five years. Today,
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the names of turn-of-the-century explorers Robert Falcon Scott and
Ernest Shackleton are almost as familiar as the hard-boiled heroes of the
films Die Hard and Hunt for Red October. Thus, Weathers’s book fills a reader’s need to know more and vicariously experience more from places that
lie beyond the accessible regions of the earth. Significantly, the tales of
Shackleton, Scott, and the Everest teams of 1996 are tales of misfortune
and disaster. We read their tales as testimony to the endurance of the
human spirit, but also as evidence of their pain.
As Michael Bernard-Donals has recently written, the truth of a person’s testimony affects historical understanding, just as the witness has
been affected by the cultural conditions of retelling. A testimony often
relates to events that have been culturally construed to be significant to
many people. “It is the point at which the event is lost that writing
begins,” argues Bernard-Donals (77). The writer “becomes an ‘I’ over
against which the event can also be identified, given attributes, and finally named,” entering into the interplay between language and silence
that Maurice Blanchot describes as the writing of the disaster. Weathers’s
autobiography provides an interesting case for study because the facts of
his story were widely known prior to his writing. If we follow BernardDonals’s argument, then, it is up to Weathers to establish his character,
rather than the facts, in the narrative. Weathers must take the events
known to the public and provide his private reflections on them.
At least five accounts of the “disaster season” were published before
Weathers’s own work. In May 1996, e-mail dispatches were forwarded
home from Everest through the NOVA/PBS Online Adventure
(Expedition ’96: Everest Quest). John Krakauer, a journalist for Outside
Magazine, was assigned to cover the Everest climb but ended up covering
the disaster. His account, Into Thin Air, was published in 1997. Anatoli
Boukreev, one of the guides assigned to team leader Scott Fischer, published his own account of the disaster titled The Climb (1997). David
Breashears, on the mountain with four climbers and an IMAX camera
crew, published his memories in High Exposure (1999). The 1998 IMAX
film, Everest, that incorporated the May 10 disaster into its story line was
filmed by Breashears. These accounts served as indexes for the points of
the disaster. Furthermore, Weathers’s story was related in the national
press, on television, and in the television “docudrama” Into Thin Air
(1997). Thus, the facts and the general trajectory of the story line are
known. Weathers is in the interesting position of writing a response to
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the disaster. He is a witness as well as a survivor who offers testimony of
the event. In Caruth’s terms, his own trauma is “tied up with the trauma
of another” (8). At the same time, Weathers is somewhat transparent.
We gravitate toward his narrative in order to see through to the iconic
moment he is representing, satisfying our public need for more information and for personal revelation.
Media critic Joshua Meyrowitz has noted that the easy access to multiple types of media in American society, such as books, magazines, newspapers, television, and the Internet, allow access to previously remote or
forbidden spaces and experiences. Places such as Mount Everest
become demystified because people are familiar with these places
through multiple exposures. At the same time that media allow us access
to the remote places of human experience, they provide us with access
to the interior spaces of the human psyche. Behaviors previously considered “private”—or what Meyrowitz calls “offstage”—become the focus
of media. He cites the television program Entertainment Tonight as an
example of the ways that media present “a wide range of personal
expressions in addition to ‘objective facts’” (177). Furthermore,
Meyrowitz argues, the American audience has developed a “presumption of intimacy” by being exposed to these confessional media (181):
It now seems more acceptable to write books about the very personal lives of
great people, to reveal old secrets, and to betray old confidences. Indeed,
memoirs without such intimate revelations about the writer or others now
seem stuffy and unrealistic. (179)

The premise of this book, The Private, the Public, and the Published, is
that everything we say and do can be made available to nearly everyone
who shares our access to media. Modern technologies—print, voice, and
electronic—translate private lives into the objects of public consumption. “Contemporary life increasingly deprivatizes stories, displacing ownership from individuals to broader going concerns,” write sociologists
Jaber Gubrium and James Holstein (180). In this cultural milieu,
Weathers’s authority as an author is fragmented—and this fragmentation is reflected in his ghost-authored text (the book was written with the
assistance of Stephen Michaud), spotted with reflections from his
friends in Dallas and his wife, Peach. Left for Dead is the story of a wound
and its healing, and like the recovery, the book represents the unevenness
of healing. There are points of disruption, moments of silence, anger,
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pain, and humor. Weathers’s wound was suffered once in private and
then reenacted in public narrative.
Bernard-Donals notes that a traditional view of testimony is that it
contributes to the construction of history, transparently providing facts
and details to the public (79). The American public has multiple ways to
access personal stories, but as we will see, testimony is not a “window
through which we see clearly the events themselves” (Bernard-Donals
79). Weathers chose to employ multiple narrators in his autobiographical account of his trauma in order to occupy different points in time and
different attitudes toward the events. He intentionally destabilizes the
events of May 10, 1996 by placing emphasis on the rescue efforts of May
11, 1996 and the subsequent recovery of his mind, body, and family.
The word witness is used as a noun and a verb in the English language.
As a noun, it stands for evidence; as the Oxford English Dictionary defines
it, the oral or written testimony of an event is “an attestation of a fact,
event, or statement.” As a verb, the word witness indicates the active participation of a person who has seen and who can verify, “one who is or
was present and is able to testify from personal observation, one present
as a spectator and auditor.” Steven M. Weine describes witnessing as
being able “to see, to know, and to be engaged with an other’s experience of traumatization”:
Assuming many different forms, the phenomenon of witnessing occupies a
central position in late twentieth-century Western culture. Witnessing encompasses more than the traumatic experiences themselves; it also includes the
life that was shattered and the life of the survivor. Witnessing is concerned
both with the individual and the collective. It is private, a confession embodying the survivor’s spiritual, aesthetic, and moral essences. And it is public, a
documentation of historical events and cultural traditions. The witness
receives, processes, and transmits survivors’ knowledge. Most important, witnessing strives to be consequential—for the witness, the individual survivor,
the collective of survivors, and other witnesses to this witnessing. (168)

Weine stresses the importance of collective memory, which is a
process of documentation. Yet the act of recording facts and events does
not in itself constitute witnessing. The witness must be able to establish
credibility, must be permitted a place and time to speak, and the tale
must be remembered (Shay 222). In Shoshana Felman’s book Testimony,
Dr. Dori Laub points out that trauma is not witnessed until it is inserted
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into language. Writing and language are essential to recovery from traumatic experiences because they overcome the silence that is “a place of
bondage” to the trauma, the oppressors, and the events (58). Narrative
also involves an audience, and, as Laub points out, “the listener to trauma comes to be a participant and a co-owner of the traumatic event:
through his very listening, he comes to partially experience trauma in
himself” (57). Psychologist James Pennebaker has commented on the
connection between writing and trauma as well, although Pennebaker
disputes that an auditor or audience is necessary for the writer:
[L]anguage apparently plays a critical role in processing the trauma. One of
the critical aspects [of recovery] may be that somehow in the process of writing down their deepest thoughts and feelings about the experience, people
get to organize the experience in a very emotional way. . . . Another critical
discovery was that it does not seem necessary for people to directly share
what they have written with others. . . . I think our work is hinting that as a
therapist you need to create an environment where a person feels completely free to reveal what they are thinking and feeling, and allow them to put
things together. (King and Holden 359)

Extrapolating to the broadest rhetorical terms, then, the traumatic
experience deploys logical and emotional elements that affect teller, tale,
and audience. Bernard-Donals warns readers and listeners that the narrative has the power to displace the events of the real into a representation, thereby making the events and their retelling uncanny because
there is uncertainty as to their “true nature” (84). In other words, once a
narrative of trauma becomes public, it assumes conventional constructions of public discourse that may mask its authentic nature. Laub and
Bernard-Donals are both taking Holocaust testimony as their subject,
while Pennebaker’s subjects were men and women who lost a spouse to
suicide or car accidents. It goes without saying that there is a significant
difference between Holocaust testimony and a narrative of illness such as
Weathers’s. No one would willingly place themselves into a situation of
extreme brutality and oppression, whereas people quite willingly climb
Everest each year. Everest, the physical mountain, is extrapolated into an
idea, and the idea feeds fantasies of glory and adventure, the stuff of
Kipling and Stevenson, the epic of Man versus the Elements.
From an Aristotelian perspective, the ethos of the speaker or writer
influences the reception of the work, although it is equally necessary
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that the ethos of the listener be trustworthy. Ethos is described by
Aristotle as the quality of the speaker’s reputation. Ethos is an important—if somewhat intangible—element of rhetorical persuasion that
determines how an audience reacts to a speaker. A witness to history
must present enough facts to become veritable, and the degree to which
he or she is able to reconstruct an authentic chronology of events and
provide details of fact that are consistent with other reports is essential.
In a study of autobiography and personal narrative that draws on
Aristotelian rhetoric, Candace Spigelman notes that “[n]arrating the
individual’s deliberate choices or attributes of character and connecting
them to moral principles help to establish an ethical character with
which the audience can identify” (72). Using common emotional
appeals as the basis for the narrative results in effects such as tragedy
because the bond of sympathy is established between sufferer and auditor (72). I would like to add to Laub’s, Bernard-Donals’s, Pennebaker’s,
and Spigelman’s conceptions of trauma, narrative, and audience in
claiming that the ethos of the witness is also affected by general public
attitudes toward the event, such as horror, dismissal, curiosity, or ignorance. Together, the witness and audience construct a third entity, the
disaster, in a dialectic between fact and attitude.
Aristotle establishes the basis for studying rhetoric and trauma in his
Rhetoric and his Poetics. In the Rhetoric, he notes that a narrator should
establish “proof (where proof is needed) that the actions were done,
[and a] description of their quality or of their extent” (207). Thus, the
witness both represents the facts and offers an evaluation of their importance. Aristotle also points out that a narration “should depict character,” continuing: “One such thing is the indication of moral purpose; the
quality of purpose indicated determines the quality of character depicted and is itself determined by the end pursued” (209). This observation
is surprisingly contemporary when applied to mountaineering literature, for climbers often must address the question of why they risk their
lives routinely in the search for high places.
Jon Krakauer, a climber and author, has no answers, but is acutely
aware throughout his published work of the moral implications of climbing. In response to the terrible 1986 season on the Himalayan mountain
K2 in which thirteen climbers died, Krakauer asks: “Should a civilized
society continue to condone, much less celebrate, an activity in which
there appears to be a growing acceptance of death as a likely outcome?”
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(Eiger 161). The climbers’ awareness of an audience that seeks a justification for their wanderlust or vivifies itself through its own thirst for danger is reflected in their prose. It occupies a large section of Weathers’s
own narrative, in which he describes his desire for high places and provides, as a counterpoint, his wife’s aggrieved comments on his all too
willing abandonment of the family.
In fact, Weathers’s justification for his climbing is morally thin, indicating that his main purpose in writing was not to provide larger answers
to the public. In his own words, he wanted “recognition” (6), he desired
the test “against the ultimate challenge” (4), he “gained hard muscle”
and “drank in the moments of genuine pleasure, satisfaction and bonhomie out in the wilds with my fellow climbers” (6). The story that is
narrated by Margaret “Peach” Weathers within the pages of the autobiography reveals the consequence of the climb on the family:
[W]hen Beck left for Mount Everest in March of 1996—he spent our twentieth anniversary there—I decided this was the last time he would run away
from us. Beck was living only for his obsessions, and I saw no further hope of
making our marriage work. . . . Beck seemed selfishly determined to either
kill himself or get himself killed. (69)

Peach is the Greek chorus of the book: she is both the editorial commentator and the exposition. There are points in the narrative that must
be accounted for, details of which Beck himself is unaware, and it falls to
Peach to provide these details. She is also a witness to the trauma, the
one who listened, observed, and was affected by Beck’s wounds. In the
Poetics, Aristotle describes tragedy as “an imitation of an action that is
serious, complete, and of a certain magnitude,” which “through pity and
fear . . . [purges] these emotions” from the spectators (230). Modern
narratives of trauma, although they are represented—or “imitated,” to
use Aristotle’s term—in many media, do not purge emotions but rather
create secondary traumas that are worked through by the witnesses.
Physical pain is individuated and resistant to language, Elaine Scarry
tells us, but can be represented discursively, through storytelling.
Although that storytelling can often be partial and fragmented, the listener plays an important role in witnessing the story, retelling it, and
becoming a “writer” or “author” of the pain itself (Scarry 9). Thus,
rhetorically, the story indicates its credibility through the reader’s emotional reaction to the events.
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Up to this point, I have focused on the rhetorical framework of the
survivor’s story. Each survivor is situated within a cultural nexus of attitudes and material structures that inform the nature of the trauma and
the telling of the events of the disaster. In her analysis of women’s rape
testimonies, Wendy Hesford discusses how self-representations are negotiated with “prevailing cultural . . . scripts” (197) that sometimes overwrite the individual, or the personal, with dominating attitudes. Hesford
asks how stories can be treated as individuated, authentic, and unique,
while at the same time she provides a means for political interrogation
of the structures that allow disasters to happen. “American mass media
tend to focus on victims and perpetrators’ psychological states rather
than on the sociological, political, and material forces that facilitate and
sustain violence,” she notes (196). Writing about the deaths on K2 in
1986, for example, Krakauer indicts the publicity surrounding Reinhold
Messner’s ascent of the Seven Summits without supplemental oxygen as
a “distorting” cause of the disasters. Messner himself is a brilliant
climber with “uncanny ‘mountain sense,’” Krakauer admits, but his
amazing ability to ascend the high peaks “may have given unwarranted
confidence to many climbers” who believed that Messner was setting
new standards for playing “the high-roller’s game,” rather than recognizing the achievements as the apex of one man’s outstanding personal
ability (Eiger 161–62).
From a similar material perspective, Weathers’s narrative must be
understood as the story of a privileged white male: he has money, power,
mobility, and education. His rescue from Everest was facilitated by the
intervention of politicians and doctors who could easily draw on power,
money, and time. Within the pages of Left for Dead, it falls to Peach to tell
the story of the rescue. On May 11, when Beck was still breathing but was
covered with ice and abandoned by his teammates, Peach was told that
he had died. Hours later, when she was called again with news of his
miraculous recovery, she brought together a network of friends and
business associates. They began to make phone calls; she reports: “We
were not worried about getting Beck off the mountain. We just knew he
was in critical condition, and he probably was going to need better medical attention than what was available in Nepal” (75). Weathers’s partners called worldwide for medical facilities, locating a medical center
staffed with U.S.-trained physicians in Singapore and a frostbite expert
in Alaska. They next called Texas senator Kay Bailey Hutchinson, “whom
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several of us knew” (75), Texas governor George W. Bush, whose daughters went to school with Weathers’s daughter, and Senator Tom Daschle
(also a friend). As Peach recounts it: “Daschle contacted the State
Department, which contacted the embassy in Katmandu, which assigned
David Schensted to the matter, which resulted in Madan K. C. risking his
life to save Beck’s” (76). Beck’s brother Dan flew to Katmandu immediately. The high-altitude rescue was not routine. Colonel Madan of the
Royal Nepalese Army had never flown a helicopter that high on the
mountain before, as the air is so thin at high altitudes that the helicopter cannot function. “However, nobody told Peach about this,” Weathers
comments. “Assisted by her bunch of North Dallas power moms . . . they
proceeded to call everybody in the United States. If you did not personally receive a phone call from my wife or one of her associates in this
effort, it was because you weren’t home” (61).
In addition, because of his social position, he has access to publishing
his story in ways that many victims of violence and trauma do not.
Weathers has a voice because of the ways he is culturally encoded: the
wealthy white male’s power to speak and to represent. Unlike many sufferers, Weathers is not silenced. Rather, he uses the occasion of his trauma in order to advance another culturally coded narrative: that of the
journey that leads to an epiphany, a deeper realization of self. On the
mountain, stranded by teammates, frozen, in pain, he saw his family
standing before him: “My subconscious summoned them into vivid
focus, as if they might at any moment speak to me. I knew at that instant,
with absolute clarity, that if I did not stand at once, I would spend an
eternity on that spot” (51). At the tail end of the book, he comments:
“While the story of what occurred during those few days on Everest
clearly is of interest, the story of what happened when I got back home
and had to rebuild my life—redefine who I was—became the story for
me” (289).
It is axiomatic for rhetorical analysis to consider who is authorized to
speak in certain cultures. Gubrium and Holstein draw on the insights of
Michel Foucault when they ask: “Who is, or is not, entitled, obligated, or
invited to offer their stories and under which social, institutional, historical, and material circumstances?” (179). On the mountain, the pool
of authorized speakers is determined by money; it is, in other words, a
self-selected population of privilege. Krakauer was authorized to represent the event because of his association as a writer for Outside Magazine.
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Breashears was a well-known documentary photographer. Weathers is
permitted to speak because of his money, of course, but he is primarily
permitted to speak because of his survival and his prolonged need to be
physically and mentally reconstructed. He is aware of the extraordinary
circumstances that allowed him to survive and admits to a profound discomfort in seeing Yasuko Namba’s family in the hotel after the disaster.
Namba, recall, had also been left for dead with Weathers as the storm
raged below the summit. She was left to die there. Unlike Weathers, she
did not raise herself and walk toward camp, physically imposing herself
upon those who had left her alone in the ice and cold. Unlike Weathers,
her family was not politically connected enough to authorize a rescue.
Seeing Namba’s family in Katmandu, Weathers is stilled:
They very much wanted to know about her and her last moments. I really
didn’t know what to tell them. I searched for anything that might comfort
them. But for one of the very few times in my life, the easy stream of words
simply wouldn’t come. At some level I felt guilty standing there, alive, when
Yasuko was gone. I couldn’t even offer meaningful consolation. (82)

In this moment of uncertainty, the two climbers who were once
equals on the mountain, Namba and Weathers, are revealed to be profoundly unequal. Their inequality is not based on physical ability or personal aspirations; it is the power of American money and social position
that divides them. Following this encounter, Weathers does not moralize. He does not reflect on the cultural causes for the Everest disaster in
the way that Krakauer did in Into Thin Air. Krakauer searched for the
underlying causes for the May 10 disaster, wondering “how could things
have gone so haywire?” (264):
With so many marginally-qualified climbers flocking to Everest these days, a
lot of people believe that a tragedy of this magnitude was over-due. But
nobody imagined that an expedition led by Rob Hall would be at the center
of it. Hall ran the tightest, safest operation on the mountain, bar none. . . .
So what happened? How can it be explained, not only to the loved ones left
behind, but to a censorious public? (272)

Earlier comments in this essay alone indicate that Krakauer is interested in the relationship of climbing to the greater nonclimbing public.
Weathers admits in his epilogue that he has left the analysis to Krakauer
and others. He doesn’t engage in any musings about his potential
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complicity in the tragedy. To what extent, then, is this also a material
characteristic of his memoir? Hesford finds that feelings of complicity
are a characteristic of women’s narratives of trauma. For example,
Hesford recounts one survivor’s story of her rape that includes her
ruminations that she was somehow responsible for the violence against
her:
What happened at the door is that I let him in. I knew there was danger, and
I didn’t follow my intuition. I didn’t protect myself. I let him in. For years, I
have felt guilty about that. I thought that it was my fault.(200)

In Left for Dead, it falls to Peach, in her rhetorical role as chorus, to
warn readers against not the physical but the emotional toll of mountain
climbing. Perhaps unconsciously drawing on female narrative strategies,
Peach sees the dangers to the extended family and not to the individual.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that, although the Everest disaster of
1996 was unexpected on May 10, it was a common type of disaster in the
mountains. Repeatedly, climbers tell of the need to acknowledge when
you must turn around. The mountains are said to send warnings, and it
is up to the sensitive to heed them.
Who owns personal stories? Gubrium and Holstein note: “Typically,
the personal story is believed to belong to someone: someone’s account
is his or her story” (178). But ownership is socially organized: “A story
may belong to its teller, in one sense, but features of narrative composition and local conditions of storytelling are also proprietary.” So much
of tragedy and atrocity is communicated visually from remote locations
that it is difficult to say what the effects are on viewers. Laub asserts that
witnesses are not only those who were there, but those who witness the
pain of survivors. In the final section of this essay, I would like to offer
some initial thoughts on issues of recent trauma. Who are the witnesses
of the September 11 tragedies in the United States?
The events of September 11, 2001 are widely known. On that day, two
commercial airplanes slammed into the twin towers of the World Trade
Center, sending clouds of fire outward in enormous roiling balls and
scattering glass, steel, and paper across the streets of lower Manhattan.
Within the next hour, planes would attack the Pentagon, crash into a
field in Pennsylvania, and the towers of the World Trade Center would
collapse. Many Americans watched this horror unfold in real time on
their televisions. In fact, witnessing took on new meaning as it divided
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those who watched live media from those who saw the evening news
replays. Yet, the act of remembering the disaster is accessible to everyone through print and electronic media. Within minutes, televised
replays of the first plane hitting the first tower were saturating the networks and these spectacular, horrifying images would be replayed again
and again in subsequent days and weeks. Newspapers and electronic
news media (the Web and the television) began to feature chronologies
of the events. It was immediately clear that there were multiple
chronologies: there were the chronologies of the terrorists, who had
planned the hijackings of the planes years in advance; there were the
chronologies of the passengers on the planes, many of whom, the public learned, phoned home to say goodbye to their families; there were
the chronologies of the media witnesses, who suffered in ignorance of
what was happening and the relationship of one event to another; there
were the chronologies of the rescue workers in New York City, who
rushed to their deaths unwittingly as they enacted their practiced rescue
missions. Following any of these chains of events entails a narrative, a
process of anticipation and reflection, a balancing of what is normal
against what is unexpected. Each of the survivors, therefore, will tell a
different story, all of which have a relationship to the facts of the events,
but which have a different chronology. For example, Phil Oye, on his
way to work in Tower 2 of the World Trade Center on the morning of
September 11, didn’t know what was happening around him but used
previous events as a template for his immediate experience. He immediately positioned himself within a well-known story, the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. Within the frame of the immediate chronology, he recounts that he saw smoke and he knew people
were evacuating: “I thought there was a bomb in the basement like in
1993 . . . [then] I downshift into thinking that [it] was an accident.” He
exits the building and begins taking photographs. He sees bodies falling
from the building, “appearing out of the smoke.” He notices that people are “completely calm.” His chronology, therefore, is not told from
the perspective of the news networks or the terrorists. It is a simple
account of walking: he leaves the train he has taken to work, he sees
smoke, he takes an escalator upstairs, he exits the building, he circles
the building to take pictures, he looks at the WTC, he hears an explosion. At no point does he know that there is a terrorist attack. That
knowledge comes later and not only reorders his experience, it positions
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him as a witness to history, a survivor, someone who can authenticate the
horror of the day. Through Oye—and particularly because he recounts
his story in present tense—the reader creates a subject space, a place to
become the I/eye of the narrative.
Not many of these survivor stories have been published at the writing
of this essay. A few have appeared in news magazines, online, or in newspapers, characterized mostly as “eyewitness accounts,” a journalistic term
indicating that the witness is useful to establishing the facts of the story.
This indicates that a period of reflection must ensue before the survivor’s
story may move into the public sphere as a personal narrative. The significance of the events to the person must be understood and organized
into a story. The narrative must have time to take on a culturally significant form, such as a tragedy or a romance. At some point, however, the
story will change. Oye and others like him will come to see themselves
taking part in an event of significance, actors in a larger drama. At one
point in his chronology he notes, “someone says that a tower fell. I attribute this to sheer rumor.” Once Oye is familiar with the facts, however, he
will dismiss the rumor. Photographs and the official chronologies will
certify that both towers of the World Trade Center fell within the hour.
His reaction will become a vestigial artifact of trauma, a personal narrative of confusion and distress. It will testify to his inner self but not to the
wider events that make up the public history of that day.
Witnessing is both a private and a public act. Initially, the individual
is faced with overwhelming and chaotic sensations. Eventually, these sensations are organized in public forms of discourse and, sometimes—but
not always—published as oral or written testimony. The language of
trauma and memory creates a factual relationship to events through
description and chronology but is individuated and articulated to a sympathetic audience through emotional appeal and common narrative
forms. Studying personal narratives of trauma, the researcher must
enter into a multidiscursive universe of psychology, rhetoric, cultural
criticism, and politics, as the narratives themselves shift from representations of occasions of magnitude for the greater public to recounting
incidents of personal significance. They move between modes of discourse, from the intimate to the oratorical. Yet, at the heart of each narrative is a voice—a cry—and this is the public and private conscience,
the voice of memory.
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The Public and the Private
in the Discipline of Composition Studies

13
MIXING IT UP
The Personal in Public Discourse
Bruce Horner

In the last two decades of work in composition studies, the personal as a
category has come under siege from proponents of post-structuralist,
post-Marxist, feminist, and social constructionist theory. This siege has
now provoked a backlash in which personal, expressive writing is valorized for its difference from conventional, and especially densely “theoretical,” academic writing: scholars engaging in personal writing are now
hailed for defying academic disciplinary conventions. Roughly simultaneously, in response to the same theoretical perspectives that have laid
siege to the personal, critical ethnographers in and outside composition
have concluded that these theories place an ethical responsibility on
ethnographers to make public admissions of the involvement of the personal in their work (see Kirsch and Ritchie). Thus, the intrusion of personal writing into a compositionist’s scholarly text can currently be taken
either as a gesture in defiance of recent critical theory or as a means of
complying with the ethical strictures that theory imposes.
In this chapter, I examine how we have arrived at these contradictory
positions. I argue that confusion over what constitutes the personal has
led to this discrepancy in positions on its use and prevents us from more
productive engagement with the personal in public discourse, in both
our writing and our teaching. I begin with a brief review of the specific
challenges theorists have posed to prior conceptions of the personal and
then explore the implications of these challenges for current debate on
the rhetoric and ethics of public engagements with the personal in writing. My contention is that those who valorize personal writing for breaking away from academic writing conventions all too often mistake
rehearsals of an established public genre of writing for writing that contests dominant social constructions of what is deemed to be personal,
and personal in, experience and writing. A commodified notion of
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personal writing is treated as in itself producing a specific kind of work;
the labor of writing, reading, and researching in producing specific use
values from that writing is dismissed from consideration. In critical
ethnography, this commodified notion of the work of personal writing
appears as the fetishizing of specific textual forms, which are treated as
in themselves constituting a means by which to conform to ethical strictures. Thus the full material social process of ethnographic work is
reduced to a focus on the problematics of textual conventions, with
deleterious results.
In my view, it is Marxist-inflected theory that has posed the most serious challenges to dominant conceptions of the personal in writing and
that has provoked the most serious backlash. Raymond Williams
explains the issue of the individual writer for Marxist theory thus:
To see individuation as a social process is to set limits to the isolation but also
perhaps to the autonomy of the individual author. To see form as formative
has a similar effect. The familiar question in literary history, “what did this
author do to this form?” is often reversed, becoming “what did this form do
to this author?” Meanwhile, within these questions, there is the difficult general problem of the nature of the active “subject.” (192)

The tendency in Marxist thought that most transforms the question
of the individual author is its identification of the individual subject “as
a characteristic form of bourgeois thought” (193). Not only is the
writer’s language defined as social in its forms and conventions, so also
are the “contents of [the writer’s] consciousness.”
It is this last implication of the sociality of writing that, Williams notes,
provokes the sharpest reactions. And insofar as it has sometimes led to
understanding individual writers as mere “carriers” of determinate
social structures, that reaction, that is, the reduction of a writer’s consciousness to no more than a particular social or historical category, is
fully understandable. Consider the move to categorize writers using the
triumvirate of race, class, and gender, say, or the reigning zeitgeist of a
given time and place. What is missing in such readings, Williams notes,
is any consideration of the “living and reciprocal relationships of the
individual and the social” (194).Faced with such reductions, “it is not
surprising that many people run back headlong into bourgeois-individualist concepts, forms, and institutions, which they see as their only protection.” The social, imagined as monolithic, is deemed not to allow for
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any possibility of individuation, and so a “social perspective” on the personal is rejected as inadequate and reductive.
In practice, this rejection has led to a renewed valorization of the personal in writing. Identifying academic writing with stylistically dense,
abstract, theoretical writing and with what seem to be inappropriate constraints made on writers by the social, represented by the academic institution, compositionists have turned to recognizably nonacademic discursive moves to counter what are seen as the limitations that academic discourse places on what writing may express and accomplish (see, for
example, Bridwell-Bowles; Tompkins, “Me”). However, such moves essentially sidestep the sociality of the personal, risking in effect the reinforcement of dominant conceptions of the personal and the social. Williams
observes that what modes of domination exclude is often designated as
“the personal or the private, or as the natural or even the metaphysical .
. . since what the dominant has effectively seized is...the ruling definition
of the social” (125). It is this seizure, Williams insists, that has to be resisted. But those writers turning to the personal instead often accept such
ruling definitions, turning to what the dominant has deemed “personal”
as a refuge from, rather than a contested site of, the social.
Thus, in practice, this turn to the personal has resulted not in new
forms of writing but in recapitulations of the generic category of personal writing—that is to say, writing recognizably “personal” because it
rehearses those features dominant culture has designated to be “personal.” And so, as Joseph Harris complains, we often get not a new form of
discourse or an intervention in dominant (say, academic) discourse but
uncritical adoptions of the “older belletristic” discourse of the personal
essay, as cultivated by such canonical figures as Montaigne, Addison, De
Quincey, Orwell, E. B. White, and the like (Harris, “Person, Position,
Style” 50).
Such uncritical adoptions of this traditional genre are problematic
because of the ideological message carried by the genre itself (see
Haefner). As Fredric Jameson has warned, because a genre “is essentially a socio-symbolic message . . . [whose form] is imminently and intrinsically an ideology in its own right,” this message persists in any reappropriation of the form (141). Those writers who adopt the genre of
personal writing under the illusion that they are thereby escaping social
discourse—“cultivating some tufts of what grows wild outside,” in Peter
Elbow’s formulation (“Response” 90)—fail to recognize the form’s
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ideological message and so can be said not so much to appropriate the
genre but rather to be appropriated by it. If, for example, a genre establishes a “contract” between a writer and his or her specific public
(Jameson 106), the genre of personal writing itself comprehends a set of
expectations, beliefs, and attitudes about the value and constitution of
personal experience, at least the experience of the writer, and a way of
approaching that experience, which is profoundly ideological. Writers
(and readers) adopting such a contract uncritically reinforce just such
expectations, beliefs, and attitudes.
This is not an argument against reappropriating existing genres, the
personal essay included. Indeed, from a social perspective, there is no
alternative to engaging existing social forms, just as there is no possibility of inventing a purely personal, private language untouched by the
social. Rather, it is an argument for confronting, and making strategic
use of, the social historicity of any of the genres we adopt in our writing,
recognizing both the historical ideological content of any discursive
genre, personal writing included, and also the susceptibility of that content to change as it is deployed in different social and cultural contexts.
It is in so doing that a particular discursive genre can be reappropriated
to new ends.
All this is to redefine the question of the use of the personal in writing as, first, a question of the rhetorical gesture any such use makes,
given the specific material social circumstances of that use. Both the
rhetorical and ethical significance borne by use of recognizably personal writing will depend considerably on the social location of the speaker,
the occasion, the intended purpose, and audience. The particular ethical and rhetorical charge of an instance of personal writing is contingent
on both the history of the use of such writing and on the material social
circumstances of that instance of use. Hence, calls to valorize, engage in,
and teach personal writing miss the mark. We need instead to interrogate
how a particular writer’s engagement in such writing might operate,
given the particular circumstances and purposes of that engagement.
Consider, for example, the following situation. A few years ago, as a
member of the Iowa Immigrant Rights Project (IRP), I participated in
lobbying Iowa state legislators (and others) on behalf of policies affecting the civil rights of recent immigrants to Iowa. This lobbying took the
form of conversations with individual legislators, public debate, a
newspaper editorial, and letters to the editor. In my lobbying efforts, my
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claims about immigrants were questioned—their susceptibility to violations of their rights and to prejudice and violence, their commitment to
learning English, their alleged criminality, and so on. The Iowa IRP was
a loose affiliation of immigrant groups, the local American Friends
Service Committee, interested members of various religious and labor
organizations, and public interest lawyers. Thus, my membership in the
IRP in itself gave me no particular credibility with legislators: it signified
at best only my concern—shared by other members of the project—
about immigrant rights’ issues. The rhetorical difficulty I faced, in my
spoken and written discourse, was how to persuade legislators of the
validity of my claims.
Any strategy I used involved some sort of personal admission, if we
accept that any self-identification other than my affiliation with the IRP
constituted an “exposure” of information otherwise private. For example, in discussing English Only legislation and the difficulties of language learning, I might attempt to gain more credibility for my claims
by identifying myself as a professor of English, on the assumptions that
this would lead my audience to 1) grant me expert status on language
learning; and 2) accept my commitment to the English language (a
commitment proponents of English Only legislation claim its opponents
do not share). Alternatively, in making claims about immigrants’ experience of discrimination, I might identify myself as the spouse, stepfather, and in-law of recent immigrants, on the assumption that my claims
about the experiences of immigrants would be accepted as reliable by
virtue of being close to firsthand.
The rhetorical value of these personal admissions would be contingent on a variety of factors. Most obviously, the rhetorical value of the
first admission would depend on the esteem, or lack thereof, with which
academics, and particularly English professors, were held. Simply put,
would my identification as English professor mark me as expert or
egghead? Similarly, admitting to marrying into a family of recent immigrants might work either to validate my claims about the experience of
immigrants, and my right to speak for them, or alternatively to call into
question my objectivity on the matter and mark me as a special interest
whose personal feelings colored his views of the public interest. Public discourse has available a variety of categories into which to place admissions like mine. In fact, in making any of them I am simply offering my
listeners a set of possible, and quite public, familiar ways of categorizing
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me and thus my argument. This highlights the fact that no such thing as
personal writing exists, if by personal we mean writing that does not arise
from and invoke some shared, public, socially constructed category:
egghead or expert, authentic family man or special pleader. Instead,
being personal constitutes a rhetorical strategy, successful or not, of donning the mantle of a public category to establish a persuasive ethos.
This is perhaps more readily seen when public figures attempt to get
personal. For example, when presidential candidate George W. Bush confessed to the world his faith in Jesus Christ as his personal savior, he may
have been attesting to a profound experience, but he was not being personal at all. Rather, he was invoking a range of possible publicly available
categories into which voters might place him: Bible Belt hick, devout
and trustworthy Christian, panderer, moral titan. That it was not an
aberration from public discourse is clear from the responses it evoked.
While editorialists and pundits disagreed with one another over the
political import of Bush’s statement, they had no trouble determining
the simple meaning of his admission, something they might have experienced if he had offered a statement coming from some realm truly
outside the social—if one can imagine any such thing.
But uses of the personal raise not only questions of rhetorical efficacy but also, as the term ethos suggests, questions of ethics. If the ability to
make rhetorical gestures of personal admission constitutes a kind of cultural capital, then the value of that capital is contingent on one’s social
capital. The fact that an established figure in literary criticism like Jane
Tompkins has gone personal in her academic writing (e.g., “Me and My
Shadow”) may speak primarily to her social position in the academy—
her going personal may function less as a risk taken than a display of that
position. We see evidence of this in the conflicted response to
Tompkins’s essays in which she goes personal (“Me,” “Pedagogy”). Olivia
Frey expresses the hope that Tompkins’s “brave experiment” will pave
the way for others (507–08). But Frey also notes that she herself cannot
yet go personal because she is, after all, “not Jane Tompkins” (524).
Similarly, Terry Myers Zawacki reports: “When I read Tompkins’ essay
[“Pedagogy of the Distressed”], I can’t help thinking about the authority that Tompkins has, because she is ‘Jane Tompkins,’ to challenge
boundaries” (35).
In noting that they themselves are not so free to go personal as
Tompkins, Frey and Zawacki raise a second complication for writers con-
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templating such moves: not only is there nothing ethical about the distribution of capital of whatever kind, the value of that capital is contingent on whether it is recognized by others in positions of dominance. As
demonstrated by teachers’ responses to students’ autobiographical
efforts, not all instances of writers “going personal” are accorded the
same value. Or, to return to the lobbying example, the options for going
personal or not, options that were available to me, were not available to
all. Rather, they were contingent on perceptions of my national, racial,
and gender identity.
For instance, while my (pale) skin color does not in theory denote my
citizenship status (e.g., I might be a citizen of Canada, France, Ireland,
the United Kingdom, New Zealand), for the vast majority of Americans,
it does. Nor in theory should the particular inflections I might give to
my words denote my citizenship. In practice, however, my skin color and
vocal inflections are commonly taken (recognized) as an indication of my
nationality as American. My being male probably furthers this identification, given patriarchal notions of Americanness. So, while I might
choose to identify myself as a member of a family of recent immigrants,
or to leave my family relations unexpressed, that choice was and is not
available to many others—for example, those with darker skin tones or
those who speak with particular accents. In short, how I choose to represent myself is more than a matter of individual rhetorical strategizing
based on surmises about my audience; it is a matter of my material social
position as a white male speaking in a particular accent on issues of
immigrants’ rights in Iowa—a matter not simply of positioning oneself
but of contending with how one is positioned materially and socially.
Questions of how to confront the power relations of social material
positioning have been addressed most prominently in the work of critical and feminist pedagogy and critical ethnography. In this work, the
personal is understood not as a way of writing emerging from and
answerable to a realm outside the social but as a site where the social,
understood as heterogeneous, is negotiated. This recognition of the
sociality of the personal raises questions of epistemology, rhetorical efficacy, and ethics. First, to put it crudely, if knowledge, personal and otherwise, is socially constructed and continually under construction, as it
were, then claims to the objectivity of one’s knowledge are untenable
and, therefore, rhetorically inefficacious. Second, the operation of
power relations between speaker and listener, and between researcher
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and informant, has to be recognized in the production of any representation of their interactions. My representation of another’s experience is
not only epistemologically suspect but politically suspect as well: by what
authority, it may be asked, do I speak for, and in the name of, others—
such as recent immigrants? Third, just as my authority for speaking in
the name of others is suspect, so I need to be wary of the likely political,
material, and social effects of my representations of others on them. I
cannot disavow responsibility for such effects by claiming that I am simply speaking the objective truth or have the best intentions for those in
the name of and for whom I claim to speak.
It is difficult to argue against the strictures these concerns place on
ethnographers. And the history of anthropology provides ample testimony of the dire effects of work uninformed by these concerns.
Nonetheless, those attempting to follow these strictures in their writing
now confront new ethical dilemmas. For critical ethnographers who
intend their work not simply to increase the general stock of knowledge
but to improve the material social conditions of those living at the field
site, the more closely they attempt to follow these strictures in their writing, the more ineffectual that writing appears to be in achieving such
ends. In “Beyond the Personal,” Gesa Kirsch and Joy Ritchie have
argued that ethnographers need not only to “encode in [their] research
narratives the provisional nature of knowledge that [their] work generates and the moral dilemmas inherent in research” but also to “reconsider our privileging of certain, coherent, and univocal writing and
include multiple voices and diverse interpretations in our research narratives, highlighting the ideologies that govern our thinking as well as
those that may contradict our own” (24). Heeding such calls, ethnographers have produced a wealth of texts presenting multivocal, tentative,
personal perspectives. Unfortunately, as Kirsch remarks in a subsequent
essay, these textual practices themselves
can disguise writers’ continuing authorial control, they can fail to provide the
theoretical framework and cultural context necessary for understanding the
multiple voices merging in a single text, they make new and difficult
demands on readers, they require tolerance for ambiguity and contradictory
claims, and they easily become elitist and exclusionary. (193–94)

Too often, Kirsch warns, the politically emancipatory aims of the writers can be contradicted by the exclusionary effects of their writing.
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Ralph Cintron echoes this warning, observing of educational ethnographies that the “pragmatic needs of education [may] . . . inhibit ethnographic experimentation” (401). For Cintron, only those writers who
“need not answer to institutions that are significantly controlled by ‘bottom-line’ economics,” who instead “have the luxury to experiment,” can
legitimately engage in such experimentation. Thus, just as critics
indulging in recognizably “personal” writing can be said to be displaying
the privileged position that enables them to afford to do so, so for
Cintron only those ethnographers in the privileged position of being
free of responsibility to “bottom-line economics” or material consequences on others from their writing can afford to write other than traditional, impersonal ethnographies. Indeed, we may understand their
experiments, like authors’ engagements in the “personal,” primarily as
displays of that privilege.
However, rather than assuming display of privilege as the motivating
impulse for such textual experiments, I would argue that they arise
instead from significantly mistaking where the work of ethnography, and
the emancipation it is meant to effect, is located. If work comes to be
located primarily in the text, then writers will focus attention on applying the strictures to the formal features of the written commodity. It is
thus that a writer can come to substitute his or her own emancipation
from writing conventions for the emancipation of those living at the
research site, and thus that complexities of textual notation can come to
stand in for the complexities of negotiating the experience, politics, and
ethics of face-to-face encounters between the ethnographer and informants. To return to the example of my lobbying, it would be as if my concern to accurately represent the ethical complexities of the issues surrounding immigration, my own investment in such issues, and the problematic of my speaking on behalf of others were to override my efforts
at persuading tired and impatient legislators to adopt a particular stance
on pending legislation, so that I produced discourse fraught with disclaimers of my objectivity, qualifications to my positions, attempts at the
presentation of multiple perspectives and voices, and the like. After all,
in my experience with the IRP, members constantly confronted such
issues in the process of researching and developing position statements,
organizing events, forming coalitions, and reviewing crises both unexpected and ongoing. But while I would agree that questioning one’s own
positionality, interests, and the politics and problematics of representation
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is indeed crucial work for those involved in such projects, that is not to
say that a text emerging from that work should attempt to capture those
dynamics in its notational strategies, any more than a text needs to
incorporate all the alternative drafts produced in the process of its composition. While such a text might be useful to the writer or those studying the writing process (think of scholarly editions of literary texts), it
would carry significantly less use value as a lobbying tool. In short, much
of what theorists like Kirsch and Ritchie quite rightly call for in the work
of ethnography could (and does) take place in the work that goes on at
the research site, which can then inform, rather than find formal textual equivalents in, some of the published writing that emanates from and
reports on that research. But there exists no necessary equivalence
between a textual form and the ethics of the interactions on which the
text itself reports.
This confusion between a textual form and the ethics of the work,
part of which includes textual production, mirrors compositionists’ confusion in their recent valorizations of personal writing. In both cases, a
textual form, or set of forms, is imagined in itself to produce specific
effects, good or bad, rather than being seen as notations whose ethical
value depends on the specific practices, and conditions (including histories) of practices, with them. This confusion instances commodity
fetishism, in which “the products of the human brain appear as
autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into
relations both with each other and with the human race” (Marx
164–65). The value of the form is identified not with the social relations
of its production (including reception) but with the form itself.
Consequently, it is the exchange value of the form, rather than its use
value in achieving particular ends in specific circumstances, arising from
particular kinds of labor with it, that is recognized.
We can see this treatment of writing as commodity in the kinds of valorization given to writing highlighting the personal location of the
writer. Critics’ praise of such writing rarely addresses the specific use it
has had. As Harris observes, praise for Jane Tompkins’s personal essay
“Pedagogy of the Distressed” was directed at Tompkins herself for taking
such a risk—not, significantly, for any insights it offered. (In fact, as
Harris observes, Tompkins’s essay simply “recycl[ed] many of the
insights of writing teachers from Britton to Bruffee to Elbow without
citation” [Harris, Person, Position, Style 47–48]). And as David Shumway
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observes in a rejoinder to Frey, Tompkins’s essay “Me and My Shadow”
was successful first and foremost at achieving distinction for the writer,
for being “noticed” (“Solidarity” 107–09; “Comment” 833).
On those occasions when some use for the personal in writing is identified, its use for the writer is often conflated with its general use for all.
In other words, the writing is again treated as a textual commodity: its
effects are imagined to inhere in the text and, like any commercial product, to be guaranteed for any and all consumers. Such an approach
ignores the ways in which the use value of writing varies by the writer, the
occasion of its production, the reader and the practices of reading and
conditions of reading it—that is, by the labor and social conditions of
production. Writing, personal or otherwise, is not in itself useful but
rather can be used for particular, different purposes by particular readers following specific practices, which themselves merit interrogation.
For example, it seems quite likely that, as Jane Hindman argues in a
recent essay defending personal writing, a “glimpse into one’s life [can]
provide a way to rethink professional work,” and, as she quotes Victor
Villanueva, Jr. observing, autobiography can be used “as a way of knowing our predispositions to see things certain ways” (Villanueva, “The
Personal” 51; qtd. in Hindman 37). These sound like eminently laudable
goals for a writer to pursue for herself, at least some of the time. For a
particular writer to use the activity of writing as a way to rethink his professional work and come to know his predispositions might be just the
thing for that writer to pursue in his private journal, written to himself,
should he have the time and means and need to do so. But the writing
produced might well be useless in helping other readers rethink their
professional work, or come to know their predispositions, or indeed
accomplish any number of other tasks. The use value of the writing, in
other words, is particular not to the text but to the user, occasion of
using, and mode and condition of use.
If the value of personal writing is itself contingent in these ways, then
its place in writing pedagogy needs to be rethought. Recent arguments
for the inclusion of personal writing contend that personal writing
offers a way to enable students to break free from the confines of academic discourse (Annas; Bridwell-Bowles 350; Torgovnick 27; see
Haefner 127–28). The aim here is to make possible the emergence of
forms of thought not expressible within such confines. But here again,
the labor of producing writing, of writing as an activity, is often elided,
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and features of the commodified form of the personal essay are often
treated as in themselves giving students this freedom. It makes good—if
by now common—pedagogic sense to warn students against paying too
much attention to conventions of form at certain stages of their writing
and to encourage them to find ways to link their writing to their personal lives. However, doing this is not the same as advising them to participate in a particular genre—that is, to produce the product commonly recognized as personal writing. For writing that may exhibit few or no
traces of personal writing in its forms may nonetheless stem productively from a writer’s personal engagement in the writing. Harris has
observed that while Harry Braverman’s Labor and Monopoly Capital bears
no features of that genre of writing recognized as “personal,” it is
nonetheless personal in the sense that Braverman shows “passionate
commitment to his subject through the range of his reading and the
clarity and care of his argument” (“Person, Position, Style” 49). In the
introduction to his book, Braverman admits that “[l]ike all craftsmen,
even the most inarticulate, I always resented [being robbed of a craft
heritage and given little or nothing to take its place], and as I reread
these pages, I find in them a sense not only of social outrage . . . but also
perhaps of personal affront” (6; qtd. in Harris, Person, Position, Style 49).
Thus, for Braverman, there is a personal resonance in making his argument in Labor and Monopoly Capital against the degradation, through deskilling, of work and workers.
Yet, Pamela Annas, in “Style as Politics,” compares Braverman’s style
of writing unfavorably to writing that is more recognizably personal in
style. Annas encourages her students to produce writing in which they
base their arguments “at least as much on lived personal experience as
on more conventional sources of information” (369, qtd. in Harris,
Person, Position, Style 48). But she fails to recognize Braverman’s writing
as such, even though from his introduction it too appears quite clearly
to be based “at least as much on lived personal experience” as other writing Annas singles out for praise that is more recognizably personal in the
textual forms it takes (e.g., Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own and
Robin Lakoff’s Language and Women’s Place). What distinguishes
Braverman’s book is not its absence of foundation in personal experience but the rhetoric Braverman employs in his writing. In other words,
Annas identifies the personal only in writing with a set of recognizable
textual features. She is thus blind to the possibility that writing that follows
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conventions of impersonality might be as profoundly personal as—perhaps in some instances more so than—conventionally, and thus recognizably, personal writing.
This is not to condemn writing that draws on conventions of personal writing but to insist that any conventions be interrogated for the uses
to which they are put, for whom, by whom, and how. In his contribution
to a recent College English symposium, “The Politics of the Personal,”
Villanueva, regularly cited for his autobiographical Bootstraps, ends up
warning against writing that constitutes effectively “the reverse of the
wolf in sheep’s clothing . . . expressionism with a social and political
rationale” (52). While he insists that “[t]here must be room for elements
of autobiography” in our writing, he calls for “the autobiographical as
critique,” “not as confession and errant self-indulgence, not as the measure on which to assess theory, not as a replacement for rigor” (51; my
emphasis).
The question of whether to allow for the personal and private in writing is, in short, a misguided question. What matters is not whether writers employ the conventions of personal writing in their writing, but the
ends to which they employ them and the circumstances, and reading
practices, that might allow for such ends to be achieved. Do we want, or
need, writing that rehearses the conventions of personal writing to reinscribe the ideology of individualism? Can we deploy personal writing to
call into question conventional understandings of what the personal
means, to mix it up, as it were, in our writing? Under what circumstances
might such mixing end up valorizing, again, conventional understandings of the personal? By what reading practices might such conventional
understandings be undermined? Insofar as all writing is, in some sense,
personal; insofar as all writing is also, in a profound sense, public; and
insofar as the personal and the public in writing are not commodities
but effects, it makes no sense to ask whether we, or our students, should
produce, or be allowed to produce, either. Instead, we can ask of any
writing and reading practice how conventions associated with either the
personal or the public, conventionally understood, are deployed, and how
we ourselves in our reading and writing might mix up, to contest, the
conventional understandings of both.

14
C U LT U R A L A U T O B I O G R A P H I C S
Complicating the “Personal Turns” in Rhetoric and
Composition Studies
Krista Ratcliffe

For the past few summers, I have taught a course entitled Rhetorics of
Women’s Multicultural Autobiographies in which students and I read
American women autobiographers (Maya Angelou, Dorothy Day, Diane
Glancy) and autobiography theorists (Joanne Braxton, Leigh Gilmore,
Sidonie Smith). Although the stated purpose of the course is to question
definitions of autobiography as well as to critique its purposes, tactics, and
effects, a side benefit for me is that teaching autobiography theory has
helped me to rethink the personal turns in rhetoric and composition studies.
DIGRESSION 1: I know it’s more accepted these days to say “composition studies,” but I recently realized that on this matter, I am a “conservative” in that I
refuse to relinquish either the founding role of rhetoric in our field or the
rhetorical dimension of all the work we do, both scholarly and pedagogically.

The phrase personal turns signifies moves within rhetoric and composition studies to employ personal stories—often autobiographical—within scholarship and pedagogy. Two such turns have occurred. Like the
bellbottom pants students now sport, the first personal turn (expressivism) had a previous life in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It emerged
in reaction to revived classical schools of rhetoric, primarily Aristotelian,
which posit writing as an invention process that can proceed rationally
and systematically on any topic, though topics were usually academic or
public, not personal. Expressivism generated a debate about whether to
use personal topics in writing pedagogy and couched the debate in
terms of invention (classical heuristics vs. expressive freewriting) and
genre (academic essay vs. personal narrative). In the mid-1990s, a second personal turn emerged in reaction to heavily theorized post-structuralist and feminist/cultural studies schools of rhetoric, which posit
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writing as multiple signifying processes functioning within linguistic and
cultural systems and which invite writers to analyze how they use language and how language uses them. This second turn generated a
debate about how to use personal writing in scholarship and pedagogy
and couched this debate in terms of function; for example, “Should a
story stand alone (à la Wendy Bishop, Peter Elbow, and Joe Trimmer) or
be employed as cultural critique (à la Susan Jarratt, Jackie Royster,
Victor Villanueva, and Lynn Worsham)?”
In this chapter, I argue that these two personal turns, though related,
generate debates with different histories, definitions, and stakes. I conclude by imagining how autobiography theory, particularly a concept of
cultural autobiographics, may productively complicate our field’s thinking about “personal turns.”
MAPPING A HISTORY OF THE PERSONAL TURNS

To map a history, let’s circle back to 1963, when Albert R. Kitzhaber’s
report on the Dartmouth study of student writing was first published
and when the number-one TV show in the United States was The Beverly
Hillbillies. While Jed and all his kin were heading west toward the cement
pond, Kitzhaber, Edward Corbett, and James Golden were circling back
through Western history to classical Greece, later joined in their journey
by Winifred Horner.
DIGRESSION 2: My favorite Win Horner story is that she flunked first-year
English. Well, actually, she chose not to complete a writing correspondence
course that she had signed up for while living on a farm and rearing her children, letting them run around the living room while she climbed into their
playpen with her typewriter.

When Edward Corbett and others argued that English departments
should revive the study of classical rhetoric, with a healthy dose of eighteenth-century theory thrown in for good measure, what they meant was
that writing teachers should teach Aristotelian invention (topoi,
enthymemes, and appeals) along with elements of Hugh Blair’s style.
Motivated by the task of training TAs to teach composition to an increasingly large and diverse student body, these scholar-administrators
argued that classical rhetoric provided foundational principles for
teaching writing. Their collective action laid a cornerstone of our discipline, rhetoric and composition studies.
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In reaction to this emphasis on classical rhetoric, the first personal
turn emerged. Consider, for a moment, the late 1960s and early 1970s.
People were rejecting any expert over thirty and any method that didn’t
enable students to turn on and tune in to the times; simultaneously, people were embracing a journey into the self. In 1973, the first personal
turn was taken by Peter Elbow, who offered students teacherless classrooms with freewriting and peer review via his Writing without Teachers.
Granted, Elbow has argued that freewriting is not self-centered but
rather an “invitation [for students] to take a ride on language itself, and
. . . to ‘get out of the self’: to relinquish volition and planning and see
what words and phrases come out of the head when you just kick it and
give language and culture a start” (“Response” 506). While I recognize
this potential, in my experience as a college student in the late 1970s
and as a beginning teacher in the early 1980s, freewriting was often
employed in ways that asked students to generate ideas from the inside
out—that is, to go inside themselves to “find themselves” and to discover what they didn’t know they knew; it was rarely employed to expose
cultural discourses that inform their identities. As such, this “finding
oneself” form of invention was a far cry from Aristotelian invention.
To clothe “finding oneself” in academic dress, cognitive theorists
arose in the 1970s and early 1980s, hoping to map the inner journey of
successful student writers so that teachers could use such maps to help
not so good student writers learn to navigate the writing process.
DIGRESSION 3: In the twilight of cognitive theory, I was hooked up to a brain
machine, thanks to Roxanne Mountford, to test my brain for left-side, right-side
activities. According to the guy operating the machine and the pictures he gave
me afterwards, my brain negated this spherical schemata. When I performed
the tasks designed to test one side of my brain or the other, both sides lit up. I
couldn’t decide if that meant that I was really smart . . . or (more likely) that I
just needed a whole lot more brainpower than most people to perform the
mundane tasks the operator gave me, my favorite being to think of all the words
I could that begin with “P.” For the record, Roxanne abandoned this research.

Again, because rhetoric and composition studies does not exist in a
vacuum, the same cultural impulse that celebrated natural food and
natural childbirth and encouraged Aretha to belt out “You Make Me
Feel Like a Natural Woman” may have encouraged Janet Emig, Linda
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Flower, and John Hayes and, later, Mountford to investigate “what comes
naturally” to good writers. But alas, mapping the writing process proved
impossible because, while there may be general patterns of brain activity, there are also patterns dependent not simply upon nature but upon
a person’s particular experiences within culture.
Once our field found itself contemplating people’s experiences within culture, we were in the mid-1980s, in the heyday of social constructionism, which challenged expressivism. Instead of foregrounding the
personal, different factions of social constructionism foregrounded the
textual and the cultural, respectively. The first faction, which promoted
the textual, was heavily influenced by poststructuralism. Followers of
Jacques Derrida argued that deconstructive textuality was the only game
in town. Followers of Roland Barthes declared the author dead, the self
a lexical subject, and personal thoughts merely discursive citations of all
the discourses surrounding and embodying us. Followers of Michel
Foucault declared the author simply a function. What’s a writing teacher
to do? Well, Greg Ulmer started holding textshops instead of workshops,
and Victor Vitanza honed his call for a third sophistic. At the same time,
a second faction of social constructionists, such as David Bartholomae,
Pat Bizzell, Jim Berlin, and Joe Harris were also influenced by post-structuralist thought but mainly as it intersected with cultural theory.
Uncomfortable with the ideas that language is the only game in town and
that life is only a linguistic game, they argued that violence in a written
text is not the same as violence in the streets. Though both a book and
the street may be read as texts, they may not be reduced to identical textuality. Hence the rise of the cultural. According to Berlin, that rise
engendered a merger of rhetoric, post-structuralism, and cultural studies
(Poststructuralism 16). This merger was designed to impress two ideas
upon teachers and students: 1) the cultural discourses into which we’re
born possess an agency to influence our thinking via socialization; and 2)
we possess a personal agency (however limited) with which to articulate
cultural discourses and “talk back” to them (Trimbur, “Agency”).
DIGRESSION 4: Of course, I can’t resist adding here the now oft-repeated claim:
many feminist and ethnicity scholars had been saying these things all along,
wondering why the author had been declared dead just when women and
nondominant ethnic groups were gaining entry into the academy in greater
numbers.
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Although this second faction researched the tensions between discursive/cultural agency and personal agency in many different cultural
sites (such as ethnic groups, religious institutions, and popular media),
Bartholomae and Bizzell were interested in university culture, especially
student writing—thus, their emphasis on theorizing and teaching “academic discourse” (Bartholomae, Inventing 134; Bizzell, Foundationalism
53; Harris, A Teaching Subject 98–107).
The early 1990s saw a debate between Bartholomae and Elbow on the
merits of academic writing vs. personal writing in the composition classroom. Bartholomae defined academic discourse as critical writing “where
students (with instruction—more precisely, with lessons in critical reading) can learn to feel and see their position inside a text they did not
invent and can never, at least completely, control” (“Writing” 482);
Elbow defined personal writing as separate from academic writing, as writing that focuses on students’ ideas and enables students to say, “I feel
like I am a writer” (“Being” 489). This debate demonstrated that,
although social constructionism had at that moment gained disciplinary
ascendancy over expressivism, expressivism was far from dead.
On the heels of this debate, a second personal turn emerged in our field
in the mid-1990s, bringing together (if you’ll pardon my parlance) strange
bedfellows: the far from dead expressivists and the feminist/cultural folks
who never really believed that the author was dead. Expressivist threads were
picked up by Wendy Bishop in her article “Places to Stand: The Reflective
Writer-Teacher-Writer in Composition” and by Joe Trimmer in his collection
Narration as Knowledge, both of whom defend the role of “story” as scholarship and pedagogy. Simultaneously, the feminist/cultural studies folks were
exposing, in both scholarly and student writing, that the personal is always
implicated in cultural critique and that the cultural is always implicated in
personal writing. In “When the First Voice You Hear Is Not Your Own,”
Royster argues for an emphasis on—indeed a respect for—the “subject positions” of particular readers and writers (29). Jarratt and Worsham’s collection, Feminism and Composition Studies: In Other Words, echoes Royster, and to
some extent Julia Kristeva: that is, when historical women and the category
Woman are inserted into the history of composition studies, also inserted is
an invitation to rethink not just our field but our own subjectivities, our politics, our texts, and our pedagogies. Given these strange bedfellows, the second personal turn engendered a debate not about whether to use personal
writing in scholarship and pedagogy but about how. In other words, the second personal turn engendered a debate about politics.
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DEFINING THE DEBATES AND TERMS OF THE SECOND PERSONAL TURN

Within the second personal turn, expressivists and feminist/cultural
studies folks both advocate the personal but in different ways. These differences are evidenced in the CCCC’s programs of 1998 and 2000. With
the 1998 theme “Ideas, Historias, y Cuentos,” Victor Villanueva located
himself more in the cultural studies camp by offering conferencegoers
an opportunity to link ideas, history, and personal stories; with the 2000
theme “Educating the Imagination and Reimagining Education,”
Wendy Bishop located herself more in the expressivist camp by offering
conference-goers an opportunity to reaffirm the creative imagination’s
place in our field, and if you examine the program, you’ll see lots of panels on stories, very few on the history of rhetoric. Now I don’t offer these
examples to celebrate Villanueva and excoriate Bishop; as Pat Bizzell
once mentioned in an e-mail message, it’s probably a good idea to have
the conference rotate its emphasis. I do, however, offer these examples
to demonstrate that the debate between expressivists and feminist/cultural studies folks is alive and kicking.
DIGRESSION 5: My naming two sides of this debate “expressivist” and “feminist/cultural studies folks” is admittedly both accurate and troublesome. The
labels work to define how the debate functions, but they also elide certain issues,
or more importantly, certain subject positions: e.g., some expressivists are feminists; moreover, some feminists and cultural studies scholars disagree about the
role of gender in cultural critique.

The debate between expressivists and feminist/cultural studies folks
may be better understood, however, by examining the terms that inform
it. For although the differing emphases of the two schools may be clear,
as Jane Hindman points out in a 2001 College English symposium on personal writing, “[m]uch less clear . . . is just what we mean when we use
the terms ‘the personal’ and ‘personal writing’” (34–35). In the wake of
critical theory’s upheaval of all our sacred terms (e.g., author, reading,
writing, reader), the second personal turn must contend with terms that
are more contested, less self-evident.
Yet the expressivist ideology of the second personal turn is haunted
by the first turn’s fairly self-evident terms: personal, writer, writing, and
story. Personal represents experiences of writers; writer signifies people
who are individual agents; writing refers to processes of discovering,
communicating, and narrating; and story represents a self-contained
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narrative. Thus, writers write stories about their personal lives. Given
these terms, the hermeneutic circle closes, apparently complete. As
Christine Farris has argued, this ideology was foregrounded in a 1999
call for papers for a special edition of Writing on the Edge, which Elbow
guest-edited, a special edition entitled “True Stories” (“Feminist”
10–11). Although that title resonates with echoes of the Hollywood
glamour magazines that populated the “beauty shops” of my childhood,
Elbow has something quite different in mind. He invites readers to submit the following: “Any stories related to writing, teaching writing, or
teaching and learning are welcome, but please let the story work on its
own; don’t include a moral or point or piece of wisdom. We are looking
for student stories, teacher stories, convention stories, dream stories,
transcribed oral stories, writing program stories, classroom stories, writing stories, stories from the past, stories from the present, stories of any
form, shape, or possibility” (CCC Online; my emphasis). Note the
“please.” Elbow is imploring us to curtail our impulse for academic critique and to foreground the story, the implication being a call for an ars
narratia, the idea that a story should not critique but be.
DIGRESSION 6: When I spoke on this topic at the 2000 Summer Seminar in
Rhetoric and Composition Studies at Millikin University, a student showed me
to my dorm room and told me in an awed, hushed tone, “This was Peter
Elbow’s room. He just left this morning.” In Elbow’s honor (and I do truly
respect his role in opening a space for the personal in our field), I’ll refrain
from making a point about this story.

Feminist/cultural studies ideology of the second turn is more clearly
haunted by critical theory’s upheaval of all our sacred terms. The term
personal signifies people’s experiences and opinions, which are always
implicated within cultural systems; writer signifies culturally located subjects who are socialized by cultural discourses and who also possess a certain agency for talking back to these discourses; writing signifies processes of recognizing this discursive socialization and of either reinforcing or
resisting it; and story refers to a narrative that is at once both personal and
cultural, both representational and representationally suspect. This ideology promotes writers telling stories as a means of identifying and critiquing not just their own always changing cultural locations but also the
attitudes and actions that emerge from these cultural locations—the idea
being that an awareness of intersecting discourses of race, gender, class,
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age, nationality, region, and so forth makes a person more able to understand and negotiate with other people, who also have their own particular always changing cultural locations. In “As We Were Saying,” Jarratt
articulates this stance: “The difference between self-reflective feminist
narratives and expressivist paradigms is theoretical, political, and rhetorical: the difference between the collective ‘we’ of my title and the
unbracketed first person evoked by some advocates of personal writing in
the composition class” (6). Note Jarratt’s “we.” With its use, she insists on
a writer’s culturally, and hence chorally, implicated subjectivity even
when that writer says “I.” And it is just this cultural implication, she
claims, that the expressivist “I” ignores by remaining naively unmarked.
Although the undergraduates in my autobiography class are unaware
of this debate, they often rehearse it. In the summer of 2000 while reading Nikki Giovanni’s Sacred Cows . . . and Other Edibles, several white students commented that they didn’t realize Giovanni was black until she
told them. I asked if they thought she was white. No, they replied, they just
didn’t think about race/ethnicity at all; further, they replied, Giovanni’s
being African American didn’t matter. Their replies may be read in a couple ways: 1) they are not prejudiced and are happy to read writers of any
ancestry; and/or 2) they believe that race and ethnicity should not factor
into writing and reading. So we talked for a moment about cultural markers (such as race, motherhood, gender, and age) in the texts that we had
been reading. We talked about why some writers have the privilege to
ignore these markers and why others don’t. We talked about Giovanni’s
decision to explicitly include them in her text so that readers cannot read
her as unmarked. In their initial replies, the students were echoing the
expressivist stance: what’s important is the story, not the cultural location
of the writer. Giovanni herself, however, was echoing the other side of the
debate: what’s important is not just the story but also how it is visibly
informed by the author’s and readers’ subject positions.
DIGRESSION 7: I wonder how the students would have told this story? What
kind of character would I be?

At this point in this chapter, it would be easy, as I noted earlier, simply to align myself with Royster, Jarratt, Worsham, and Villanueva and
feel smugly self-righteous about my choice. But to my mind, the road to
self-righteousness (especially my own) is always suspect. So that idea,
coupled with my hunch that this debate may have something more to
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tell us than the simple binary that meets the eye, leads me to yet another issue: the stakes of getting personal.
A S S E S S I N G T H E S TA K E S O F G E T T I N G P E R S O N A L

Although I’ve clearly located myself within the feminist/cultural studies
camp, I know some really good scholars and teachers who are expressivists (and yes, I know how that sentence sounds, but it’s true).
Moreover, I respect how these teachers use their (dare I say) values and
beliefs about language and writing to excite students into wanting to
write. So whether theorized from the sites of expressivism or
feminist/cultural studies, our field’s personal turn in many ways heartens
me. But the story does not end there because I am also troubled. I’m
troubled not because I want to convert the expressivists. I don’t (except
on days when I’m really cranky). I’m troubled because I see problems
that haunt both camps, these being the stakes of getting personal.
Although the stakes of how personal writing is employed in rhetoric and
composition studies raise myriad questions, here I address only three: 1)
How does the personal count in scholarship? 2) How does it count in
pedagogy? and 3) How does it count in cross-cultural communication?
First, in terms of scholarship, one stake concerns the role of theory.
Although expressivists and feminist/cultural studies folks make similar
textual moves in their scholarship, they position themselves differently in
terms of theory. In the scholarship where Bartholomae engages Elbow
and Elbow engages Bartholomae, where Jarratt engages expressivists and
Bishop engages social constructionists, they all set up a thesis, establish
reasons that may be enumerated and relegated into logical categories,
and weave personal stories into the piece as evidence. But Bartholomae
and Jarratt embrace theory; Elbow and Bishop seem . . . well . . . a little
more suspicious of it. In “Places to Stand,” Bishop confronts this issue
head-on when she says: “[I]t seems so uncanny for me today to be hearing
. . . that expressivists don’t do other things (‘things’ are often represented
by the word ‘theory’) because they ‘can’t,’ not because they choose not
to” (11). This “choosing not to” idea was reinforced to me by Joe
Trimmer, to whom I owe a great debt for encouraging me to enter this
field at a time when I wasn’t sure I was smart enough for Ph.D. studies.
Years later, after attending one of my CCCC’s talks, he sent me a piece he
had written along with a note that said something like: Here’s my foray
into multicultural autobiography, but notice, no theory jargon. What I get
from reading Elbow, Bishop, and Trimmer is that they are all more than a
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little fed up with academic jargon in scholars’ and students’ writings—and
in some cases, rightly so. Their eyes and ears desire a cleaner prose; their
writerly sensibilities demand a broader audience reminiscent of the public intellectuals of old. In some ways, I’m sympathetic to those ideas.
Theoretical writings are sometimes poorly written. But so are stories.
Conversely, both theoretical articles and stories can be done well. The
question for me about the role of theory in rhetoric and composition
studies is not so much a question of writing quality as one of disciplinary
function: what does theory make (im)possible? For me, as a scholar, theory productively complicates my thinking, my writing, my teaching, and
my daily living; it offers me a forum for framing my own ideas; and it offers
me a humility in recognizing that my ideas, experiences, and stories are
rhetorically linked to a community of thinkers beyond myself.
Another scholarly stake of getting personal concerns negotiating the
question: what counts as disciplinary knowledge? When reviewers of
book manuscripts and tenure cases assess scholarship in terms of how
well it extends disciplinary knowledge, what are they to do with stories
that stand alone? Can story count as theory? You bet. Even Judith Butler
agrees. But can it stand alone? That is the question, and it invokes a tension that is felt by expressivists and feminist/cultural studies folks even
though personal writing is widely employed today. Otherwise, why would
Bishop feel compelled in “Places to Stand” to assure readers that she
wants to hear their stories? “Did you not know I wanted to know about
it? I do” (29). And why would Worsham, citing Toni Morrison’s Nobel
lecture, assure readers that “[n]arrative is radical . . . creating us at the
very moment it is being created” (337)? The conventions of scholarly
readership (e.g., for reviewing book manuscripts and tenure cases) are
such that personal writing cannot simply stand alone but must further
disciplinary knowledge; in other words, scholars (especially beginning
ones) must navigate existing institutional structures that demand they
distinguish a Harper’s creative nonfiction essay from a CCC’s scholarly
article. Granted, a third option does exist. Villanueva names this option
“critical autobiography” and defines it, via Antonio Gramsci, as a
“mixed-genre,” a hybrid of personal story and intellectual critique
(Symposium Collective 51). But as Chris Farris argues, negotiating this
textual terrain is tricky. What if one reads it from within traditional
scholarly criteria? What if one develops new criteria (telephone conversation) for reading it? These are not impossible questions, but they are
important ones that need to be more fully disseminated and discussed so
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as to clarify for scholarly writers and readers the stakes of getting personal. Second, in terms of pedagogy, the stakes of getting personal
include how well teachers and students perform in the classroom.
Again, similarities exist between expressivists and feminist/cultural studies folks. We all want students to leave a writing course with a increased
appreciation for writing, with an increased respect for the power of language, with an increased ability to engage in writing as intellectual and
communicative acts. And we may all use freewriting and peer groups,
circled chairs and portfolios.
One pedagogical stake lies, again, in teachers’ orientation toward theory. Teachers’ theoretical assumptions (whether articulated or not)
drive their use of pedagogical tactics. For instance, freewriting may be
used by an expressivist to dig into the self; it may also be used by a cultural studies person to expose cultural discourses that embody us.
Circled chairs may be used by a feminist to promote a more equal
forum; they may also be used by a tyrannical teacher to better control
students. I could go on, but I won’t. My point (and personal pet peeve)
is that pedagogical tactics are not inherently expressivist or feminist or
anything else. Just as Aristotle argues that rhetoric becomes good or bad
in the hands of a moral or immoral rhetorician, pedagogical tactics gain
meaning from how they are employed. Granted, rhetorical structures
and pedagogical tactics have inherent limitations and possibilities. But
that is precisely why teachers of writing need to clarify their theoretical
positions and then clearly articulate these positions for students and for
themselves. Otherwise, freewriting in the hands of a cultural studies
teacher might still be perceived by a student as a means of purely private
investigation.
Another pedagogical stake lies in the question of course content.
Horner rehearsed this question in her oft-cited Bridging the Gap, a 1983
collection in which everyone from J. Hillis Miller to Wayne Booth
weighed in on whether readings should be used to teach writing.
(Horner said no; Miller and Booth said yes). Bartholomae makes critical reading and writing about texts, such as Richard Rodriguez’s Hunger
from Memory and Plato’s Phaedrus, a focus of his composition course
(“Wandering” 97); although Elbow agrees that students should read
texts, he advocates spending less class time on reading and more having
students write by “pretend[ing] that no authorities have ever written about
their subject before” (“Being” 491, 496). For a teacher, this choice has
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institutional and disciplinary implications. For example, listen to the following tirade against personal writing by Richard Marius, a Harvard professor who wrote the “Composition Studies” chapter in Stephen
Greenblatt and Giles Gunn’s Redrawing the Boundaries: “Get rid of autobiographical writing in the classroom. . . . Autobiographical writing
demeans our profession. While our colleagues in history, literature, and
other liberal arts are asking for writing about the world out there, we
often look like a crowd of amateur therapists delivering dime store psychology to adolescents. Our discipline then becomes trivial in the eyes
of the larger faculty” (475–76). My point is not that one should be intimidated by Marius’s admonition; actually, his dismissive tone about personal writing makes me want to pledge allegiance to expressivism. My
point is that this bias is still “out there,” affecting things like hiring,
tenure, promotion, pay raises, and personal status within one’s department. Part-time and untenured pedagogues know this better than anyone else.
Third, in terms of cross-cultural communication, a stake in getting
personal concerns how well U.S. cultures develop tactics for negotiating
commonalities and differences. Although this issue is so complex as to
make me throw up my hands before I begin, I choose to focus on one
tactic: the trump card, particularly its reception. A trump card is a personal story linked to a cultural location; it is used as a shortcut to a conclusion, functioning enthymemically via traditional common sense. In
rhetorical exchanges, a trump card can take any claim on any topic. The
trump card wins the argument—unless, of course, it is overtrumped by
a more powerful trump card. And there’s a whole deck of them—both
traditional and revisionary. Traditional trump cards may be classified
according to relational roles, such as the parent card, the teacher card,
the boss card. For example, when I tell my six-year-old daughter to pick
up her toys “because I say so,” I’m hoping she’ll be sufficiently intimidated by the parent card to do as I ask. As this example indicates, such
trump cards work only because there is an accompanying subordinate
position to be trumped (child, student, employee). Traditional trump
cards may also be classified according to cultural markings such as race,
gender, class, age, and nationality. For example, when white students say
that Giovanni’s race does not matter, they are speaking from a position
of privilege. Common sense tells us that if a traditional card is played
and we occupy a subordinate position, then we had better listen and act
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accordingly . . . or resist and be aware of the consequences. Obviously,
traditional trump cards still resonate within the United States: parents
still say pick up your room because I say so, and privileged whites still say
race does not matter. Yet, these traditional trump cards may be stood on
their heads when proved unjust, for example, when adolescent or adult
children challenge the parent card or when civil rights movements challenge the traditional race privilege card. Interestingly, though, traditional trump cards are often received not as trump cards but as norms;
it is mainly revisionary actions, such as children arguing for rights or
nonwhites arguing that race does matter, that suffer the label “trump
card.” And this phenomenon leads me to questions of reception.
In terms of trump card reception, sometimes a trump card is simply
a trump card. It happens. People of every cultural location use them to
achieve their own ends. But sometimes what is received as a “trump card”
is not intended to be one. Sometimes what is received as a trump card is
actually intended as a necessary corollary to the topic under discussion.
What is at stake in getting personal is that people in authority often
choose to interpret another’s story as a trump card. The O. J. Simpson
trial is a perfect example. When Johnny Cochran and his defense team
introduced LAPD attitudes toward African Americans into the defense,
the media accused him of playing the race card. But, as Cochran and his
team showed, racist attitudes did exist among LAPD officers; consequently, Cochran and his team deemed questions of race a necessary
corollary to their defense of the murder charge. But the (dominant
white) media’s and John Q. Public’s reception of this corollary as “the
race card” prevented productive discussion of LAPD corruption. Stasis
theory helps explain the problem. The media and public obsessed on
the stasis of conjecture (i.e., is race an issue?); actually, the majority
obsessed on arguing that race was not an issue and concluded that
Cochran was simply attempting to deflect discussion of the real issue,
murder. A more productive option for discussion might have been to
pursue the stasis of quality (i.e., given that race is always already a factor
in daily U.S. life, to what degree did racist attitudes inform white officers’ handling of the evidence and to what degree should such attitudes
influence the verdict?). From this point of stasis, there would have been
heated discussions but perhaps not such racially divisive ones.
When people choose to interpret an/other person’s personal story as
a trump card (and, remember, it is always a choice), they often enact one
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of three dysfunctional receptions: 1) they remain silent; 2) they talk back
to the “other” person but remain overly suspicious; or 3) they speak in
ways that essentialize gender and other cultural categories by saying, for
example, “oh, that’s just how they are”—as if all the theys are exactly alike.
DIGRESSION 8: It probably hasn’t escaped your notice that calling someone an
expressivist or social constructionist may also function as a trump card.

The danger with trump cards is that when they are used or, worse,
when necessary corollaries are received as trump cards, three negative
consequences ensue: 1) cultural categories (such as gender, ethnicity,
age, nationality) are reified; 2) the potential of both the personal and
cultural are downplayed and sometimes downright denied; and 3) possibilities for cross-cultural dialogues are shut down. In sum, the status
quo reigns.
So our discipline’s stakes in how to use personal writing are greater
than just a question of differences in theory and pedagogy. The stakes are
also in how well we help facilitate cross-cultural communication. Perhaps
in further interrogating the trump card and other cross-cultural tactics,
expressivists and social constructionists may find adjoining ground.
R E / T H E O R I Z I N G T H E P E R S O NA L — O R , H OW AU TO B I O G R A P H Y
THEORY MIGHT INFORM OUR CURRENT PERSONAL TURN

Like rhetoric and composition studies, autobiography studies gained
respectability within the academy only within the last thirty years, with
founding texts being James Olney’s 1972 Metaphors of Self: The Meaning
of Autobiography and his 1980 Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical.
When the field’s early focus stayed on great men, the field of women’s
autobiography emerged, and when that field’s early focus stayed on
white women, an emphasis on women’s multicultural autobiography
emerged. During this evolution, old definitions of autobiography were
exploded. The old definitions posit autobiography, historically, as a literary genre—a genre defined as the “full factual account of the author’s
public self, . . . [in] a linear, chronological exposition of events, . . . within a single work” (Morgan 5), a genre that operates as a not so thinly
veiled hero’s tale, a genre that purports to be didactic or confessional or
some combination of the two. Literary scholars have often dismissed this
genre, ranking autobiography as inferior to other genres (such as poet-
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ry and drama), fearing that if personal experience entered the literary
realm, then somehow the aesthetic might be polluted by the
didactic/confessional. Feminist literary scholars have often dismissed
not the genre but the traditional definition, questioning the gendered
assumptions behind phrases such as “full factual account,” “author’s
public self,” and “linear, chronological order exposition.” Rhetoric and
composition scholars have often dismissed this definition, too, questioning its positivistic overtones. To help rhetoric and composition studies incorporate more productive ideas about autobiography, which in
turn may help our field complicate notions of the personal, I offer a
concept of cultural autobiographics, a concept indebted to many rhetoric and composition and autobiography theorists. Cultural autobiographics posits autobiography, or personal writing, as both genre and
rhetorical tactic; it interweaves the personal with the textual and the cultural, and it exposes the material dimensions of language and written
texts.
When positing personal writing as a genre, cultural autobiographics
presumes not a stand-alone story but Villanueva’s “critical autobiography,” a “mixed-genre” or hybrid of personal story and intellectual critique (Symposium Collective 51). When positing personal writing as a
rhetorical strategy that permeates all genres, cultural autobiographics
complements Villanueva’s ideas with Leigh Gilmore’s. Gilmore coins the
term autobiographics and defines its “elements” as
those elements of self-representation which are not bound by a philosophical
definition of self derived from Augustine, not content with the literary history of autobiography, those elements that instead mark a location in a text
where self-invention, self-discovery, and self-representation emerge within
the technologies of autobiography—namely, those legalistic, literary, social,
and ecclesiastical discourses of truth and identity through which the subject
of autobiography is produced. . . . Autobiographics, as a description of selfrepresentation and as a reading practice, is concerned with interruptions
and eruptions, with resistance and contradictions as strategies of self-representation . . . [and] is the site of multiple solicitations, multiple markings of
“identity,” multiple figurations of agency. . . . The I, then, does not disappear
into an identity-less textual universe. Rather, the autobiographicality of the I
in a variety of discourses is emphasized as a point of resistance in self-representation. (42)
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In conceptualizing autobiographics, Gilmore asks us to imagine the “presence” of autobiography in all texts; thus, she shifts the question from whether
the autobiographical exists in a text to questions of degree and manner.
To demonstrate how the personal, the textual, and the cultural intersect, cultural autobiographics hearkens back to Janice Morgan, who
(echoing Olney) reminds us that the term autobiography contains etymological echoes of all three categories. That is, autobiography contains auto
(signifying self), bio (signifying life), and graphy (signifying writing/textuality). According to Morgan, depending on which etymology is emphasized, we get three different views of autobiography. Focusing on bio gives
us a premodern emphasis on the life of a person in relation to existing
cultural structures; for example, one was born either a serf or a king with
little or no options for change. Focusing on auto gives us a modern
emphasis on the life of a person as an autonomous self, as with Ben
Franklin’s argument that a person’s hard work promotes success. And
focusing on graphy gives us a postmodern emphasis on the life of a person as lexicon of textuality à l‘écriture feminine (Morgan 5). Although I
agree with Morgan (and Olney) that playing with etymologies is fruitful,
I want to argue that instead of relegating these three emphases to differing philosophical systems, we might try merging them into one: materialist feminism. Within this framework, autobiography may be imagined
as cultural autobiographics—i.e., as a space where the personal (auto),
the cultural (bio), and the textual (graphy) intersect as competing agents.
DIGRESSION 9: Because Leigh Gilmore’s autobiographics signifies cultural discourses and because Janice Morgan’s bio signifies culture, my use of the “cultural” marker preceding “autobiographics” may seem redundant, but given the
pervasiveness of individualism in U.S. culture, I’ve found it a useful emphasis
with students.

Within this materialist emphasis of cultural autobiographics, personal writing emerges as a textual map of the personal and the cultural.
Such textual maps function as a metonym for culture, not as a metaphor
for it, in that an individual’s text is associated with a culture, not representative of its entirety. And such textual maps have material effects on
people’s lives, other texts, and cultures. Conceiving personal writing as
cultural autobiographics enables students and scholars/teachers to
write the personal as described by Victor Villanueva in the College English
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Symposium Collective (51), to read the personal as described by Min
Zhan Lu in the same symposium (52–55), and to listen to the personal
as described by Joanne Braxton in Black Women Writing Autobiography (5).
Writing, reading, and listening to personal writing—whether women’s
multicultural autobiographies or any other text—enables students and
scholars/teachers to map intersections of various cultural categories,
such as gender and whiteness, as they merge in particular ways in particular people’s lives and texts. Conceiving personal writing as cultural
autobiographics also enables students and scholars/teachers to foreground the representational gaps in time and place inherent in all personal writing. In sum, practicing cultural autobiographics as writers,
readers, and listeners necessarily engages students and scholars/teachers in conversations about the ethics of writing, reading, and listening.
DIGRESSION 10: I admire the following quote by Victor Villanueva: “There must
be room for elements of autobiography, not as confession and errant selfindulgence, not as the measure on which to assess theory, not as a replacement for rigor, but as a way of knowing our predispositions to see things certain ways, of understanding what it is that guides our intuitions in certain ways.
This is autobiography as critique” (Symposium Collective 51).

This is what Adrienne Rich calls recognizing our own “politics of location” (212).
FINAL DIGRESSION: A STORY OF MY STORIES—OR, THE PERSONAL AS SYNECDOCHE

My ten numbered digressions interrupt the text proper, yet they serve
the text, too, demonstrating different functions of stories and storytelling. Digression 1 (which attempts to recover the name rhetoric and
composition studies) locates my current disciplinary standpoint but only
hints at its cause, i.e., my training with Ed Corbett. Digression 2 (which
tells Win Horner’s story) exemplifies my commitment to foregrounding
the lives of women. Digression 3 (which recounts my brain machine
experience) historicizes me within a particular (cognitive) moment of
our field, but it uses Roxanne Mountford as a character and backgrounds her story within our field, a success story that extends far
beyond this anecdote. Digression 4 (which questions the timing of the
death of the author) preaches. Digression 5 (which questions the terms
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I employ) acknowledges the slipperiness of terms and the violence
inherent in all definitions. Digression 6 (which relays my Peter Elbow
story) attempts to have fun, not make fun; but I’m not sure that it works,
and I’m not sure that it’s scholarship. Digression 7 (which narrates a
classroom moment) acknowledges that a narrator’s point of view determines the story and that we are all the “heroes” of our own stories.
Digression 8 (which admits that my terms may be used as trump cards)
turns my critique on myself—but not too seriously. Digression 9 (which
lays Leigh Gilmore, Janice Morgan, and my students alongside one
another) attempts to define and defend my use of cultural autobiographics within scholarly conversations and within pedagogical practices. And digression 10 (which highlights a quote I admire) only hints
that I collect quotes to help me think things through, but you might not
know that from my text; it might just look as if I threw in Villanueva’s
quotation in a rather sloppy fashion, leaving it hanging in ways we
encourage our undergraduate writers not to do.
Because these digressions are texts, they are representations of people, places, and ideas. At best they function as synecdoches; at worst they
function as misrepresentations, appropriations, or silenced voices. As
the writer, I control some part of how these representations are received;
as readers, you control more; and our common discourse . . . well, it controls even more. So in contemplating how to use the personal in scholarship and pedagogy in this our second personal turn, rhetoric and
composition studies needs to theorize further both the synecdochic
methods of representation and the ethics of such representations in the
personal writing that haunts our scholarship and our pedagogy. That’s
what I believe . . . but I am also echoing what Chris Farris said on the
phone last evening. That’s the problem—and the beauty—of personal
writing: it is written, as we all are, by the people and the discourses we
encounter. We all know that. But given that we live within an academic
discourse community where who-says-what counts, and where, presumably, people count too, we must proceed with care—in all senses of the
word.

15
GOING PUBLIC
Locating Public/Private Discourse
Sidney I. Dobrin

It is surprising, in many ways, that this deep into the postmodern era we
still make distinctions between public and private discourse(s) (or any
discourses, for that matter). It seems that one of the primary characteristics of postmodernity is the debunking of narratives that cubbyhole
phenomena in convenient, codifiable locations. Yet, our conversations
regarding public and/or private discourses frequently maintain a binary opposition between the two. As Andrea Stover has noted: “The public and private frequently collide in my classroom, and I worry about it”
(5). Collision. The term suggests both fundamental distinction between
the colliding items and conflict between the two. Collision, not convergence. Conflict, not coherence. And worry.
Simply put, what I want to do here is to take this binary, this potential
for collision, to task and argue that the distinction between public and
private discourses is both false and limiting in our understanding of
communication. In order to do so, I propose an ecological model for
understanding discourse and turn to the work of postprocess writing
theorists to explore the ways in which all discourse, be it defined as
either public or private, emanates from the same location and serves, in
fact, the same function, construction, and production. In turn, I will
consider that individual communicators rely on a host of prior discursive
moments to develop passing theories for engaging particular communicative moments and at no time separate those prior theories into
realms of public or private but instead rely on all prior theories to enter
into any communicative scenario. Hence, the distinction between public and private dissolve as each communicative moment is at once
dependant upon and moderated by both “private” and “public” prior
theories, and neither can be codified as anything more than a unique,
individual moment of discursive production/interpretation. Ultimately,
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what I argue is that the binary distinction of private and public is counterproductive in that it encourages discursive collision rather than a
more holistic, ecological vision of the function of discourse and discourages particular discursive maneuvers in certain discursive scenarios,
hence limiting discursive possibilities and potentially silencing users of
discourse (the private denied access in the public). That is, I opt for an
ecological, postprocess vision of discourse that sees all discursive
moments as unique events that encompass all that is public and private
at once. In other words, public discourse is as much private discourse as
private discourse is public. And separating the two leads toward a disempowering discursive collision.
P U B L I C / P R I VAT E D I S C O U R S E

In the introduction to the collection Post-Process Theory: Beyond the
Writing-Process Paradigm, Thomas Kent begins to explain that those who
subscribe to postprocess writing theories generally endorse “the fundamental idea that no codifiable or generalizable writing process exists or
could exist” (1). He goes on to explain that “most post-process theorists
hold three assumptions about the act of writing: 1) writing is public; 2)
writing is interpretive; and 3) writing is situated.” I would like to begin
by extending Kent’s notion of postprocess writing theory to an understanding of a postprocess discourse theory. Of course, the idea of postprocess writing theories directly reflects a reaction to the idea that the
production of writing can be marked in an identifiable process, an idea
that is distinctly a theory of composition studies. To theorize beyond the
entrenched notion that student writers—in fact, all writers—engage in a
recursive process of composing is to propose a rather disciplinary-specific theory. What I do not want to suggest here is that “discourse” is produced in a process similar to the ways in which we for so long assumed
“writing” to be produced. We cannot theorize discourse in the exact
same ways we theorize writing. In fact, I do not believe that I have ever
encountered such a thing as process discourse theory or a discourse
process paradigm. Discourse, that is, is more problematic, less tangible,
even less codifiable (in the traditional view) than is writing.
Discourse, if it is possible to talk about such a thing, if such a thing
exists, is nontotalizeable. Yet, we need some vocabulary for talking about
and for theorizing an idea of discourse, and what we learn from postprocess writing theories can help lead to a theory of discourse which,
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while originating in postprocess composition studies, should rightfully
be called something other than postprocess discourse theory as there is no
process discourse theory from which to be post. In fact, to name some
verbal exchange postprocess or paralogic discourse is both redundant and
poor modification. Writing is a technology; it is a secondary representation of discourse, a sort of a metaphysical technology, one that perpetually contributes to and is bound by discourse but exists as a representative technology of discourse. That is, writing is not discourse per se, but
rather a technological representation of discourse. Hence, the term
written discourse is also problematic, and it should probably be recast as
written (representation of) discourse. Discourse, too, is a technology, but discourse is discourse, neither postprocess nor paralogic, unlike writing,
which can be both. Discourse is at all times only and totally discourse.
So, what I offer here is neither postprocess discourse theory nor paralogic discourse theory but an understanding of discourse that draws
from an understanding of postprocess writing theory and paralogic rhetoric.
To understand the postprocess model, it is important to note that
postprocess thinking initiated both a shift from thinking about writing
as an activity that begins “inside” a writer and a shift from scholarship
that focused on individual writers (those theories often labeled historically as cognitivist or expressivist) to scholarship that acknowledges how
external forces—ideology, culture, society, race, gender, environment,
etc.—affect and are affected by writers (those theories often historically
labeled social constructionist). Indeed, most scholarship about writing
now acknowledges that writing takes place in relation not only to individual writers but also to the worlds in which they live and function. For
Kent, this move in theoretical focus from individual writers to communication contexts was a move from what he has called “internalism” to
“externalism” (Paralogic). (For an excellent critique of Kent’s internalism/externalism discussion, see Davis.) As Gail Hawisher et al. explain:
“During the period of 1983–1985, composition studies absorbed the
changes brought about by the new emphasis upon process and began to
chart the course it would follow postprocess, looking beyond the individual writer toward the larger systems of which the writer was a part”
(65). It is from these locations that I begin to consider discourse.
Gleaning, then, from this glossing of the postprocess composition
model, I want to propose a “postprocess” understanding of discourse
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(though, again, this is a poor label). In order to do so, I offer a paraphrase of Kent: central to understanding discourse is the fundamental
idea that no identifiable, codifiable, or generalizable discourse exists or
could exist. There are three assumptions about discourse that are crucial: 1) discourse is public; 2) discourse is interpretive; and 3) discourse
is situated. From here we can begin.
I take my central claim that there can be no identifiable, codifiable,
or generalizable discourse from Kent’s work in the postprocess theory of
paralogic rhetoric. To summarize and offer an overly simplified explanation of paralogic rhetoric, as I have before in my essay “Paralogic
Hermeneutic Theories: Power and the Possibility for Liberating
Pedagogies,” these theories state that each moment of communicative
interaction is singularly unique and that the ways in which we interpret
our communicative moments are not codifiable or verifiable in any logical manner (for a detailed explanation of paralogic rhetorical theories,
see also Kent, Paralogic or Dobrin, Constructing). Ultimately, what paralogic rhetorical theories identify, then, is that discourse does not operate in any logicosystemic manner and never remains stable long enough
for one to develop concrete understandings of the communicative interaction it encompasses. In other words, there are no codifiable processes
by which we can characterize, identify, solidify, and grasp discourse.
Communicative interaction, then, relies on strategies of what Kent labels
“hermeneutic guessing,” wherein participants develop strategies based
on previous experience to interpret discourse for that moment of communication. Kent draws his notion of hermeneutic guessing from
Donald Davidson’s theory of triangulation:
Each of two people finds certain behavior of the other salient, and each finds
the observed behavior of the other to be correlated with events and objects
he finds salient in the world. This much can take place without developed
thought, but it is the necessary basis for thought and language learning. For
until the triangle is completed connecting two creatures and each creature
with common objects in the world there can be no answer to the question
whether a creature, in discriminating between stimuli, is discriminating
between stimuli at the sensory surfaces or somewhere further out, or further
in. It takes two to triangulate. For each of us there are three sorts of knowledge corresponding to the three apices of the triangle: knowledge of our own
minds, knowledge of other minds, and knowledge of the shared world.
Contrary to traditional empiricism, the first of those is the least important,
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for if we have it we must have the others, so the idea that knowledge could
take it as foundation is absurd. (qtd. in “Externalism” 65–66)

“We come to know and understand objects in the world and each
other,” Anis Bawarshi explains of triangulation, “only when our interpretations match others’ interpretations” (73). Theories of paralogic
rhetoric make the similar claim that an individual comes to know an
object through interpretive moves with other interpreters. In other
words, knowledge is social and discursively constructed, but can only be
discussed as such as a means of convenience, as the very discourse
through which knowledge is made socially (publicly) can never be codified, confirmed, identified, or totalized.
Kent explains, via Davidson, that triangulation is dependent upon
two theories: passing theory and prior theory. Prior theories are the
interpretive strategies one brings to a particular communicative scenario—the hermeneutic guessing skills one has developed prior to a
particular situation. Passing theories are the strategies one employs during the particular instance of communication. Each communicative act,
then, becomes an interpretive moment unique unto itself in which a
participant relies on particular prior theories to develop a passing theory in order to achieve successful communication with another. The skills
we develop through prior theories, then, determine how effective our
passing theories might be situation to situation.
To further examine the issue of discourse, then, what can be understood, too, is that discourse, the very medium through which we come
to develop prior and passing theories, is also known only through our
communicative interactions and interpretations with others. That is to
say, discourse is a product of triangulation, a socially mapped construction, a phenomenon that cannot be codified but that must be assumed
to be product and purveyor of social interaction. One does not come to
discourse, come to know discourse, without social interaction. Hence,
discourse itself is socially constructed, socially construed. Functioning,
then, as the medium through which we come to know both discourse
itself and the world, discourse is itself discursively constructed and is
thus necessarily public. The idea of private discourse has become a term
used as a sort of self-validation of the authentic, a resistance to this very
idea that all discourse—in fact, all existence—is public. It provides the
inaccurate idea of being able to escape the public while maintaining a
hold on an identifiable, confirmable self that is separate from public
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discourse, from social interaction, and somehow identifiable as such. If
we are to accept Kent and Davidson’s notion of triangulation as an
explanation of the act of communication, then private discourse cannot
exist free of the public; it is, in fact, itself public.
Turning back to my paraphrase of Kent, discourse, then, is public at
all times. Private discourse may be identified as a discourse known and
used only by one’s self, but the fact of the matter is that before a discourse can be made private (the privatization of discourse?), it must first
be experienced publicly. Certainly, then, we can say that there is a distinction between public and private discourse, but only as a matter of
convenience and codification. That discourse which we conveniently
call private is in no way different from that discourse we call public.
However, we must recognize that because of the ways in which we come
to know discourse, come to know through discourse, discourse does not
begin private and then earn a label or stature of public discourse as it is
made public. Rather, discourse begins public and is labeled private as is
needed. This is an important distinction to make, for it allows us to recognize that any discourse, whether we call it private, public, home,
hybrid, or alternative, is always already public. There can be no other
kind of discourse, for discourse by its very nature, its very construction,
is a public, social, triangulative, interpretive entity. Identifying something as discourse identifies it as a product of, mediator of, and a purveyor of the public. While individuals’ discourses affect all discourse, discourse itself is that which makes individuals’ discourses.
If we accept the maxim “all discourse is public,” then we must also
identify that all discourse is interpretive. Returning to Kent’s explanation
that each communicative scenario is unique and dependent upon individual interpretive moments, it becomes clear that discourse itself is
dependent upon those very interpretive moments. In order for discourse
to exist, each moment of triangulation requires a moment of interpretation. Each moment of interpretation requires a growing resource of prior
theories to engage and successfully interpret each new communicative
moment in order to develop a passing theory for that scenario. Now, it
might seem reasonable to assume, then, that each communicative scenario requires the individual to develop an internalized or private theory for engaging each new communicative scenario, that, in fact, discourse
originates internally, in the private self, before being made public.
However, such an assumption neglects that all prior theories originated
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in public, shared discourse before ever becoming prior theories. That is,
in the chronology of prior theories, our first prior theories and all subsequent prior theories were developed through public interaction. No
prior theory, no discursive experience, no internal conversation initiated
prior to public conversation exists prior to triangulation, prior to interpretation. Hence, in order to engage something conveniently called “private” discourse, one must first have public discourse and must have interpreted moments of that public discourse in order to develop even a label
of “private.” Private discourse is nothing more than a manifestation of
public discourse internalized. All discourse, then, is reliant upon individuals’ experiences of interpreting discourse and making use of that discourse in order to develop prior theories of communicative interaction.
Private discourse is merely symptomatic of public discourse.
Writing is, as I have said, a technology, and, as Kent identifies, it is necessarily place-based. Discourse, too, is a sort of technology and it is always
place-based. Discourse is situated. Discourse always comes from someplace; discourse, to paraphrase Kent, is never nowhere. I have argued in
my essay “Writing Takes Place” that writing is an ecological pursuit, that
“in order to be successful, it must situate itself in context; it must grow
from location (contextual, historical, ideological)” (18). I go on to
explain: “Writing does not begin in the self; rather, writers begin writing
by situating themselves, by putting themselves in a place, by locating within a space. Writing begins with topoi, quite literally with place” (18–19).
Here, I want to argue likewise that discourse is place-based, is situated.
Discourse, that is, is at all times local. Discourse exists in context. By this
I mean more than a physical location, I mean to suggest that discourse is
place-based in terms of historical location, ideological location, physical
location, political location, imagined location, and so on. Discourse is a
place-based technology, a thing that is altered to the needs of a particular context, made by that context, and ultimately the very thing that
makes that context. That is to say, discourse constructs the places that
construct it. The relationship between discourse and place is reciprocal,
uncodifiable. Discourse makes place as much as place makes discourse.
In our book, Natural Discourse: Toward Ecocomposition, Christian Weisser
and I argue that this very idea of discourse constructing place, or environment as we term it, and place constructing discourse is the cornerstone
of understanding ecocomposition, to seeing the relationships among
places, environments, and discourse. What we argue is that discourse is
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dependent upon the environments from which it grows, and those very
environments are dependent upon, created by, those same discourses.
Separating discourse from place is impossible; they are inextricably
bound. Of course, making such a statement allows, then, for work to be
done that sees the links between other discursive constructions—history,
gender, race, culture, ideology, nature, and so on—and place. That is, the
proposal that discourse is placed-based allows for the development of an
ecological view of discourse.
E C O L O G I CA L P U B L I C / P R I VAT E

Before proposing an ecological model of discourse, I want to briefly
examine what I mean by ecological. Unfortunately, the concept of ecology—and the oft-used prefix eco—has been popularly adopted to resound
with the idea of environmentalism and with a particular political position. While I approve of such a position, I do want to emphasize that this
is not the political position I take when I refer to an ecological model of
discourse. Rather, I mean to allude to the science(s) of ecology, those
inquiries that seek to examine relationships among organisms and their
environments. That is, when I say that I want to propose an ecological
model of discourse, I am suggesting a relational understanding of discourse, an environmental and place-based understanding of discourse.
In her 1986 article “The Ecology of Writing,” Marilyn Cooper contributes to the initiation of the postprocess endeavor when she proposes an ecological model of writing “whose fundamental tenet is that writing is an activity through which a person is continuously engaged with a
variety of socially constituted systems” (367). In other words, Cooper
suggests that writing be examined not as an individual process but as a
functioning and reliant part of the systems in which that writing is situated. While Cooper, like Kent and other postprocess theorists, addresses writing in particular, what she teaches us can help us to develop an
ecological model of discourse as well. She writes:
All the characteristics of any individual writer or piece of writing both determine and are determined by the characteristics of all other writers and writing
systems. An important characteristic of ecological systems is that they are inherently dynamic; though their structures and contents can be specified at a given
moment, in real time they are constantly changing, limited only by parameters
that they themselves subject to change over longer spans of time. (368)
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To once again paraphrase (and alter a bit) our view of writing so that
it encompasses discourse, we see that all the characteristics of discourse
are determined by the characteristics of all users of discourse and all
other discourses. Discourse is inherently dynamic. Its structure cannot
be specified, codified, totalized, or identified at any given moment as it
is constantly changing, limited only by parameters that discourse itself is
subject to change. Discourse, then, can be seen as ecological: a system
(albeit, as I have explained it, and to borrow again from Kent, discourse
is beyond system, as system suggests having identifiable characteristics)
that is dependent upon the relationships of discourse users to each
other in order for discourse to survive, reproduce, evolve.
What is critical about Cooper’s ecological model is that it introduces
the notion that writers interact with systems that affect their writing. As
Erika Lindemann explains when writing about Cooper’s article and
about writing as system: “The ecological model usefully complicates the
learning and teaching of writing because it reminds us of the social context in which all writers work” (296). Writers—or more to the point of
this discussion, users of discourse—in essence are dependent upon their
surroundings—surroundings that are dynamic, difficult to define, and
susceptible to the forces imposed by other users of discourse. As Cooper
notes, ecological models are not simply new ways of saying “contextual”
(367). Context suggests that potential effects of all local systems can be
identified through heuristics in order to provide writers with accurate
and complete information prior to writing. Cooper points out: “In place
of the static and limited categories of contextual models, the ecological
model postulates dynamic interlocking systems that structure the social
activity of writing. . . . The systems are not given, not limitations on writers; instead they are made and remade by writers in the act of writing”
(368). Again, in a larger, more encompassing view, discourse is not systemic, yet it is ecological in that its users are dependent upon, inextricably linked with, and a product of those very discourses. Hence, an ecological model of discourse removes the need for a binary distinction
between private and public discourse in favor of a dynamic interlocking
view of discourse, one in which private and public discourse function in
relation, connection, and dependence upon one another.
Cooper explains that “the metaphor for writing suggested by the ecological model is that of a web, in which anything that affects one strand
of the web vibrates throughout the whole” (370). She posits:
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Two determinants of the nature of a writer’s interactions with others are intimacy, a measure of closeness based on any similarity seen to be relevant—kinship, religion, occupation, and power, a measure of the degree to which a writer
can control the action of others. . . . Writers may play a number of different roles
in relation to one another: editor, co-writer, or addressee, for instance. Writers
signal how they view their relationship with other writers through conventional
forms and strategies, but they can also change their relationships—or even initiate or terminate relationships—through the use of these conventions if others
accept the new relationship that is implied. (369–370)

Cooper also claims: “In contrast, then, to the solitary author projected by the cognitive model, the ideal image the ecological model projects
is of an infinitely extended group of people who interact through writing, who are connected by the various systems that constitute the activity of writing” (372). To extend Cooper’s statement to include not just
writing but all discourse, we must see the web of discourse as a much
more all-encompassing and dynamic web, one that is perpetually shifting, always vibrating, and constantly reforming itself in terms that cannot be defined long enough to grasp the identity, shape, or characteristics of that web. That is, from moment to moment, the web of discourse
maintains operational integrity through its relationships with users of
discourse, the place in which those users of discourse use discourse, and
its own shifting (lack of) form. In other words, when Cooper proposed
a model of system and a metaphor of web, she began to see the relational value of writing but did not see the limits placed on writing or discourse by identifying either as a system, as a measurable structure. To
envision discourse as more than a web like that of a spider and instead
see it as something more dynamic and more elusive is to begin to develop an ecological model of discourse. This means creating a more holistic vision of discourse and seeing users of that discourse to be more
active participants in it. An ecological model of discourse allows, in fact,
the binary of private/public to fracture in favor of a more holistic concept of discourse as a perpetually public, perpetually discursive entity. It
disallows the false authentication of self through private discourse in
favor of authenticating a public self through discursive relationships,
and finally, it allows for that public (the only) self to be an active contributor to, participant in, manufacturer of, and product of discourse.
Simply put, an ecological view of discourse suggests relationships. It
places all participants in and of discourse in relation to one another; it
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situates all users of discourse in and of a public discourse. It does not
suggest that all users of discourse are the same, communicate the same,
or use the same discourse. In fact, it does not suggest that discourse itself
is ever the same. It identifies the perpetually shifting and dynamic
nature of discourse as the environmental force that maintains all discursive relationships. Discourse itself is engaged in an ongoing, fluctuating relationship with all users of discourse. It (if there is even an
appropriate pronoun through which to represent discourse) is affected
by and affects all that stand in relation to it. Even those discourses we
choose to label as private, hybrid, alternative, personal, and so on function in relation to discourse as a whole. That is to say, the labels we place
for convenience, to distinguish what we interpret as different discourse,
do not actually separate those fractions of discourse from the more
encompassing concept of discourse. Again, to simplify, all discourse is
public, all discourse is interpretive, all discourse is place-based, all discourse affects and is affected by its users, all users of discourse affect and
are affected by discourse.
COLLISION

At the beginning of this short ramble, I noted that perpetuating the
public/private binary gives rise to conflict, to the kinds of collision that
Stover identifies as occurring in her classroom. It is particularly this sort
of collision, this location for conflict, that I wish to avoid through a
reconceptualization of discourse as an all-inclusively public, ecological
entity. What I posit is that by disavowing the self-authentication through
private discourse, through discourses that we identify as somehow representative of our own or our students’ own true self, the risk of exposing particular discourses in larger discursive moments is reduced. Any
time an individual enters into a communicative scenario, that individual
makes certain choices as to what to bring to that scenario, what prior
theories to make use of: choices, simply, of what to say and what not to
say, choices of what and how to interpret. In any communicative
instance, users of discourse make decisions as to what they wish to reveal,
what they wish to expose within the discourse. Once a communicator
has made particular interpretations available to others, that user risks
vulnerability through exposure. Part of this vulnerability comes from the
long-professed idea that revealing the personal places the discourse user
at greater risk of vulnerability because that which is exposed represents
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the authentic self, represents private discourse. By rethinking the
emphasis we place on the risk of exposing the private as representation
of self and instead seeing exposure as a participatory, public discourse,
we stand to lessen the vulnerability of the discourse user. Let me offer a
quick example.
On the morning of September 11, 2001, I watched the horrific events
unfold on television as most of America did. At some point, I logged
onto my computer to check CNN online. When my e-mail popped up,
there were, as there always are, a series of e-mails from the WPA
Listserve. At 08:46 (Mountain Time, I believe) Bonnie Kyburz posted
the first message to the list with the subject line “Terrorism (?)” Prior to
this message, all messages had been about general WPA-type issues. The
messages following Kyburz’s initial post began a thread discussing the 911 events, first relaying news of the events to those in their offices away
from televisions or radios (I never thought of my office as particularly
shut off from the world). The thread also bears marks of a community
looking for comfort, extending wishes of safety to one another, of information. A few posts go on about business as usual, answering questions
of writing majors and writing requirements. At 9:34 (Pacific Time),
Gordon Thomas of the University of Idaho posted the following request:
“I’d like to hear how people are responding to these plane crashes in
their Writing Programs.” He asks in regard to teaching about the event:
“Does asking students to write or even discuss these events unduly
inflame their emotions and make later teaching more difficult?” The
conversation then turned to what composition instructors should ask
their students to write, to how writing could be seen as a therapeutic
response to the horrible events. Deb Core, for instance, at 12:49
(Eastern Time, I think) wrote: “Seems to me that letting them talk is
more appropriate at this point than asking them to write, to the extent
that writing is private and students need the communal at this point.”
The public/private binary became central within hours of the event.
And writing teachers began to decide what “students need.” At
10:41(Pacific Time) Gordon Thomas posted a writing assignment, part
of which included these directions:
Writing Exercise Concerning the Events of September 11, 2001, for classes
meeting on September 12–14:
Start by just having a general discussion for a few moments about the
events of Tuesday, September 11, 2001. Try to get the students to contextualize
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the event historically (many news commentators are now saying that the only
thing that this compares to is the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Oklahoma
City bombing, these comparisons may be controversial, but they are already
being made).
Be prepared for the possibility of some students expressing great anger or
fear (or both). It is quite possible that some students may say things that they
don’t really mean. Do your best not to inflame such feelings, and keep in
mind that it does help some people to talk about this at the time. The best
attitude for you to take is to be nonjudgmental about their responses unless
someone says something that is overtly hostile to international students,
Moslem students in particular. . . .
After this short oral discussion, ask them to take out paper and write freely
in answer to the following questions.
Now that some time has passed since your first heard the news, write
down some of the pieces of information that you have learned since the
initial news. Just list the information, not how you feel about it (yet).
Describe how your initial response changed as you learned more about
what had happened.
What is the primary feeling that you have concerning these events?
Why do you feel that way?
What do you think the response of the U.S. government will be to these
events? How do you feel about that potential response?
When the students have finished writing, ask them to put their writing
away and keep it until later in the semester. Explain that you won’t be collecting or reading their work. Tell them that they may want to save this writing as a personal record of what has happened.

Let me offer an explication of this questionable and inappropriate
assignment: something horrible has happened in the world, and we as
writing teachers should have our students expose themselves before us.
In other words, as writing teachers, it is our duty to ask our students to
perform the private in a public forum on demand. I can think of no
other example of a larger instance of collision or of providing the place
for collision to happen. (Please note my apology for the seemingly
insensitive metaphor of collision here in relation to the events of 9-11.)
I also fail to see how this assignment teaches writing, but that’s another
matter. I understand that carrying out Andrea Stover’s metaphor here is
a bit uncomfortable, but as I explain to my students, my primary objective as a teacher, writer, scholar is to make folks uncomfortable. We tend
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to pay attention to things that are uncomfortable; we try to adjust them.
Uncomfortable clothes for instance, get altered; uncomfortable discourses don’t seem natural, like they belong somehow.
The WPA discussion and the writing assignments proposed in this discussion seek to validate the student’s authentic self by asking (in fact,
demanding) that the student express feelings, the private, in a public
forum under the guise of therapy, under the guise of helping the student. I would like to point out as well that such therapeutic assignments
often stem from instructors’ needs for a therapeutic response to a situation inflicted upon students. Yes, the September 11 disaster was hideous,
and many students and teachers wanted/needed to discuss it and should
be able to, but not under the aegis of writing assignments, not at the
command of a writing instructor.
Don’t hear, however, that I am arguing against the expression of feelings, against the rights of students or any other users of discourses, to
self-expression (for more on the role of emotions see Dobrin and
Weisser). I am in favor of and even encourage such things. However, to
suggest that, first, the feelings of students are somehow private expressions of themselves, and, second, that teachers of writing have a right to
demand those discourses be made public is abhorrent. However, when
we encourage students to see how their reactions and their feelings are
part of a more encompassing discourse that is affected by its relational
aspects, students are in a better position to act in that discourse rather
than be exposed in that discourse, made vulnerable in that discourse.
Asking students to perform the private publicly is counterproductive.
Asking students to make decisions about their public discourse participation seems more empowering, more discursively responsible. I find it
difficult, in fact, to find a reason to want to maintain a concept of private discourse, of an authenticated self; doing so merely provides an
opportunity to allow expressionism to raise its dying head and maintain
a foothold in the conversations of discourse studies.
Let me conclude, then, with a final maxim: discourse is always already.
Period. In order for discourse to be, it must be public, it must be interpretive, it must be place-based. Hence, any discourse exists only in relation to
discourse and to users of discourse. Discourse is itself affected by and
affects its users, constructs and is constructed by its users. Any discourse, no
matter what we chose to label it for the sake of convenience—not the sake
of actual identification or codification—is, then, always already public.

16
PUBLIC WRITING AND RHETORIC
A New Place for Composition
Christian R. Weisser

Public spheres are not only arenas for the formation of discursive opinion; in addition, they are arenas for the formation and enactment of
social identities. This means that participation is not simply a matter
of being able to state propositional contents that are neutral with respect
to form of expression. Rather . . . participation means being able to
speak in one’s own voice, and thereby simultaneously to construct and
express one’s own cultural identity through idiom and style.
Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere”

Due to a number of internal and external forces, the field of composition has begun to embrace courses, pedagogies, and theories that
engage in discourse with and about the public—and rightly so. (For a
fuller explication of the recent move in rhetoric and composition
toward public writing, see Weisser; Dobrin and Weisser.) A focus on public writing—which might loosely be defined as written discourse that
attempts to engage an audience of local, regional, or national groups or
individuals in order to bring about progressive societal change—offers
much more than the relatively “arhetorical” approaches to writing
instruction that ask students to write to no one for no particular purpose. (For practical purposes, I offer this definition, which is limiting yet
necessary for the task at hand. The distinction between “public” and
“private” that seems implicit here is itself problematic and worthy of
more attention than space permits.) Instead, courses focusing on public
writing have the potential to give student writing real significance; they
allow students to produce meaningful discourse that has the potential to
change their lives and the lives of others. In this respect, students see
public writing as more “real” than, for example, an essay about what they
did last summer or an analysis of a particular piece of literature. Public
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writing can help students to see the value of adopting a particular
rhetorical stance, since public writing is often directed toward a particular audience that might be influenced by a student’s writing. Students
often come away from a course or assignment that focuses on public
writing with a better understanding of the importance of shaping the
style, form, and tone of their written work in ways that might be most
persuasive and convincing. In addition, public writing more easily allows
students to see that language is a powerful tool for swaying opinions and
actions. When a student’s writing generates further public discussion or
leads to some political or social change, he or she comes to see how discourse is deeply implicated in the structures of power in a society. It is
easy to understand, then, why Gary A. Olson suggests that “public writing is clearly emerging as a powerful expression of some of the field’s
most cherished values” (ix).
This is not to say, though, that public-writing assignments are a
panacea for national or even local ills. Helping students find avenues
and situations for public discourse demands an enormous amount of
time, and even when they are found, public discursive spheres are often
difficult to enter. Public forums usually work on a different schedule
than that of a university course, and grading students for their “participation” in such forums creates new problems for both student and
instructor. Even when students successfully enter and participate in public discourse, there is no guarantee that their opinions will be listened to
and acted upon. In fact, the odds are against them.
So, many writing instructors see the value of courses and assignments
that focus on public writing and rhetoric, but they just as wisely anticipate the pedagogical difficulties and risks associated with them. As a
result, some advocates of public writing rely upon established, conventional pedagogical assignments for addressing the public, such as letters
to the editor of the local newspaper on a current topic. The occasional
student letter that is published in the local newspaper is very often a
rewarding experience for that student and may encourage him or her to
write and speak in other public forums and situations. Now and then,
these letters compel others to write in response, and once in a while
(though rarely), student letters elicit response and discussion in other
public forums. However, while these assignments have some potential
merit, they are more often than not an exercise in frustration and discouragement for most student authors. Letters to the editor are usually
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one-way assignments; students put effort into writing them but get little
response. As a result, these types of assignments are often counterproductive. Perhaps more significantly, such exercises do little to cultivate
the students’ facility with public writing. In many instances, the students’
letters are very often generated just to fulfill the assignment. I don’t wish
to imply that the newspaper editorial column should be overlooked as
an appropriate forum for student-generated discourse. Occasionally,
students may come across a public issue that they are genuinely interested in, but more often than not, the issues students write about in their
letters have little bearing on their lives outside of the classroom.
Unfortunately, students often come to feel that participating in public
discourse, if letters to the editor are indeed public discourse, has little
effect on what happens in their world. They surmise that the public
sphere is a realm where nothing actually gets accomplished—at least not
by them.
If we wish to create assignments, courses, and pedagogies that enable
students to interact more effectively with other groups and individuals
in public arenas, we could begin by considering where and to whom
meaningful and productive public writing might be delivered. Luckily,
when it comes to thinking about the location for public discourse—the
public sphere—we need not reinvent the wheel; a number of social and
cultural theorists have already written extensively and usefully about this
notion from a variety of perspectives. By drawing principally upon the
work of Jürgen Habermas—and perhaps more fruitfully upon critiques
of his work as offered by Nancy Fraser, Oscar Negt, and Alexander
Kluge—it is possible to develop a richer, more nuanced conceptualization of the public sphere than that which seems to underlie some traditional public-writing assignments. There are many parallels between the
conversations of the public sphere in social and cultural theory and the
more recent conversations in composition regarding public writing, and
these similarities have allowed me to dispel several of my own initial misconceptions about the locations of public discourse. While it is impossible to fully address all of these parallels in this chapter, it may be useful
to examine just a few of them to extend our current understanding of
where and how public writing exists.
A PLACE IN TIME

A good place to begin this investigation is to examine the historical and
contextual conditions that give rise to public discourse. One could
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assume that public writing is an activity that takes place in a relatively stationary sphere and that it requires little knowledge about the conditions
that gave rise to the activity of public discourse or the conditions corresponding to each particular topic in the public sphere. Public writing
may seem to be a comparatively ahistorical activity that calls for little
prior knowledge of prior conversations or modes of conduct. However,
effective public-writing assignments must account for the degree to
which public discourse exists in a historically textured sphere that is the
product of innumerable social and political forces. These forces have
long histories and are in a constant state of flux. If we are to fully and
cogently theorize public writing, we must begin by establishing it as a
complex historical category.
Perhaps the best way to conceptualize this notion is to examine where
public writing is thought to occur. The location of public discourse—
labeled “the public sphere” by many theorists—has been seen primarily
as a historical concept. Efforts to understand the history, foundations,
and internal processes of public discourse have been central to the conversations about the public sphere in social and cultural theory. The
debate on the public sphere has been influenced most deeply by
Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, a work that is,
as Susan Wells writes, “both deeply problematic and astoundingly fruitful” (“Rogue Cops” 327). Essentially, the book builds its theoretical argument through an analysis of the historical growth of capitalism and
democracy in Britain, France, and Germany in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thomas McCarthy argues that the book is “a historicalsociological account of the emergence, transformation, and disintegration of the . . . liberal public sphere that took shape in the specific historical circumstances of a developing market economy” (“Introduction”
xi). The book envisions the public sphere as an institutional location where
practical reason and debate arise out of material circumstances in order
to promote more democratic ideals. That is, one of the most significant
aspects of Structural Transformation is that it sees public discourse as occurring only as a result of a particular cultural climate. Habermas asserts that
the public sphere “is a category that is typical of an epoch” and that “we
treat public sphere in general as a historical category” (xvii). Similarly,
Richard Sennett’s The Fall of Public Man suggests the importance of a historical understanding of the concept of the public sphere. Sennett
argues that his book attempts to “create a theory of expression in public
by a process of interplay between history and theory” and that to have a
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clear understanding of the subject, it is necessary to examine “the social
and political dimensions of the public problem as it has developed in
modern society” (6). Both of these conceptions of the public sphere, and
the many conversations that they have generated in social and cultural
theory, see public discourse as arising from the distinct cultural conditions of capitalist and postcapitalist societies. They both suggest that public discourse occurs in the context of a particular cultural milieu.
If we agree that public discourse arises from a culture, and that social,
political, and historical forces have constructed, shaped, and otherwise
affected the locations, topics, and methods of public discourse, we are,
in a sense, arguing that it is ideologically interested. (Of course, all discourse is ideologically interested. I mention the role of ideology here to
emphasize it, not to suggest that public discourse is somehow different
from other discursive situations in this respect.) In short, any understanding of public discourse as a product of a particular cultural climate
must take into account the ways that ideology shapes and structures
nearly every aspect of what, where, and how public discourse occurs as
well as who gets to speak in public settings. While both Habermas and
Sennett devote a great deal of attention to the historical emergence of
the public sphere, they also (as their critics note) fail to recognize the
degree to which ideology shapes public discourse. For example, in their
analyses of the bourgeois public sphere of that time, both Habermas
and Sennett overlook the degree to which dominant ideology shaped
public debates, and, as a result, they both fail to account for the degree
to which the discourse that occurred in this forum was controlled and
manipulated by white property-owning males. Commonly, in public discourse, ideology naturalizes certain authority regimes—those of class,
race, and gender, for example—and renders alternatives all but
unthinkable. As James Berlin writes, ideology always brings with it
“strong social and cultural reinforcement, so that what we take to exist,
to have value, and to be possible seems necessary, normal, and
inevitable—in the nature of things” (Rhetorics 78). Therefore, it is imperative that we recognize that public writing, and the spheres in which it
occurs, is ideologically constructed. In short, recognizing that public
discourse is historical, contextual, and ideologically influenced is an
inherently rhetorical move, since it allows an author to better conceptualize his or her audience and the discourse that will suit it best.
Seeing public writing as a political move allows us to pay particular
attention to both our audience and our subject. We recognize that the
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groups or individuals that we hope to persuade and possibly call to
action are influenced by particular rhetorical modes and devices, and
their reactions are often shaped by their prior experiences with public
discourse. They may consider our public discourse more or less closely
as a result of where we speak from and the style and type of discourse
that we use. Furthermore, we can better conceptualize our subject if we
see it as discursively constructed through a variety of previous public discussions. That is, our own conceptions of a particular topic are shaped
by all of our previous encounters with it, and many of these encounters
transpired in public spheres. Envisioning public writing in this way situates each public discursive moment as ideologically situated, itself an
intervention in the political process. Public writing cannot deny its
inescapable ideological predispositions. It cannot claim to be above ideology, a transcendent discourse that exists outside of history or culture.
Like Berlin’s social-epistemic rhetoric, public writing, when seen from a
historical/cultural perspective, contains “within it a utopian moment, a
conception of the good democratic society and the good life for all of its
members” (Rhetorics 81). Public writing must be aware of its historical
contingency and of its limitations and incompleteness.
I’m certainly not suggesting that we have our undergraduates read
Habermas, Sennett, or any other historical investigation of the public
sphere. Nor am I suggesting that they read Berlin to learn more about
the relationships between ideology and discourse. What I am suggesting
is that we should help them to recognize that culture, politics, and ideology shape public conversations. We should highlight the ways in which
material forces shape what gets said, who gets heard, and how these
forces have structured public discourse throughout history. This can be
accomplished by choosing particular cultural issues that have been discussed in the public sphere, examining which voices have been heard
and acknowledged, which voices have been marginalized, silenced, or
excluded, and how discourse on particular issues has changed or developed as a result of the larger political and social climates in which they
have been generated. Students are able to easily transfer these heuristics
and skills to their own areas of interest, and, as a result, they are more
capable of generating effective public writing. By looking at public writing in context, we allow students to see how to use the tools of language
to their best interests and in the process discover how textual production—such as public writing—helps to shape and construct knowledge
rather than simply reproduce it. Such an approach will necessitate that
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writers research the histories of the issues they choose to address to find
out how the conversations surrounding them have been shaped, altered,
and constructed. At the same time, they will need to consider what is not
said, whose voices have been excluded from the conversation, and how
ideology has normalized certain features of the public discussion they
are entering.
A course or assignment focusing on public writing would need to consider how a particular issue—school vouchers, for example—has been
shaped by the long history of educational debate in this country. Writers
would need to consider how legislative programs such as school segregation, bussing, and standardized testing have been used in the past to
justify the ideological perspectives of those in power. In addition, writers
would need to consider what sorts of rhetoric might open up or foreclose further discussion from various groups in the public sphere.
Regardless of the form or topic of the assignment or course, effective
public writing necessitates a thorough investigation of the political,
social, economic, cultural, and ideological forces that have influenced
any public issue.
BRACKETING DIFFERENCE

It is easy to assume that a writer’s identity can be put aside or “bracketed”
in public discursive situations. The assumption goes that such writing, if
done clearly and logically, frees the individual of his or her particular ethnic, gender, or class distinctions. Public writing, when examined as a category, is often assumed to be evaluated for its merits alone, disengaged
and independent from the features and characteristics of its author.
Furthermore, the audience for public writing is often assumed to be neutral, open-minded individuals who evaluate public discourse entirely on
the merits of its argument. If writers would only express themselves with
complete clarity and grammatical and mechanical correctness, some
might argue, their positions would be accepted magnanimously, or at
least evaluated honestly. The social inequalities that exist in the rest of
society are often assumed to be set aside in the arenas of public discourse.
In other words, it might be assumed that the differences and inequalities
between the author of a piece of public writing and his or her audience
can be overlooked. In addition, it is often supposed that all individuals—
regardless of their race, class, gender, sexual inclination, or other distinguishing features—are as capable and authorized to produce public
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writing as anyone else. In short, the avenues of public discourse are often
presumed to be open and accessible to all, free of any of the social
inequalities that pervade other discursive situations.
Once again, it is useful to examine the discussions of the public
sphere in social and cultural theory in order to most effectively theorize
this aspect of public writing. Habermas’s account of the bourgeois public sphere, which stresses the claim of open access to all, runs parallel
with the assumptions outlined above. For Habermas, the idea of open
access and participatory parity is one of the central aspects of public discourse. Habermas’s interpretation of the bourgeois public sphere posits
it to have been an arena where individuals would set aside “such characteristics as differences in birth and fortune and speak to one another
as if they were social and economic peers” (Fraser, Rethinking 118). That
is, Habermas assumed that a “social leveling” of all participants was an
integral part of the liberal public sphere in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe. He argues that “they preserved a kind of
social intercourse that, far from presupposing the equality of status, disregarded status altogether. The tendency replaced the celebration of
rank with a tact befitting equals” (Structural 36).
Nancy Fraser questions the assumption that it is possible for interlocutors in any public debate to actually bracket status differentials and
to participate in discourse as if all of the members of a public sphere
were social equals. She suggests that when analyzing the bourgeois public sphere, or any other public sphere for that matter, it has been impossible to effectively bracket social differences among interlocutors.
But were they [the differences between interlocutors] really effectively bracketed? The revisionist historiography suggests that they were not. Rather, discursive interaction within the bourgeois public sphere was governed by protocols of style and decorum that were themselves correlates and markers of
status inequality. These functioned informally to marginalize women and
members of the plebeian classes and to prevent them from participating as
peers. (“Rethinking” 119)

In this respect, Fraser is talking about informal impediments to participatory parity that can persist even after everyone is formally and legally licensed to participate. Certainly, there are no legal restrictions on public writing in the United States today, regardless of the circumstances.
Such restrictions are not allowable by law. This fact has, unfortunately,
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created a situation that makes public discourse appear to be equally open
to all, existing in arenas that seem to have overcome all social exclusions
and marginalizations. However, public discourse is influenced by forces
that cannot be easily disposed of through legislation. Fraser notes a number of these informal impediments to participatory parity in public discourse. She cites, for example, a familiar contemporary example drawn
from feminist research. It has been documented that in mixed-sex deliberations, men tend to interrupt women more than women interrupt
men, men also tend to speak more than women, and women’s interventions are more often ignored or not responded to than men’s.
Deliberation and the appearance of participatory parity can serve as a
mask for domination. These feminist insights into the ways that discourse
is used to mask domination and imbalances of power can be applied to
other kinds of unequal relations, like those based on class or ethnicity.
They alert us to the ways in which “social inequalities can infect deliberation, even in the absence of any formal exclusions” (Fraser,
“Rethinking” 119). In this respect, the bracketing of differences and
social inequalities in public discourse cannot actually be enacted, and
assuming that it can actually works to the advantage of dominant groups
in a public sphere and to the disadvantage of subordinates. In most cases,
it would be more appropriate to unbracket these inequalities by foregrounding and thematizing them. Doing this would help to eliminate
some of the more pernicious uses of discourse in public deliberation.
The assumption that public writing occurs in an arena that can overlook,
bracket, or disregard social and cultural differences is counterfactual.
There is no reason to think that these conversational dynamics are
somehow miraculously absent from the particular discursive situation of
public writing. Since public discourse often brings together individuals
from radically different perspectives and positions, and since these individuals often have no prior bonds or other incentives that would urge
them to work toward participatory parity, it stands to reason that these
status differentials are perhaps even more apparent and significant in
public settings. For communicative situations such as public writing,
gender-specific power differences cannot be disregarded. In fact, any
course or assignment focusing on public writing must recognize the
degree to which a number of other social forces—among them race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, age, occupation, class—influence the idealized statusfree public spheres envisioned by some writing instructors.
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Compositionists should recognize that social differences shape public
writing in significant ways. We also need to continue efforts to establish
new theories of public writing that acknowledge differences in thinking
and writing. At the same time, we need to assure that new theories identify the origins of many of these differences as ideologically constructed.
For instance, new theories should acknowledge that the label “difference” can be used to reinforce and justify marginal or dominant status.
In composition courses focusing on public writing, it is important
that instructors highlight for students the degree to which their social
status and differences from others will affect how their writing is evaluated. Instructors will also need to examine with their students how differences themselves are often labels that are used to justify the dominance or subordination of certain classes or groups in public settings.
Students will need to question whether it is possible, even in principle,
for individuals to deliberate through public discourse as if they were
social peers. If public discourse is situated in a larger societal context
that is marked by structural relations of dominance and subordination—and students will often be the first to note these societal differences—it must follow that public writing will not be evaluated free of
these systemic factors. In addition, it is also important to enable student
writers to examine the ways that they themselves often evaluate the public discourse of others in biased and unproductive ways. Students need
to understand that social inequalities are very real and significant factors
affecting the reception and production of public writing. Such a recognition allows them to become more discerning users of the discourse
they consume and produce. One task of an effective public-writing
assignment is to render visible the ways that societal inequality infects
formally inclusive existing public spheres and taints discursive interaction within them.
M U LT I P L E S P H E R E S

Perhaps one reason why the letter to the editor is such a common public-writing assignment is that its forum—the local newspaper—appears
to be the primary site available for students to reach a wide audience of
diverse individuals who might be interested in what they have to say. It
seems natural to think that student public discourse is only worthwhile
if it reaches a large segment of the population that is able to act upon it
in some way. In other words, students and teachers often assume that
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public writing must address the “general public,” and the term public is
often taken to encompass all members of a society, or at least a representative microcosm of them. However, it is incorrect to assume that
newspapers are the only significant medium for reaching others
through public writing, just as it is incorrect to assume that public writing must reach large segments of the population in order to be useful
and constructive. Habermas, Negt, Kluge, and Fraser provide useful
explanations as to why these assumptions are faulty and how we might
more productively envision the full scope of public writing.
The belief that a large audience is mandatory for public writing, and
that this audience must represent all or many individuals in a society,
runs parallel to Habermas’s conceptions of the public sphere.
Habermas stresses the singularity of the bourgeois conception of the
public sphere, its claim to be the public arena, in the singular, asserting
that the bourgeois in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe conceived of “the public sphere as something properly theirs” (Structural
24). On the whole, Habermas agrees with this bourgeois conception, as
he casts “the emergence of additional publics as a late development signaling fragmentation and decline” (Fraser, “Rethinking” 122). That is,
Habermas seems to suggest that any departure from this conception of
a singular public sphere is a departure from the ideal. Like the conceptions of public writing I’ve just mentioned, Habermas’s view is based
upon an underlying assumption: that confining public discourse to a single, overarching public sphere is a desirable and positive move, whereas
the proliferation of discourse in a multiplicity of public spaces represents a departure from, rather than an advance toward, democracy.
In contrast to Habermas, Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge insist on
the need to understand postbourgeois public formations in terms other
than those of disintegration and decline. In Public Sphere and Experience,
they assert that no singular form of the public did or ever could exist.
They understand public discourse as existing in numerous sites that
have “no homogenous substance whatsoever” (13). In their attempt to
debunk the myth of a single, overarching public sphere, Negt and Kluge
suggest that there are at least two other significant arenas of public discourse: the “public sphere of production,” which is more directly rooted
in spheres of capitalism, such as factory communities and labor unions,
and the “proletarian public sphere,” which is “substantively meshed with
the history of the emancipation of the working class” (xliv). Moreover,
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Negt and Kluge make the point that these other sites for public discourse cannot be viewed in isolation from one another; these public
spheres must be seen as “mutually imbricated,” overlapping, cohabitational, and often contradictory. In contrast to the conception that there
must be one singular site of public discourse, and that it must embrace
a diverse public, Negt and Kluge suggest that there are multiple arenas
for public discourse, and these might best serve the needs of particular
groups rather than a general public.
Nancy Fraser’s analysis of this misconception is equally compelling.
Counter to Habermas’s confidence in an all-encompassing site for public discourse that is comprised of a cross-section of society, Fraser contends that in stratified societies, “arrangements that accommodate contestation among a plurality of competing publics better promote the
ideal of participatory parity than does a single, comprehensive, overarching public” (“Rethinking” 122). As I explained earlier, she suggests
that in societies whose basic structure generates unequal social groups
in relations of dominance and subordination (as is the case in the
United States), full parity of participation in public discourse is not feasible. Despite the fact that all members of a society may be allowed to participate in public discourse, it is impossible to insulate special discursive
arenas from the effects of societal inequality. This being the case, she
goes on to assert that the disadvantages marginalized groups face are
only exacerbated where there is just one single arena for public discourse. If there were only one site for public discourse, members of subordinate groups would have no arenas for deliberation among themselves about their needs, objectives, and strategies. They would have no
“venues in which to undertake communicative processes that were not,
as it were, under the supervision of dominant groups” (123). In other
words, if there were only a single public sphere, subaltern groups would
have no discursive spaces in which to deliberate free of oppression.
Fraser suggests that it is advantageous for subordinated groups to
constitute alternative sites of public discourse—what she calls subaltern
counterpublics. She envisions these sites as “parallel discursive arenas
where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate
counterdiscourses to formulate oppositional interpretations of their
identities, interests, and needs” (123). Perhaps the most striking example of a subaltern counterpublic in contemporary history is the latetwentieth-century U.S. feminist subaltern counterpublic, with its diverse
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array of journals, bookstores, publishing companies, film and video distribution networks, lecture series, research centers, academic programs,
conferences, conventions, festivals, and local meeting places (123).
While subaltern counterpublics are not always inherently democratic or
progressive, they do emerge in response to exclusions and omissions
within dominant publics, and, as such, they help expand discursive
space. In general, the proliferation of subaltern counterpublics means a
widening of discursive contestation, and “that is a good thing in stratified societies” (124). Subaltern counterpublics can serve at least two
functions. On the one hand, they function as spaces where oppressed
others can withdraw, regroup, and heal; on the other hand, they function as “training grounds” and bases for the development of discourse or
action that might agitate or disrupt wider publics.
Several scholars in composition have noted the usefulness of employing alternative or subaltern arenas for public writing. Susan Wells argues
that compositionists “need to build, or take part in building, such a public sphere that . . . cannot, in our society, be unitary” (“Rogue Cops” 326)
She goes on to suggest that given the intractable fragmentation of modern society, the representations of the public we offer students “beyond
the classroom will be provisional; we will look for alternate publics and
counter publics” (335). Wells offers a number of possible alternative
publics that students might engage with through public-writing assignments that pair writing classes at different institutions, involve the collection of oral histories, and bring together computer-networked classes. Similarly, Irene Ward explores the potential for the Internet to
become an alternative public sphere. While she rightly addresses the
many problems with employing the Internet for public writing, she suggests at the same time that “some forms of the Internet . . . can potentially function in ways that print media functioned in the eighteenth
century by delivering information, points of view, and extended argument to a growing sector of the public” (375).
Obviously, public writing need not be limited to a single discursive
arena like the readership of a newspaper. Writing teachers should help
students discover the various counterpublics where their public writing
might have a receptive audience and, consequently, might result in significant outcomes. Public discourse is often difficult to generate and
even more difficult to disseminate to large audiences—particularly
when students have had little or no prior contact with these audiences.
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Compositionists should work to create spaces for public writing if they
don’t exist or aren’t readily entered by students. Public writing exists in
a wide array of locations. Often, students feel most comfortable joining
in conversation in Internet chat rooms, volunteer organizations, community outreach programs, or other smaller venues that target more
specific issues and strive for and generate significant local results. Rather
than feeling that they are just insignificant individuals who are unable to
bring about sweeping changes—as is usually the case with letters to a
newspaper with a wide circulation—students working with smaller, more
specific groups often see tangible results from their public discourse.
Enabling students to connect with counterpublics comprised of likeminded individuals is an important component of a successful publicwriting assignment or course. In specific counterpublics, students often
find that they can generate effective public discourse in a climate that is
supportive and nurturing, which prepares them to enter larger public
debates in the future. Also, these counterpublics allow them to see that
they don’t necessarily stand alone in their views and opinions; they learn
from others with similar experiences and perspectives and often come
away from such interactions with more complex and sophisticated views
on public topics. Entering into discourse with specific counterpublics is
often the most effective way for students to enter public space, and this
move can encourage students to feel that public discourse is worth pursuing in the future.
OF COMMON CONCERN

An additional significant misconception of public writing must be
debunked if we are to theorize and teach public writing more competently and productively: the misunderstanding that public writing must
be confined to matters of “common concern” to all of the members in a
society. Similar to the last misconception that I addressed, those who
support this fallacy assume that the topic of public discourse must affect
all (or at least many) members of society. By definition, such thinking
limits public writing to public issues in general, to the exclusion of
matters of specific or particular interest. This limitation reflects dualistic
thinking that juxtaposes “public” with its apparent opposite, “private.” It
is easy to see how discursive topics might be placed into either of these
two categories. If a topic does not seem to affect a large segment of the
public, it is easily relegated to the realm of the private, and as such it is
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not seen as an appropriate topic for public writing. Students who choose
to write about issues that do not appear to concern large segments of the
population might be chastised for myopic thinking and encouraged to
address topics that have wider implications and audiences. However, as
I shall show, the myth that matters must be of “common concern” to be
considered viable topics for public writing is based upon an ideologically interested notion of what counts as public matter.
Habermas envisions the bourgeois public sphere as a discursive arena
in which private persons deliberate about public matters. He argues that
discussion within this public sphere is grounded on the idea that areas
that had previously been off-limits were to be problematized and questioned. Historically, public discourse first took the form of bourgeois discussions of the merits of art, music, and literature—subjects that had
previously been confined to aristocrats and noblemen. Gradually, the
commodification of cultural products made them more accessible to the
public, taking them out of the control of the church and state.
Habermas writes:
[D]iscussion within such a public presupposed the problematization of areas
that until then had not been questioned. The domain of “common concern”
which was the object of public critical attention remained a preserve in which
church and state authorities had the monopoly of interpretation not just
from the pulpit but in philosophy, literature, and art, even at a time when, for
specific social categories, the development of capitalism already demanded a
behavior whose rational orientation required ever more information.
(Structural 36)

Over time, public discussions of common concerns came to include
not just art, literature, and philosophy, but economics and politics as well.
In short, Habermas suggests that while the subjects of public discourse
were quite diverse, they fulfilled an important criteria: they dealt with
matters of common concern to all or nearly all members of a society.
Habermas limits his conception of the public sphere to sites where
private persons deliberate about “public issues,” and he suggests that the
appearance of private issues and interests is always undesirable.
However, this conception fails to recognize that the term public is
ambiguous and open to interpretation. Fraser argues that there are several usages of the term beyond the sense of “of concern to everyone.”
She suggests that only participants can decide what is of common concern,
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and there is no guarantee that all of them will agree. Fraser suggests that
the term public is “ambiguous between what objectively affects or has an
impact on everyone as seen from an outsider’s perspective, and what is
recognized as a matter of common concern by participants”
(“Rethinking” 128–29). Only participants can decide what is of common
concern to them. However, there is no guarantee that they will all agree,
and what will actually count as a matter of common concern will be
decided through discursive contestation. Any consensus reached
through such contestation will have been achieved “through deliberative processes tainted by the effects of dominance and subordination”
(131). In other words, those who are in power get to decide what is a
public issue and what is not.
Fraser asserts that the terms public and private are not simply straightforward designations of societal spheres; they are “cultural classifications and rhetorical labels” (131). As such, they function ideologically to
delimit the boundaries of public discourse to the disadvantage of subordinate groups and individuals. For example, the issue of domestic violence was, until quite recently, considered to be a private matter between
what was assumed to be a fairly small number of heterosexual couples.
Feminists were in the minority in thinking that “domestic violence
against women was a matter of common concern and thus a legitimate
topic of public discourse” (Fraser, “Rethinking” 129). The feminist
counterpublic, however, was instrumental in disseminating a view of
domestic violence as a widespread systemic feature of male-dominated
societies. Only through their sustained discursive contestation were they
able to make it a matter of common concern.
A useful classroom heuristic is to ask students to talk about which
issues are labeled “public” and which become “private.” Such conversations often reveal the ideological mystification of these two categories.
Matters that have heretofore been labeled private—such as sexual orientation, spousal and acquaintance abuse, and other matters of domestic or personal life—become important subjects for student writing.
Students should feel free to address all of the issues that affect their
lives—not just those that have been delegated “of common concern.” In
general, composition needs to take a more critical look at what we have
determined are matters of public or private interest, and we must be
willing to address issues that are often disturbing and unpleasant. We
might begin by considering how the notions of public and private can
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be vehicles through which race, class, and gender disadvantages operate
subtextually and informally, even after formal restrictions have been
removed.
PUBLIC WRITING, DECISION MAKING, AND ACTION

There is one final assumption about public writing that I would like to
address: that its only purpose is to sway public opinion and that it does
not encompass actual decision making and action. If we employ newspapers as the primary venue for public-writing assignments, we imply
that student discourse can rarely lead to substantial changes in public
policy and can at best only convince others to “think differently.” This
presumption is especially pernicious because it forecloses real results
from student writing and often turns public-writing assignments into
pointless and futile exercises. While I’m not suggesting that public writing must always lead to decision making, I do believe that in certain circumstances it can. Public writing can form opinions and translate them
into authoritative decisions, but only if we reconsider the presumption
that public discourse is necessarily separated from legislative action.
Interestingly, Habermas suggests that a fundamental aspect of a functioning democratic public sphere is the sharp separation between civil
society (the public) and the state (the government). He stops short of
recognizing the power manifested in the eighteenth-century bourgeois
public sphere, in particular, and suggests that there was no immediate
implementation of the opinions produced through this sphere’s deliberations. He notes that the bourgeois public “readied themselves to compel public authority” (Structural 27). This definition delineates the public sphere not as a site for the compulsion itself, but only for readying
oneself to compel. Even that compulsion, had it been realized, was only
a compulsion for the authorities to engage in further dialogue.
Habermas suggests that members of the bourgeois public were not (and
could not be) state officials, and their participation in the public sphere
was not undertaken in any official capacity. As Fraser notes, Habermas’s
conception of public discourse does not “eventuate in binding, sovereign
decisions authorizing the use of state power; on the contrary, it eventuates in public opinion” (“Rethinking” 133). Seen from this perspective,
the public sphere is the polar opposite of the state; it is the informal
body of discursive opinion that can serve as a “counterweight” to the
state. Formal decisions on public issues cannot be made in the

Public Writing and Rhetoric

247

Habermasian public sphere, because its scope is limited to conjecture,
speculation, and debate about public matters. It is precisely this aspect
of the public sphere that confers an aura of legitimacy, impartiality, and
independence on the “public opinion” formed within it. Habermas’s
conception of the public sphere in effect implies that a sharp separation
between civil society and the state is always desirable.
Fraser disagrees with this limited conception of the public sphere,
arguing that the force of public opinion is strengthened, not weakened,
when a body representing it is empowered to translate opinion into
authoritative decisions. For example, self-governing institutions such as
child-care centers, self-managed workplaces, or residential communities
can be arenas of both opinion formation and decision making. She suggests that in these strong publics, whose discourse encompasses both
deliberation and action, the “force of public opinion is strengthened
when a body representing it is empowered to translate such ‘opinion’
into authoritative decisions” (Rethinking 134–35). The formation of
these strong publics would be “tantamount to constituting sites of direct
or quasi-direct democracy, wherein all those engaged in a collective
undertaking would participate in deliberations to determine its design
and operation” (135). While these internal public spheres would still be
accountable to a larger public in many respects, their mere existence is
a step toward a more egalitarian society, since they disseminate authority and power to a greater number of publics and individuals.
Students’ public writing can have significant, tangible, immediate
results if it is directed toward publics where both debate and decision
making are central goals. It is both useful and important to help students
locate strong publics where their discourse can lead to action. Asking students to write in spheres where discourse does not often lead to direct
action, such as the local newspaper, is often pointless and futile. There are
many arenas where student discourse can lead to palpable changes for
them and others, and students may very well be members of these publics
already. Students are often involved and engaged in student governments,
campus organizations, resident-life committees, and workplace unions
before they enroll in composition courses, and these and others are certainly sites where their discourse can have substantial effects. We should
encourage students to write for publics where their discourse can have
real significance, and we should help them to develop the rhetorical skills
they will need to sway opinion and bring about change.
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I have highlighted here just a few parallels between conversations
about the public sphere in social and cultural theory and the more
recent conversations of composition scholars about public writing.
There is much more to be learned about public spheres and public discourse by looking outside of our own discipline. By drawing upon
insights from cultural and social theory, we might develop more specific theoretical and pedagogical approaches to public writing. As a result,
we should become more adept at facilitating critical public discourse in
the writing courses that we teach.
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